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Abstract 
Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides and volcanic activities has 
had devastating effects on human life. Risk is the probability of harmful consequences 
from the interaction of hazards and vulnerable conditions. With increasing numbers of 
people living in crowded cities and other vulnerable areas, it is more important than ever 
to advance our understanding of natural disasters and the ways in which humans respond 
to them. My interdisciplinary study reflected in my thesis includes integrated research on 
the risk assessment methods for natural hazards with focus on earthquake disasters. 
This thesis address firstly the development of a scaled risk assessment framework, 
comparative assessment of natural hazard losses, including respective case studies and 
global overview of natural hazard risk, and secondly a comparative risk assessment of 
geological disasters to elaborate the major disastrous hazards for global population. 
Furthermore, I evaluate the effect of past events in form of the number of losses with 
respect to the exposed population on the proneness of people to the disaster. I summarize 
acceptable risk criteria and the necessity of having a normalized framework for societal 
risk assessment. I evaluate the natural hazard risk assessment and acceptable risk criteria 
of 32 European countries. I also introduce the concept of resistance in both risk equation 
and in FN-curves. Resistance is the societal resilience of a society to the occurrence of a 
natural disaster. Moreover, using components of FN-curves (slopes and intercepts) for 
risk assessment of geological disasters based on real data, I showed that the world has 
been more at risk of earthquakes than tsunamis, volcanic activities and landslides since 
1600. Also. based on the earthquake disasters data (1973-2010), I evaluated the temporal 
trend of hazard, risk, exposure and resistance of the world towards earthquake disasters. 
Our results does not provide any evidence of increase or decrease in the temporal trend of 
fatality rate and earthquake resistance while there is a significant decrease in the crude 
death rate. Finally, we evaluated the reliability of earthquake disaster system during 
1950-2012 using probability of more than 1000 fatalities as probability of failure. Our 
yearly estimate of reliability at the beginning of each mission year shows that the avreage 
reliability of earthquake disaster system is very low (~0.3) and it is decreasing over time, 
too. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the new perspectives of the global 
risk assessment of natural disasters 
Due to increasing numbers of people living in crowded cities (Bilham, 2009), it is more 
important than ever to advance our understanding of natural hazards and the ways in 
which humans respond to them. Recent typhoon in the Philippines  (2013) (aka Haiyan 
and Filipino disaster) has been an example of an extreme natural hazard that occurred in a 
region which was 1) highly populated, 2) vulnerable to atmospheric hazards, and 3) 
poorly responsive to disasters. An extreme typhoon such as the recent one could cause 
more than 6,000 fatalities (CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/philippines-
typhoon-haiyan/) and make many homeless.  
Natural disasters are rare events that have been sources of devastation for human 
populations and economies. Woo  (1999) introduced and analyzed different aspects of 
natural catastrophes/disasters, their underlying mathematics, corresponding risk and the 
available decision-making processes. Natural disasters/catastrophes are thought to be rare 
events either based on their long return intervals, or on their unpredictability. These 
events are called black swans (Taleb, 2007) if they have long return periods, or dragon 
kings (Sornette, 2009) if they are unpredictable. Black swans are high magnitude events 
that occur with very low frequencies which makes them indistinguishable from smaller 
events in a power-law distribution (a power-law distribution forms a straight line with a 
negative slope on a log-log plot, y=ax-b), therefore, since they share the same properties 
(except their sizes). On the other hand, dragon kings are the outliers of a power-law 
distribution which makes them distinguishable from the smaller events. Sornette (2009) 
suggests that these outliers can be predictable by applying small changes to their 
distribution function. 
In this thesis, I consider natural disasters as rare events in all my assessments which 
include both black swans (very low frequency events which locate at the tail of the 
power-law distribution) and dragon kings (outliers/peaks in the tail of the power-law 
distribution). Looking at the frequency-size distribution of various natural hazards, Sachs 
et al. (2012) showed that the global frequency-magnitude of earthquakes and volcanic 
eruptions exhibit power-law behavior for small sizes but have roll over for large events. 
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However, in the data for landslides neither roll over nor dragon-king behavior is 
observed. Considering these facts, I analyze the risk of both types of events and provide a 
unified framework for risk assessment of natural disasters.   
To explain the terms black swans and dragon kings on a frequency-magnitude curve 
generated from a set of data that is best fitted to a (fat-tailed) power-law distribution, 
black swans are the rare (high magnitude and low frequency) events located at the tail of 
the curve and dragon kings, are the events that are the outliers located in the high 
magnitude area of the curve while holding frequencies that are much different from the 
frequency that the power-law curve suggests. Sornette (2009) well illustrated the 
existence of dragon-kings in six different examples one of which is the distribution of 
earthquake energies. Fig. 1.1 which is reproduced from Fig. 22 of Sornette (2009) shows 
the magnitude frequency distribution of the ruptures in San Andreas fault in California 
where dragon-kings are associated with the clusters located above the extrapolation of the 
Gutenberg-Richter distribution from smaller events.  
 
Figure 1.1: frequency-magnitude of earthquakes in San Andreas fault. Clustered events above from the 
power-law fit (Gutenberg-Richter distribution) are called dragon kings (reproduced from Sornette (2009), 
Fig. 22). 
In regards to the predictability of rare events, Cavalcante et al. (2013) used two coupled 
chaotic oscillators in an electric circuit in a synchronized state which then leads to the 
desynchronized state through a bubbling phase (aka the burst mechanism), where a 
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bubble corresponds to a large temporary digression from the state of the system away 
from a nominal value. The behavior of this system reveals an approximate power-law 
distribution for small and intermediate size events but a noticeable peak for large events 
(dragon-kings). The peaks are associated with the bubbling phenomenon. 
Cavalcante et al. (2013) proposed that the dragon-king events can be controlled and 
suppressed through the bubbling phase. The mechanism is through applying small 
feedback perturbations to the large bubblings of the system while small bubblings are 
allowed to proceed, therefore, large bubblings are suppressed. Thus, this way, by 
understanding the burst mechanism of certain disasters, large dragon-king events may be 
able to be avoided by producing small, wise system perturbations.  
We believe that while considering the lack of knowledge in black swans is essential for 
analyzing the risk of natural disasters, looking at characteristics and trends in the 
behavior of natural disaster data helps prediction and reducing of risk. Thus, we support 
the dragon-king approach for natural disasters, their risk assessment and risk reduction 
which considers them as events that can be predicted and controlled, rather than 
uncontrolled “acts of God”. 
Risk has various definitions one of which is the probability of harmful consequences 
from the interaction of hazards and associated vulnerability conditions (UNDP, 2004; 
HSE, 2001). The definition of risk can be summarized in an equation, 
Risk=Hazard×Vulnerability(×Exposure) (Birkmann, 2006), in which hazard is defined as 
a risk source event where consequences relate to harm (Aven, 2011) and Vulnerability 
and Exposure are defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives at the occurrence of 
an event, and the presence of an object being subject to an event or risk source, 
respectively (Aven, 2011). The effect of hazard on risk has been studied in depth in the 
literature (e.g., Marfai and Njagih (2004) on floods, McCall et al. (1992) on earthquakes 
and Woo (1999) on most of natural hazards). On the effect of exposure on risk, Bilham 
(2009) compared the number of fatalities due to earthquakes to the global population. 
However, the effect of vulnerability on risk has been a source of debate. 
There are various definitions in the literature for vulnerability (Cutter, 1996). One 
unifying definition based on Watts and Bohle (1993) indicates that vulnerability is a 
multidimensional variable integrating the environmental, social, economic and political 
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situations of people in a society in the case of potential harm. In case of natural hazards, 
vulnerability is defined as the degree of loss resulting from the occurrence of a natural 
disaster (Marfai and Njagih, 2004). One can conclude that vulnerability provides a 
measure of the resistance of the elements at risk to the impact of a natural hazard (Blong, 
2009). Some current natural hazard vulnerability indicators include development 
measures, such as buildings’ resistance to earthquake ground-shaking (Blong, 2009).  
In terms of current vulnerability analyses, Mustafa et al. (2011) claim that 
vulnerability analysis has deepened our understanding of the behavior and origin of 
damage due to extreme events. However, policy makers and researchers do not agree on 
their vulnerability frameworks and mainly seek different goals. The reasons for the 
discrepancies between academic and policy-makers vulnerability analyses have been 
summarized by Mustafa et al. (2011), one of which is the different concerns of 
vulnerability analysts (e.g., a fundamental approach) and policy makers (e.g., a practical 
approach). Another underlying difference, according to Mustafa et al. (2011), is that 
policy makers are seeking a quantitative input for their policy processes, while 
vulnerability analysts want mainly qualitative data (e.g., vulnerability assessment of 
hunger and famine by Watts and Bohle (1993)). However, in the field of engineering, 
there are in-depth quantitative measures of vulnerability (e.g., Li et al., 2012). These 
measures, however, are mainly based on detailed specifications of the related system, and 
therefore, are only applicable in special conditions. Furthermore, most of vulnerability 
assessments are locally valid. We are looking for a global assessment since our concern is 
vulnerability to natural disasters. 
“Earthquakes don’t kill, buildings do” (Musson, 2012). Musson (2012) argues that 
there is no fully resistant building. However, in the best-case scenario, the damage is 
minimal and no fatality occurs. This argument can also be applicable to the effect of 
natural disasters on the countries, cities, or societies. There is no perfect resistance 
towards natural disasters, but the damage can become minimal by building well-equipped 
structures and well-prepared societies. Using this terminology (resistance), instead of 
vulnerability, can bring a positive notion to the aspect of risk assessment, when the 
question is how societies can withstand an occurrence of natural disasters, i.e., how does 
the structure of the region resists. As part of this thesis, I illustrate the concept of 
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resistance towards natural disasters from various perspectives (Chapter 3). I also 
investigate the trend of global resistance towards earthquake disasters (Chapter 5). 
Why are we looking at global assessment of resistance and risk of natural disasters, 
when most events are local?  Local events sometimes have non-local strong effects on 
each other (e.g., a correlation between hydrocarbon reservoir properties and induced 
seismicity in the Netherlands (Eijs et al., 2006)). Furthermore, the actions taken for risk 
reduction on a local scale (e.g., development of building codes to improve earthquake 
resistance) do not guarantee the reduction of risk on a global scale. Therefore, we need to 
have a figure of merit in order to be able to evaluate our developments in the world. A 
quantitative, integrative and frame-independent measure is vital for such a unified 
approach.  
FN-curves have been a major tool of societal risk assessment in health studies, 
human-caused (industrial) accidents and natural hazard events for many years. In this 
approach, F is the frequency of death cumulatively plotted versus the number of fatalities 
(N) due to an event. Associated best-fit to the data plotted on an FN-curve is a power-law 
distribution. We believe that FN-curves can provide a frame-independent scheme for risk 
assessment from integrated historical data of natural disaster losses. The data integration 
brings together social and physical science information in ways useful for decision-
making and the definition of acceptable risk criteria based on historical background 
losses for a region. 
As debates exist about all aspects of vulnerability and risk, any quantification can 
help policy makers and authorities take action towards natural hazard global risk 
reduction. The main goal of this thesis is to advance one step forward in quantification of 
global vulnerability and risk assessment measures.  
This study addresses five main objectives. The first objective is to pursue an 
integrated research that combines social and physical dimensions of hazards and provides 
linkages to decision-making policies. The second objective of my thesis is to better 
understand and quantify the concept of resistance in risk assessment of natural disasters. 
The third objective is to quantitatively analyze geological disasters and their risk to 
provide better understanding of the contributions of hazard, vulnerability (1/Resistance) 
and exposure to risk. The fourth objective is to investigate the behavior of the global 
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societal resistance to earthquake disasters. The fifth objective of this thesis is to improve 
acceptable risk criteria for natural disaster risk assessment by investigating the 
deficiencies and misinterpretations in other approaches and by using effective tools 
borrowed from engineering (e.g., reliability assessment) to define a better criteria for a 
global risk assessment of natural hazards.  
1.1  Chapter objectives 
Each chapter is written as a stand-alone paper that covers a specific aspect of the thesis 
objectives. The format means that a chapter may be read on its own and that each chapter 
can contain new science with its own results and conclusions. However, the format also 
necessarily results in repetition of some fundamental concepts and descriptions of data, 
definitions or study areas. To this end, the reader’s indulgence is requested. Each chapter 
is outlined below. 
1.1.1  Review of FN-curves and their implications for natural hazard 
risk assessment  
This chapter, reviews the background of FN-curves draw from works in the literature 
such as Farmer (1967), Cox and Baybutt (1982), Hirst (1998), Skjong and Eknes (2002), 
and Horn et al. (2008) and their usage in risk assessment in literature such as Hagon 
(1984), Vrijling et al. (1995), and Jonkman et al. (2003). It also reviews the challenges of 
risk neutral, aversion and proneness. The mathematics of and the arguments that Griffiths 
(1981) and Evans and Verlander (1998) pose on the functionality of FN-curves are also 
studied. Societal risk assessment is compared with individual risk assessment, and the 
acceptable risk criteria based on FN-curves, used in some countries (Trbojevic, 2005), is 
summarized and analyzed. We evaluate the application of FN-curves to natural disaster 
risk assessment particularly the usage of industrial risk criteria. We also introduce the 
need for normalization of FN-curves and the normalization methods suggested by others 
(Prugh, 1992; Nishenko and Barton, 1995; Hungr and Wong, 2007; Horn et al., 2008). 
We compare the risk of natural hazards in Europe with the industrial risk assessment 
criteria in some European countries as a case study. 
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1.1.2  Concept of resistance in natural disaster risk assessment with an 
earthquake example (Haiti 2010) 
We introduce the concept of resistance in this chapter from two perspectives: 1) from 
modification of risk equation (Risk=Hazard×(1/Resistance)×Exp.Pop) and 2) from the 
slope of the FN-curves. We introduce two types of resistance, Rc and Re, country-specific 
and event-specific resistance, respectively in order to be able to compare the resistance 
that countries would have in case of occurrence of a geological hazard to prevent a 
geological disaster. We compare the resistance of Haiti, Iran, and Japan both at the 
country level and at the events of Haiti (2010), Bam (2003), and Kobe (1995). We also 
use seismic hazard assessment as well as destruction image processing to evaluate the 
resistance of the commune of Port au Prince to the 2010 Haiti earthquake at the gridded 
level. 
1.1.4  Magnitude and Frequency of Geological disasters 
In this chapter, we review and summarize the magnitude scales for geological hazards 
(earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic activities and landslides) proposed in the literature (e.g., 
Gutenberg and Richter, 1942 and 1956; Scheidegger, 1975; Abe, 1989; Woo, 1999; 
Bardet et al., 2003; Kanamori and Brodsky, 2004; Self, 2006; McGuire, 2006). We 
introduce a new unified scale for magnitude of geological hazards based on their energy 
release (J). We modify some methodologies introduced in the literature to estimate the 
source energy of some of the geological hazards which caused 1,000 fatalities (disaster) 
and greater for which enough technical information recorded during (1600-2012). Then, 
we calculate the energy efficiency of the geological hazards for causing disasters 
(death/energy, D/J). We also compare the global risk of geological disasters with each 
other using FN-curve framework. We use the slope and intercept of FN-curves as 
indicators (one expressing resistance and one expressing the annual frequency of 1,000 
fatalities and more, respectively) of risk and introduce a new risk factor.  
1.1.5  Has global societal earthquake resistance improved since 1973?  
In this chapter, based on a simple risk-based conceptual model, we introduce the concept 
of “global societal earthquake resistance". In our proposed approach, there are three main 
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determinants of global societal earthquake resistance: the hazard (energy release of 
earthquakes with M≥5.5), the number of fatalities and the exposed population. 
Furthermore, we compare the annual ratio of earthquake casualties to exposed population 
(at 5-year pentade level), with the total number of deaths per year per 1000 people (crude 
death rate), excluding earthquake (and other) natural disaster) deaths. We further estimate 
the trend of log(resistance) during the period of 1973-2010. 
1.1.6  Risk and reliability in a natural disaster system 
This chapter compares the risk assessment methods in natural and industrial events. We 
examine the application of industrial risk assessment criteria to introduce a unified 
framework for risk assessment of natural hazards. We estimate the probability of failure 
of earthquake disaster system Pf (more than 1000 fatalities is considered as failure in a 
natural disaster system), to compare the Pf−N  curve of earthquake disasters with 
industrial accidents. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of reliability to natural 
disaster risk assessment based on failure rate of the system. We also investigate the 
yearly trend of reliability in the global earthquake disaster system (1950-2012) at the 
beginning of each yea
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Chapter 2 FN-Curves and their implications for natural hazard risk 
assessment 
2.1  Introduction 
As stated by Woo (1999) (Pg. 1), “a natural catastrophe is a tragedy played on the Earth’s stage, 
brought about by events which are today called as the acts of God”. These acts of God are (in 
fact) natural hazards, defined as natural events that potentially can cause harmful consequences 
to human life. Natural hazards become natural catastrophes when large numbers of people or 
economic assets are damaged or destroyed during a natural event. Catastrophes have two sets of 
causes. The first set is the characteristics of the natural hazards themselves, including floods, 
droughts, hurricanes, cyclones, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, landslides, snow storms and 
meteorites. The second set comprises the vulnerabilities of elements at risk; populations, 
infrastructure, and economic activities, that make them more (or less) susceptible to being 
harmed or damaged by a hazard event (Wisner and Luce, 1993). “Man may be powerless to stop 
catastrophic events” (Woo (1999), Pg.1), but creative ways have been adopted to reduce the 
losses. First step is to understand the extent of the risk that natural hazards impose to the human 
society based on past events. 
Risk can be defined (among many definitions) as the probability of harmful consequences or 
expected losses (deaths, injuries, loss of property and livelihood, economic activity disruption, or 
environment damage) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and 
vulnerable conditions (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, UNISDR 
(2009)). Conventionally, risk is expressed by the notation 
Risk=Hazard×Vulnerability(×Exposure) (Birkmann, 2006). Risk assessment/analysis is defined 
as "A process to determine the nature and extent of risk by analyzing potential hazards and 
evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could pose a potential threat or harm to 
people, property, livelihoods, and the environment on which they depend" (UNISDR, 2009). 
Therefore, natural hazard risk assessment is a tool that provides information on the effect of 
natural hazards on the life or environments of human beings.  
Here, our main goal is to investigate about one of the quantitative societal risk assessment 
measures, the FN-curve. FN-curves are log-log plots that illustrate frequency of exceedance of 
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losses versus magnitude of losses. These curves are commonly used for societal risk assessment 
(e.g., nuclear power plant risk (Rasmussen, 1975), landslide risk (Fell et al., 2005), flood risk 
(Jonkman, 2007), (comparative) risk assessment in Germany (Mendes-Victor et al., 2009)) and 
to develop acceptable risk criteria (e.g., societal acceptable risk calculations by Skjong, 2003). 
However, there are debates on their applicability (e.g., Evans and Verlander, 1998), mathematics 
(e.g., Hungr and Wong, 2007) and importance (e.g., Abrahamsson and Johnsson, 2006).  
One of the major applications of these curves is for decision-making based on quantitative risk 
limits. Acceptable probability (or frequency1) of an event with certain consequences can be 
examined by means of a limit line on the FN-curve (Ball and Floyd, 1998; Jonkman, 2007). FN-
criteria (based on fatalities) can provide a valid basis for the evaluation of societal risks (Ball and 
Floyd, 1998). However, we show that (in section 2.4.3) the limit lines proposed for practice are 
far below the FN-curves of natural disaster data. FN-curves and their application are discussed in 
various literature (e.g., Jonkman (2007); CCPS (2009)); however, there are common mis-
understandings and misinterpretations about these curves and their application for natural 
hazards. We explore methods and notations used for FN-curves, address misunderstandings 
about their application and clarify their underlying concepts in order to be able to use them for 
natural hazard risk assessment purposes. 
In this chapter, we introduce FN-curves, summarize their history, and their mathematics. We also 
illustrate the normalization of FN-curves in general and for natural hazard risk assessment in 
particular. We use European natural disaster data for our illustrations.  
2.2  History of FN-curves 
FN-curves are introduced in literature as one of the quantitative measures of societal risk. 
Societal risk itself is not well-defined (Ball and Floyd, 1998), however, from its name, it is a 
measure of the sustainability of a number of people at a specific level of harm in case of certain 
hazards (Ball and Floyd, 1998). When quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and consequence 
analysis developed based on the probabilistic analysis of major hazards in 1960s and 1970s (Ball 
and Floyd, 1998), FN-curves started to be used for societal risk criteria. Lees (1996) (Chapter 9) 
                                                
1 Since the occurrence in time is commonly used for generating FN-curves, frequency is a better word to use. 
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claims that, using FN-curves as a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) method is an element that 
cannot be ignored in societal risk assessment and decision making processes. 
Individual risk, on the other hand, is a measure of risk that defines the expected tolerance of 
an individual at a certain level of harm in case of certain hazards. The relationship between 
individual and societal risk levels varies with circumstances, however, a commonly-used guide is 
that, if the societal risk of more than 10 fatalities is x, the maximum individual risk is in order of 
10x (Ball and Floyd, 1998). In section 2.4.1 we compare the relationship between individual and 
societal risk from various literature. 
Frequency-number (FN) curves are generated from a set of loss data gathered over a period 
of time. In these plots, frequency of exceedance of the loss is on the y-axis, and the magnitude of 
the loss is on the x-axis. However, the other way to construct frequency-number (FN) curves is 
based on regulations and judgment of authorities. These curves have been used for design 
requirements and estimation of predicted values (Lees (1996), Chapter 9) since they were first 
developed in 1960s. The general procedure of generating FN-curves based on estimated fatalities 
of incidents is given in CCPS (2000) (P. 419) based on Marshall (1987). 
The history of design requirement use of FN-curves goes back to Farmer (1976), who used 
these plots to illustrate the consequences of reactor years in the form of radiation of I131 in 
Curies (Ci) and limit the acceptability of risk of I131 with a straight line in a log-log area (Fig. 
2.1). Fig. 2.1 illustrates the dosage of I133 in Curies on the x-axis and the reactor years of the 
dosage production on the y-axis (Farmer, 1967). Fig. 2.2 illustrates the probability of accidents 
versus the equivalent I133 release in Curies which is the closest version of Farmer-type graphs to 
the current Pf−N curves, which are extensively used in engineering practice (e.g., Baecher, 
1982).  
Although the acceptable risk defined by Farmer (1967) according to 
(Consequence)×(Frequency)=1Ci/yr proposes the slope of -1 on Fig. 2.1, the acceptable limit 
line that Farmer (1967) proposed considering the risk aversion towards higher releases of I133, 
in Fig. 2.1 has a slope of -1.5. This way, Farmer tries to impose a criterion for risk assessment 
using slope of the frequency-consequence curves. 
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After Farmer (Farmer, 1967), certain people (e.g., Beattie (1967)) interpreted Farmer’s curve 
in another way with the limit line in terms of the number of casualties instead of Curies. fN-
curves were generated for the first time by Beattie (1967), in which f is the frequency of 
casualties per year and N is the number of deaths per year. Note that the f is not cumulative. 
Table 2.1 shows the suggested conversion of the Curie released by I131 to the death rate (from 
thyroid cancer). 
Table 2.1 Suggested acceptable estimated casualty rates for various Iodine releases (reproduced 
from Beattie (1967), Table 3) 
 
However, the Farmer-type limit lines cannot estimate the overall risk of a system as they are 
based on single accidents with multiple fatalities. In other words, if the number of fatalities in an 
event has a frequency of f(N) and N is in the range of N1 to N2 , where N2=10N1, and the range 
is in a logarithmic unit, if f times N equals to a constant, f(N)=k/N , the line has the slope of -1 on 
the log-log scale. In this example, if the total maximum and minimum average death is 
calculated, only two numbers with a 10 factor difference will remain because of the width of 
interval in the definition of our criterion (Griffiths (1981), P.64). Farmer (1981) introduced the 
cumulative frequency of N or more losses versus the value of losses (FN-diagram) for the 
purpose of quantitative (comparative) risk assessment of natural and man-caused events (Fig. 
2.3). Using FN-diagrams, Farmer proposed an acceptable limit line for risk assessment. As stated 
by Ballard (1993), Farmer suggested a slope of greater than -1 in order to reduce the effect of 
average fatalities/year from larger accidents because at slope of -1, all accidents make an equal 
contribution to the average fatality level. 
Baecher (1982) later plotted the accepted risks for various civil facilities as a graph with 
annual probability on the y-axis and lives/cost on the x-axis at log-log scale. This graph was used 
later in a book by Baecher and Christian (2003) (Fig.507, P. 106) with the misspelling “F−N 
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chart”, and by Christian (2004) when compared fN and FN diagrams. Ball and Floyd (1998) 
analyzed and compared the acceptable criteria based on fN and FN diagrams in more detail. 
 
Figure 2.1: The Farmer limit line (reproduced from Farmer (1967)) 
 
Figure 2.2: Farmer’s risk averse (slope of -1.5) limit line (reproduced from Farmer (1967)). 
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a) Frequency of global multiple-fatality accidents from natural causes. The numbered arrows are 1, Storms; 2, 
floods; 3, earthquakes; 4, avalanches and landslides; 5, volcanic eruptions (reproduced from Farmer (1981), Fig. 1) 
 
b) Frequency of man-caused events (reproduced from Farmer (1981), Fig. 3) (as stated by Farmer (1981), “fatalities 
due to car accidents are not shown because data were not available; car accidents cause about 5×104  fatalities per 
year”). 
Figure 2.3: FN-curves of natural (a) and man-caused (b) events (based on real data) for comparative risk assessment 
reproduced from Farmer (1981).  
 
In order to be able to visually compare the frequencies of occurrences on a log-log graph, a 
cumulated frequency, F, is a better measure than a non-cumulative one, f (Griffiths (1981), P.64). 
The cumulative approach has also been interpreted through mathematical formulations (Kaplan 
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and Garrick (1981); Cox and Baybutt (1982); and Hagon (1984)). These two approaches, fN and 
FN, are simply transferable through a certain formulation that will be explained in detail in 
section 2.3. 
In some industrial reports on risk, e.g., the Rasmussen Report-USA (1975), the Canvey 
Report-UK (Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (1978) and the Rijnmond Report-the 
Netherlands (1982), FN-diagrams were plotted for comparative risk assessment of industrial 
accidents and natural events, introducing the curves to derive acceptable levels of risk. In other 
words, these empirical FN-curves are used to obtain a frequency for the annual fatalities that 
makes comparisons of risk of different activities possible (Lees (1996), Chapter 9).  
The other usage of FN-curves that has been introduced by Farmer and others was to impose 
acceptable levels of risk for risk assessment practices and for decision-making. Fig. 2.4 is a 
schematic graph of FN-curves which shows the anatomy of the curve on a log-log plot. Although 
the equation of the curve is not linear, but since the FN-curves are mostly plotted on a log-log 
scale, the curve is depicted as a straight line. The illustrated steepness (slope) of the schematic 
FN-curve in Fig. 2.4 is -1. If an FN-curve is steeper (e.g., slope of -1.5), it means that higher 
fatalities are less frequent. On the other hand, a less steep FN-curve (e.g., slope of -0.5) shows 
higher fatalities with more frequency. 
 
Figure 2.4: Schematic FN-curve on a log-log scale. The slope and the intercept creates an equation for the curve, 
F(N)=Intercept × NSlope.   
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To define acceptable criteria for risk assessment based on FN-diagrams (not based on real-data), 
following facts and rules introduced in literature must first be understood:   
• (Fact) FN-curves hold a shape of F×Nα=k (power-law) in which α is the slope of the FN-
diagram and k is a constant (Porske, 2008). Although, other fits also can be considered in 
some cases, the power-law is considered as a universal fit to these type of data. 
• (Rule) The slope of the FN-diagram is a measure of aversion to risk (Griffiths and Fryer 
(1979); Hagon (1984); Cox and Baybutt (1982); Slovic et al. (1984); Hirst (1998)), which 
is being imposed as a risk assessment criteria.  
• (Rule) The minimum and maximum criteria are proposed in the form of  
intercepts at various Ns on FN-curves by local authorities based on discretion  
(Skjong and Eknes, 2002). 
   There are several approaches to selecting the slope and intercept of FN-curves for risk 
assessment purposes. The acceptable levels of risk adopted by industrial concerns, and more 
generally by countries differ according to their desire for risk reduction (the slope of the curve). 
Some studies review the use of these criteria by countries that accept this method of risk 
assessment (such as Ball and Floyd (1998); Jonkman et al. (2003); Trbojevic (2005); Jonkman 
(2007); Porske (2008); Trbojevic (2009)). We analyze some of these criteria in section 2.3 and 
2.4.1. 
2.3  Mathematics of FN-curves 
FN-curves that are plotted based on real data (of natural or man-caused events) are generated 
according to the frequency of N or more losses versus the value of these losses; here, our focus is 
on life-loss. More simply, the process of generating an FN-curve (based on real data) is to make 
an ascending sort of the number of fatalities due to an event, rank them accordingly and divide 
them all by the considered time period. This simple process produces a cumulative frequency of 
fatalities during a series of events over a specific period of time. If the result of this process is 
plotted versus the number of fatalities in a log-log scale, the graph would be several points that in 
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most cases to which a straight line can be fitted on a log-log plot with certain slope and intercept2 
which together represents the nature of that dataset. The unit of the x-axis and the y-axis on the 
generated graph would be number of losses and frequency (1/time) respectively. The fitted 
trendline is used for comparative risk assessment (e.g., Mendes-Victor et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, FN-curves are plotted to define a reference curve for risk assessment purposes. For 
this purpose, one has to plot a line with a certain slope and an intercept on a log-log scale. This 
way, the generated line is not based on real data; it is based on the authority judgments and 
discretion. The imposed line is used for decision-making and setting acceptable risk criteria for 
risk reduction purposes (e.g., Skjong and Eknes (2002)). These criteria are extremely subjective. 
Porske (2008) calls the lines that limit the acceptable risk in countries (or industrial activities) as 
proof line. To introduce the different depicted levels of risk on FN-curves, we borrow the 
diagrams that Porske (2008) used in his book for summarizing the work by Ball and Floyd 
(1998) in Fig. 2.5. The dark gray area limits the acceptable level of risk, the lightest gray area 
limits the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels of risk and the white area limits 
the unacceptable level of risk. Fig. 2.5 from top left, respectively, shows the Groningen curve 
(1978), the Farmer curve (1967), Hong Kong for hazardous material (1997), Hong Kong for 
transport of chlorine, the revised Kinchin curve (1982), Hong Kong (1988), Netherlands (1980s), 
Netherlands (1996), Netherlands for transport of dangerous goods (1996), Great Britain ACDS 
(1991), safety of off-shore installations in UK (1991), Hong Kong (1993), and Switzerland for 
the transportation of hazardous material (1991-92) [Porske, 2008, pp, 305]. Variation among the 
limit lines in Fig. 2.5 suggests that acceptability of risk depends on the purpose of the authorities 
and their judgment for risk reduction. The concept of ALARP introduced by Health and Safety 
Executive of United Kingdom (1989) for cost-benefit analysis and risk reduction purposes. 
                                                
2 The fit is a power-law formula but when it is plotted on a log-log scale, it visualized as a straight line with a 
certain slope and intercept. 
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Figure 2.5: Proof lines for FN-diagrams (reproduced from Porske (2008), Fig. 3-24, based on Ball and Floyd (1998)) 
 
Cox and Baybutt (1982) introduce the mathematical basis of FN-curves (in general) as a 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). In Cox and Baybutt’s (1982) notation, 
 F  (N) is the annual probability of consequences exceeding N, where the F(N) is the cumulative 
distribution function of N, and the over bar is defining the complementary of the function. This 
function can be expressed both in a discrete, Eq. 2.1 (Cox and Baybutt (1982), Eq. A.1), and a 
continuous, Eq. 2.2 (Cox and Baybutt, 1982, Eq. A.5) format, depending on the underlying 
source of and purpose for its generation, i.e., if it is generated from a dataset3 or from a decision-
making model4. 
 
                                                
3 The real data from natural or man-caused events are mainly plotted in a discrete format. 
4 based on a slope and an intercept of the FN-curve as an acceptable limit line for risk assessment. The line is 
mainly plotted in a continuous format. 
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  F  (N) = Prob(consequences  exceeding  N)(1) 
  = i
NN
P
i
∑
≤
 
  = ⌡⌠
N
∞
 f(x)dx (2.2) 
where Pi s are annual probabilities of Ni consequences; 11 =∑ = i
n
i
P , Pi≥0 in the case of a 
discrete function, and f(x)dx is the annual probability of having consequences between N and 
N+dN, 0≤N<∞. The transformation of a probability density function from CCDF is simply as the 
minus derivative of the cumulative distribution function of N, Eq. 2.3, in continues cases (Cox 
and Baybutt, 1982, Eq. A.5). 
 f(N) = − ddN  F  (N) (2.3) 
  In the industries and countries where FN-diagrams are used for risk assessment purposes 
(among other risk assessment approaches), the measure of societal risk can be estimated. This 
measure is defined as the expected value of the number of deaths per year, E(N), and 
mathematically is the total number of deaths per year, Eq. 2.4 (derived from Jonkman et al., 
2003).  
 E(N) = ∫
∞
0
)( dxxxf N  (2.4) 
Limiting conditions that can be imposed for determining acceptable risk in a national level 
(considering aversion factors) through the calculation of E(N) were proposed by Vrijling et al. 
(1995), Eq. 2.5 (Eq. 7 from Vrijling et al., 1995). 
 E(N)+k×σ(N) < β.100 (2.5) 
where k is the risk aversion index, a constant, and β is the policy factor that varies with the 
degree of voluntariness which changes from 10 in the case of complete freedom of choice to 0.01 
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in case of an imposed acceptable risk. On the other hand, at a local level, the acceptable levels of 
risk are based on the FN criteria5, Eq. 2.6 (Eq. 8 in Vrijling et al., 1995). 
 1−FN(x) ≤ 
C
xn
  forall x≥10 (2.6) 
where 1-FN(x) is the frequency of exceedance of x fatalities, n is the slope of the limit line
6 and 
C is a constant that determines the position of the limit line . In order to relate and apply the 
acceptable levels of risk in a national level to a local level, some assumptions are considered: 1) 
the number of casualties obey a Bernoulli distribution function, 2) the probability distribution 
function of the annual number of deaths can be driven from the FN-curve7 and 3) the probability 
distribution function of casualties should fulfill the same requirement as the associated FN-curve. 
Considering these assumptions, in a single location, we would come up with the f(N)≤ C
N2
 
requirement. If the expected value of the number of fatalities is much smaller than its standard 
deviation, which is often the case of disasters, in a national level with NA independent locations, 
Eq. 2.5 and Eq.2.4, would lead us to Eq. 2.7 (Eq. 12 in Vrijling et al., 1995). 
 C = 
⎣⎢
⎢⎡
⎦⎥
⎥⎤ 
β.100
k NA
2
 (2.7) 
where β is the policy factor and k is the risk aversion index. From the general criteria formulized 
in Eq. 2.5 and using Eq. 2.7 which is derived based on the conversion of the national societal 
acceptable risk criterion to a local acceptable risk criterion, one can derive the criteria proposed 
by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Ministerie van 
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, VROM) by replacing β, k and NA, by 
0.03, 3 and 1,000, respectively (VROM-type criteria; Vrijling et al., 1995). 
The ways various countries define their acceptable risk criteria are explored in more detail in 
the paper by Vrijling and Glender (1997). Table 2.2 is a summary of the criteria for FN-diagram 
                                                
5 Vrijling et al. (1995) call this as VROM-type criteria 
6 limit line in Vrijling et al. (1995) is the same as proof line in Porske (2008)(Fig. 2.5) 
7 using Eq. 2.3 to convert probability distribution function to FN-curve 
21 
 
parameters undertaken by selected countries based on different C and n values. These criteria are 
gathered from Jonkman et al. (2003) and complemented by the acceptable levels of risk in 
European Countries from Trbojevic (2005) and with the Hong Kong criteria (based on Hong-
Kong (1994)). Fig. 2.6 illustrates a complete version of these criteria along with the Health and 
Safety Executive of the UK criterion, Reducing Risk, Protecting People (R2P2) (HSE, 2001). 
 
Table 2.2 Summary of societal risk criteria used for decision-making of industrial activities in 
selected countries (reproduced from Jonkman et al. (2003))  
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Figure 2.6: Acceptable level of risk in some countries based on HSE (2001) (R2P2), Trbojevic (2005) and Jonkman 
et al. (2003) (Netherlands, Denmark, UK and France), and Hong Kong Report (1994).   
 
Since Eq. 2.5 is used for the total risk and it includes risk aversion index, k, and the standard 
deviation, σ, the term “risk averse” is used when the criteria is imposed. On FN-curves, the 
concept of risk averse, neutral and prone is contained in the slope (steepness) of the curve, n in 
Eq.2.6. Slope of -1 represents risk neutrality, slope of smaller than -1 represents risk aversion 
and slope of greater than -1 represents risk proneness (Pikaar and Seaman, 1995). Jonkman et al. 
(2003) compare the aversion indices used in various acceptable risk level calculations in 
literature in more detail. Vrijling and van Gelder (1997) showed that the area under FN-curve 
(which is a measure for societal risk (Ale et al., 1996)) equals the expected number of fatalities 
per year. Later, Jonkman et al. (2003) derived a mathematical relationship between the individual 
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risk and societal risk based on the individual risk contours. More details on individual risk 
contours can be found in section 2.4.1.  
Hagon (1984), uses slightly different notation and approach in using FN-curves as a risk 
analysis tool based on a graph that compares different aversion indices, α, on a diagram of 
∑= αα NNS 1),(  on the y-axis and the maximum number of fatalities, N, on the x-axis, Fig. 
2.7. S(N, α) is a function that is based on summation of the 1/Nα values, which is borrowed from 
a simple power-law formula of fNα=r, where f is the frequency (per year) and r is a constant. 
Calculation of the cumulative frequency (for FN-diagrams) is introduced as a discrete and 
continuous summation of f s, Eq. 2.8 (Eq. 2 in Hagon-1984). This transformation brings a new 
function, S(N,α), of number of fatalities, N, and aversion index, α , to the mathematics of FN-
diagrams. In Eq. 2.8, the frequencies are summed and generate the cumulative frequency of N=1 
to N=K. Replacing f by the inverse of the power-law formula, fNα=r, and considering the new 
S(N,α) function, Eq. 2.9 (Eq. 3 in Hagon, 1984) is evident. Eqs. 2.8 and 2.9 show the relationship 
between FN-curve and the new function. Results of the cumulative frequencies and the total 
deaths per year for different aversion factors, α, are shown in Table 2.3. 
 (F)K1  = ∑
N=1
N=K
 f (2.8) 
  = ∑
N=1
N=K
  
r
Nα
   
  = rS(N,α)  (2.9) 
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Table 2.3: Integrals based on fNα=r , reproduced from Hagon (1984)  
 
 
Hagon’s (1984) approach for the estimation of the total number of fatalities per year is shown 
in Eq. 2.10 (Eq. 8 in Hagon, 1984) which is a similar approach to that of Vrijling et al. (1995) in 
Eq. 2.4, but with slight changes. The domain in which the summation is calculated is between 1 
and the maximum number of fatalities that can occur (i.e., maximum exposure) whereas in Eq. 
2.4 the domain starts from the minimum number of fatalities, which can be zero or one, and goes 
to the infinity. The relationship between the estimated total number of fatalities and the new 
function is shown in Eq. 2.11 (Eq. 6 in Hagon, 1984). 
 (D)K1  = ∑
N=1
N=K
 fN (2.10) 
  = ∑
N=1
N=K
  
r
Nα−1
 
  = rS(N,α−1)  (2.11) 
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Figure 2.7: Different aversion indices, α, on S(N,α) versus maximum number of fatalities, N (reproduced from 
Hagon (1984))  
Wilson (1975) proposed that the risk involving N people simultaneously is N2 times as 
important as an accident involving one person. This proposal indicates a slope of -1 for less than 
one fatality and -2 for more than one fatality on FN-diagrams; these slopes used as nuclear 
reactor risk assessment criteria (Fig. 2.8). This is similar to the Risk Integral, RI, approach 
proposed by Carter (1995) and Cassidy (1996), Eq. 2.12, and interpreted by Vrijling and van 
Gelder (1997) in terms of the area of the FN-curve, Eq. 2.13 (Eq. 10 in Vrijling and van Gelder 
(1997)). In Eq. 2.12 and Eq. 2.13, the unit is (death2/year)8. The RI method is justified by Hirst 
(1998) as it is compatible with the expected (dis)utility function. This justification is in reply to 
the published arguments in which FN-curves are alleged to be unsatisfactory (Evans and 
Verlander, 1998). In section 2.3.1 and Appendix I, we go into the detail of the comparison of 
FN-curves with disutility functions with focus on justification of FN-curves. Hirst (1998) uses a 
term called “weighted risk indication” which emphasizes the number of fatalities in an event by 
applying a power greater than one to N, similar to the approach that Wilson (1975) suggested. 
Hirst (1998) proved that the RI can be expressed as an equation in the form of an expected 
                                                
8 since in the Eq. 2.12, x has the unit of death, and the frequency,  F  (x), has the unit of 1/year, an integration 
over x will have the unit of death2/year. 
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disutility function, ENFY= ∑ f(N).N= ∑ F(N), where ENFY is an abbreviation for the expected 
number of fatalities per year. By applying some mathematical transformation between f(N) and 
F(N), using Eq. 2.3, we can derive Eq. 2.14 (Eq. R.1 in Hirst (1998)). The term in the square 
brackets in Eq. 2.14 is the aversion multiplier and it includes the slope of an FN-curve, a. Later, 
Horn et al. (2008) introduced the general form of ENFY equation as a measure for societal risk, 
Wfa=∑ =
M
n
aNNf
1
).( , where a is an aversion factor for large incidents (1≤a≤2) and M is an 
upper limit on the number of fatalities per incident. 
 RICassidy/Carter = dxxFx )(.
0
∫
∞
 (2.12) 
 RIVrijling = 
1
2(E
2(N)+σ2(N)) (2.13) 
 RIHirst = dxxx
xxF aa
a
N
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−+
+
∫
∞
)()1(
)1().(  (2.14) 
 
Figure 2.8: Wilson Criteria for multiple fatality, reproduced from Wilson (1975) 
Horn et al. (2008) also proposed a more generalized formulation that summarizes the risk 
integral approaches of above-mentioned authors, based on the fact that the risk value at a 
composite region S is equal to the sum of the values of its parts (z(S)= ∑
s∈S z(s)). Eq. 2.15 (Eq. 12 
in Horn et al. (2008)) shows the steps that one can follow from the definitions of risk measures in 
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terms of f(n) introduced by Hirst (1998) to find the relationship between the scalar measure of 
societal risk, Wfa with respect to its parts in a composite region S. 
 Wfa(S) = ∑
=
)(
1
).,(
SM
n
ansnf  
  = ∑ ∑
∈ =Ss
SM
n
ansnf
)(
1
).,(  
  = ∑
∈Ss
a sWf )(  (2.15) 
        Skjong and Eknes (2002) suggested a method to calculate the acceptable risk criteria in 
terms of the intercept of FN-diagrams in a general format. Their method is based on the Potential 
Loss of Life (PLL), which is the expected loss of life due to an event. The PLL is calculated by 
averaging the fatality rate per Gross National Product (GNP), q, and economic value, EV, of the 
activity, Eq. 2.16 (Eq. 1 in Skjong and Eknes (2002)). This value is equal to the summation of 
the number of fatalities that may occur in the event times the frequency of occurrence of an 
accident involving N fatalities, Eq. 2.17 (Eq. 2 in Skjong and Eknes (2002)). 
 PLL = q.EV (2.16) 
  = ∑
N=1
Nu−1
 NfN (2.17) 
  = F1( 
1
Nb−1u
+ ∑
N=1
Nu−1
  
(N+1)b−Nb
Nb−1(N+1)b
)(2.18) 
where N is number of fatalities, Nu is the upper limit for fatalities, F1 is frequency of events with 
one or more fatalities, and b is the slope of FN-curve. Using Eq. 2.18, and setting the slope to b= 
−1, F1, frequency of events involving one or more fatalities, can be calculated. According to 
Skjong and Eknes (2002), the ALARP area would be limited by 
F1
10 and F1×10 on the y-axis, 
shown on Fig. 2.9 (reproduced from Fig. 1 in Skjong and Eknes (2002)).  
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Figure 2.9: General format of societal acceptance criteria, FN-curves (reproduced from Fig. 1 in Skjong and Eknes 
(2002)) 
    All of the approaches mentioned above are different perspectives of various authors from the 
integrated societal risk used as acceptable risk criteria mostly in industry. However, containing 
similar realization of the frequency-based measures of risk; f(N) and F(N) are the bases of the 
calculations and methods. All above measures can also be derived from the combination of the 
individual risk (IR) and the societal risk (SR) formulations and criteria. In section 2.4.1 we 
further compare the bases and the mathematics of IR and SR. 
2.3.1  Is the mathematics of FN-criterion adequate?  
    Evans and Verlander (1998) criticize the mathematical formalism of the FN-criterion in 
comparison with (dis)utility criterion. The disutility function is based on the expected utility of 
multiple fatality accidents. In this comparison, Evans and Verlander (1998) use an example of 
two systems with disutility of u(n), where n is the size of accidents, and tolerability thresholds of 
U1 and U2. The FN-criteria for the two systems are given as C1(n) and C2(n). In this example, 
these two systems are combined into a single system, without any changes in the risks. In Evans 
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and Verlander’s approach, disutility functions and FN-criteria are both considered as linear 
functions, therefore, in a combined system, they are linearly additive. However, in FN-curves, 
the relationship between the intercept (FN-criterion, C(n)) and size of the accident, n, is not 
linear. From Eq. 2.6, Eq. 2.9, Eq.  2.11 and Eq. 2.32 (from Evans and Verlander, 1998) this 
nonlinearity is obvious. 
In a combined system using FN-criterion framework, if the criteria are added non-linearly 
1
C(n)= 
1
C1(n)
+ 
1
C2(n)
, instead of the linear summation used by Evans and Verlander (1998), 
C(n)=C1(n)+C2(n), the result of the combined intolerability measure, in both disutility and FN 
approach will be the same. Details of this derivation is given in Appendix I.  
Horn et al. (2008) used another strategy based on the same examples used in Evans and 
Verlander (1998) to criticize their conclusion regarding the usefulness of FN-curves. Horn et.al 
(2008) in reply to the following paragraph by Evans and Verlander (1998):  
“This is a situation where the judgment about tolerability [i.e., acceptability] changes for 
reasons that have nothing to do with safety. It follows that the criterion based on FN curves does 
not always come up with the same judgment for the same safety situation. It thus fails an 
essential logical test for a prescriptive criterion.” (Evans and Verlander, 1998, P.165),  
suggest that: 
“... this interpretation ignores the critical element of organizational context. In terms of 
ENFY or F(n), the system as a whole (i.e., the two airlines combined) is identical in the two 
scenarios, as one would expect. The difference between the scenarios is due to differences in the 
types of risk assumed by each airline, taking into account both the frequency and severity of 
accidents. In particular, the exchange of aircraft has produced imbalances in each airline’s 
“risk portfolio” such that Airline 1 is overexposed to high-frequency incidents, and Airline 2 to 
high-loss incidents. The F(n)/C(n) criterion thus has potential value in detecting such 
imbalances within individual enterprises, with potential ramifications in fields such as the 
insurance industry.” (Horn et al., 2008, P.1717) 
From Horn et al.’s (2008) reasoning, beside our mathematical argument on the non-linearity 
of the FN-criteria, we can conclude that FN-curves are still (mathematically and rationally) good 
tools for decision-making purposes. 
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2.3.2  FN-curve or Power-law distrubution 
Power law (PL) distributions, also known as Pareto distribution, Yule-Simon distribution, and 
Zipf’s law, have been largely reported in the modeling of distinct real phenomena. Nevertheless, 
this is still a controversial issue on PLs being simply spurious facts or they are about how well or 
how poorly these distributions fit the data (Pinto et al., 2012). When we have a non-negative 
random variable, x, that follows a PL distribution, the complementary cumulative distribution 
function of x is: )1(
)1(
)()( −−
−
=≥= ax
a
CxXPxF                   (2.19) 
where a > 0 and C > 0. A random variable that follows a Pareto distribution, the rank-frequency 
plot, in log–log scales, is asymptotically a straight line. This is exactly similar to what we 
introduced for FN-curves, Fig. 2.4.  
PL distributions are detected in various real-data random variables, such as size of the cities, 
income (wealth) in various countries or local regions (Nitsch, 2005), size of the fire (Weiguo et 
al., 2006), online sales (Newman, 2005), wars and terrorist attacks (Richardson, 1948, 1960), 
occurrence of earthquakes (Gutenberg and Richter 1944), epidemics (Stroud, 2006) and size of 
craters (Pinto et al., 2012).  
Clauset et al. (2009) tested and reported the parameters of PL distribution among 24 datasets 
drawn from physics, earth sciences, biology, ecology, paleontology, computer and information 
sciences, engineering, and the social sciences. 
As shown by many authors, PL distribution is very common in nature and around us. Using the 
term “FN-curve” in the context of risk assessment is only because of its distinction otherwise, 
FN-curves are not curves that have not been introduced or assessed before; they are simple PL 
distributions that are applicable for loss data. 
Distributions of many natural processes, such as earthquake energy, and casualties from natural 
disasters, are often modeled by power-like laws, such as the Pareto distribution. Pisarenko and 
Rodskin (2014) show that in heavy-tailed distributions (such as power-law) the expected 
maximum event is not a stable measure for estimation of risk. Instead, the high-level quintile of 
generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) in a certain time is a more stable measure of risk. 
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Now, why does PLs give a good description of data from seemingly completely unrelated 
phenomena? Baek et al. (2011) argue that because they can all be described as outcomes of a 
ubiquitous random group division in a Random Group Formation (RGF), i.e., there is a 
systematic change in the PL-index (the slope of the log-log plot) with system size. One 
consequence of this theory is that, the PL index is determined by the size of the largest group. 
This will be helpful when we aim to analyze the slope of a real-data FN-curves. 
2.4  Risk and Risk Assessment 
    Bernstein (1998) (pg. 8) states that the word “risk” is derived from an Italian word, “risican”, 
which means “to dare”, i.e., risk is “the action we dare to take, which depends on how free we 
are to make choices, are what the story of risk is all about” (Bernstein (1998), pg. 8). The 
definition of risk includes two main components: 1) in-determination and 2) consequences 
(Porske, 2008). The conceptual, mathematical and engineering definitions of risk (to life) always 
carry these two components. As Aven (2011a) mentioned, the quality, consistency, and meaning 
of the definitions are important for a unified framework for risk assessment and management. 
The conceptual definition of risk, Eq. 2.19, is based on the common knowledge of risk, which 
includes hazard and consequences. 
 Risk = Hazard×Consequenses (2.19) 
Here, Hazard from al zahr (the Arabic word for dice) indicates probabilistic nature of risk with 
the unit of 1/time or , and Consequences is the total value of elements at-risk which is expressed 
as financial or life loss with the unit of the value of consequences (e.g., number of fatalities, or 
amount of money loss). “Risk analysis is a process that determines risk by analyzing potential 
hazards and evaluating the conditions that could pose a potential harm to people, property, 
livelihoods, and the environment” (Dilley et al., 2005). Risk assessment involves defining an 
acceptable criterion for risk at which the consequences are affordable (CCPS, 2009). Acceptable 
risk criteria are mainly developed locally based on the opinion of the decision-makers. However, 
there are certain theoretical (and mathematical) bases for decision-making process. We introduce 
a number of approaches in this section. 
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2.4.1  Individual Risk (IR) vs Societal Risk (SR) 
    Individual Risk (IR) is a measure that explains the possibility of harm to individuals in an at-
risk location. The (mathematical and conceptual) definition of IR however, varies in literature 
and practice. IoCE (1985) nomenclature defines IR as “the frequency at which an individual may 
be expected to sustain a given level of harm”. According to Bottelberghs (2000), IR is defined as 
the probability that an average unprotected person, permanently located at a certain location, 
would die due to a hazard. Eq. 2.20 (from Jonkman et al. (2003)) is the mathematical formulation 
for IR that Jonkman et al. (2003) use based on the understanding of the definition of individual 
risk and the realization of dependent failure from Bedford and Cooke (2001) (Chapter 8). 
 IR=PfPd|f (2.20) 
where Pf is the probability of failure (unit of 1/time) and Pd|f is the probability of the death of an 
individual in the case of failure (no unit); this definition was used by the Dutch Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) (Jonkman et al., 2003). From this 
definition, IR is a property of a place since it assumes permanent location for the individual. That 
is why Stallen et al. (1996) and later Bottelberghs (2000) and Jonkman et al. (2003) use risk 
contours for presentation of (individual) risk. Common graphical illustration of individual risk 
contours is shown in Fig. 2.10 (reproduced from Fig. 4.2 in CCPS (2000)) and in Fig. 2.11 
(reproduced from Fig. 1 in Jonkman et al. (2003)). The procedure of generating risk contours for 
chemical installations is vastly discussed in CCPS (2000) (P. 411 and P. 413).  
 
Figure 2.10: Example of an individual risk contour (circles that connect points of equal individual risk of fatality, 
per year). (reproduced from Fig. 4.2 of CCPS (2000))  
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Figure 2.11: Individual risk contours for hazardous installations (point source). (Reproduced from Fig. 1 of Jonkman 
et al. (2003))  
     
Societal risk (SR) is defined by IoCE (1985) as the relationship between frequency and the 
number of people who suffer from a specific level of harm in a given population. SR is the risk 
of multiple-fatality events that affects the whole society. Individual risk contours are also used 
for the realization of societal risk (SR) by Stallen et al. (1996) and later by Jonkman et al. (2003). 
The relationship between IR and SR is shown in Fig. 2.12 using individual risk contours. Both 
situations (A and B) have equal contours with individual risk levels (shown by IR and IR’), 
however, the SR in situation B is greater than SR in situation A since the population density in 
situation B is larger. 
 
Figure 2.12: The difference between individual and societal risk proposed by Jonkman et al. (2003). Both situations 
have equal contours with two individual risk levels (shown by IR and IR’). Situation B has a larger societal risk 
because of a larger population density (reproduced from Jonkman et al. (2003), Fig. 4).  
 
Trbojevic (2005) also relates the IR to SR by using the approach that Schofield (1993) developed 
for societal risk criteria. Trbojevic (2005) applies this method to compare the IR and SR of 
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European countries. In this approach, potential loss of life, PLL, is defined as Eq. 2.219(from 
Trbojevic (2005)), which relates the individual risk to the frequency of N fatalities. 
 PLL=Nmax×IR = ∑ f(N)×N (2.21) 
where f(N) is the frequency of exactly N fatalities (f(N)=FN−FN+1 (Schofield, 1993)), N is the 
number of fatalities, IR is the maximum tolerable individual risk and Nmax is the number of 
exposed population. Table 2.4 (based on Table 4, Trbojevic (2005)) is a list of the old 
(previously used criteria) and new (updated criteria over time) values of F(1) (frequency of 
exceedance of 1 fatality, intercept on FN-curve), aversion factor (slope of FN-curve 10 ), 
acceptable IR (based on policy factor of countries) and Nmax (number of exposed population), 
calculated from Eq. 2.21 at the given values of cumulative frequency F(1), risk aversion factor 
and the maximum individual risk corresponding to the FN-criteria imposed by United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Czech Republic.  
It must be pointed out that the acceptable criteria used in Table 2.4, F(1) and IR, are based on 
the acceptable criteria proposed by the authorities of the selected European countries.  
Table 2.4 Comparison of the frequency of 1 fatality based on FN-criteria, F(1), aversion factor, 
individual risk, IR, and calculated exposed population (Nmax) (from Eq. 2.21) of selected 
countries (reproduced from Trbojevic (2005 
 
                                                
9 The definition of PLL in Eq. 2.17, defined by Skjong and Eknes (2002), is similar in the ∑ f(N)×N part, which 
is the route of FN-curves. However, the Trbojevic’s(2005) approach includes an IR-related definition, 
therefore, connects the IR to the FN-curves. 
10 for calculation of f(N) based on f(N)=FN−FN+1, where FN=F(1)×N
−b 
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There is a further concept called the annual probability of loss of life (PLL or PLOL), which 
has a notation similar to PLL, in Eq. 2.21 but an aspect similar to Eq. 2.20. For example, the 
probability of loss of life in case of a landslide is calculated from Eq. 2.22 (Eq. 4 of Fell et al. 
(2005)). 
 P(LOL)=P(L)×P(T:L)×P(S:T)×V(D:T) (2.22) 
where P(L) is the frequency of the landslide, P(T:L) is the probability of the landslide reaching 
the element at risk, P(S:T) is the temporal spatial probability of the element at risk and V(D:T) is 
the vulnerability of the person to the landslide event (Fell et al. (2005)). 
Horn et al., (2008) use a definition for the IR that HSE (1992) proposed, the probability of 
death per person per year, and interpreted this definition as the total number of deaths per year, 
FA, divided by the number of persons at risk, P, Eq. 2.23 (Eq. 1 in Horn et al. (2008)). 
 IR= 
FA
P  (2.23) 
Since IR and SR are mainly defined separately and independent from each other 11 , an 
installation (or a development) might be acceptable in terms of IR but unacceptable in terms of 
SR. This can occur if authorities do not define risk standards with respect to the differences of 
the two; e.g., SR per capita can be expressed as IR, but the opposite is not true (Horn et al., 
2008). This suggests that the collective behavior in societal risk is not the result of the risk that a 
certain individual might have; therefore, one cannot just sum up the individual risk over a certain 
population for calculation of the societal risk. Horn et al. (2008) also propose scaling for the SR 
with respect to the exposed population 12 which will be discussed in section 2.4.2 in more detail. 
                                                
11 They are mostly defined as acceptable levels of risk used for practice.  
12 For example, Horn et al. (2008) suggest that, a common unit for comparing risks to travellers at different-sized 
airports (from an IR perspective) which is “fatalities per traveler per annum” can be modified as “fatalities per 
incident per traveler per annum” when considering estimates of SR. 
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2.4.2  Normalization of FN-diagrams 
    Efforts have been made to normalize FN-curves before, such as Nishenko and Barton (1995), 
and Hungr and Wong (2007). However, which axis on the diagram has to be normalized?  
Ferreira and Slesin (1976) introduced a parameter called severity function, S(N), which is 
defined as the “total number of fatalities in incidents in which at least N persons die” divided by 
the “total number of incidents during a specific period of time in which at least N persons die” 
(Ferreira and Slesin, 1976). This function is used in a diagram called an F−S diagram which 
shows the cumulative frequency of fatalities, F(N), on its y-axis and S(N) on its x-axis, a plot 
similar to FN-diagrams but scaled with respect to the number of incidents. An acceptable risk 
criteria based on Ferreira and Slesin (1976) model implies a reverse cubic F−S relation, F≈S−2, 
according to empirical data, (Ferreira and Slesin (1976), Figure 1, P. 8). 
Nishenko and Barton (1995), applied normalization of FN-curves to real earthquake fatality data 
of several countries. Fig. 2.13 illustrates the earthquake fatality-frequency distribution of 8 
countries normalized by the population of the country at the time of the earthquake. Using this 
method, Nishenko and Barton (1995) compared the risk of earthquake in the eight countries. 
Nishenko and Barton (1995) also proposed that the breaks in the slopes of some of these curves 
are associated with the selection and reporting criteria of fatalities in different countries. We 
believe that this was the first time that (normalized) FN-curves used for the risk assessment of a 
natural hazard based on the characteristics of the curves13. We use this approach in section 2.4.3 
for the European countries. A similar method has been suggested by Horn et al. (2008) in which 
fatalities are normalized by exposed population for societal risk assessment. Using an example of 
application of societal risk assessment (based on FN-curves) in civil aviation, Horn-et.al-2008 
conclude that, using un-scaled14 frequency data will tend to be uninformative. Fig. 2.14 (Fig. 6 in 
Horn et al. (2008)) illustrates the method that Horn et al. (2008) suggests for normalization of 
FN-curves for a multi-level system, S, with components {s1, s2, s3}. The deviations of the 
frequency of each component, F(n,sk) , from the mean, F(n,S), are shaded, and the upper 
                                                
13 This method is 1) based on real data and 2) normalized by the exposed population. 
14 scaling according to the population exposed to events 
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edge, F(n,sk)max , (i.e., worst-case risk) can be used for decision-making purposes. From Fig 
2.14, we could also see the importance and the application of normalization on FN-curves.  
Neither the work of Horn et al. (2008) nor Nishenko and Barton’s(1995) effort have been taken 
seriously in the literature or in practice. We suggest that this method will strengthen the basis of 
FN-diagrams as the confusions about these curves have resulted in less interest in them. 
 
Figure 2.13: Normalized FN-curve for earthquake fatalities in 8 countries in log-log scale. The fatality data is based 
on minimum and maximum estimates of past events in the countries: Peruvian, Chinese, Chilean, and Japanease 
earthquake fatalities (reproduced from Nishenko and Barton (1995)). 
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 Figure 2.13(continued): Normalized FN-curve for earthquake fatalities in 8 countries in log-log scale. The fatality 
data is based on minimum and maximum estimates of past events in the countries: Iranian, Italian, Turkish, and 
Indian earthquake fatalities (reproduced from Nishenko and Barton (1995)). 
 
Figure 2.14: Scaled FN-curve (fatality per capita) proposed by Horn-et.al-2008 which shows F(n) curves for a multi-
level system, S with components {s1, s2, s3}. The deviations of each component F(n,sk) from the mean F(n,S) are 
shaded, and the upper edge (i.e., worst-case risk) is of particular interest for decision-making purposes. (reproduced 
from Fig. 6 of Horn et al. (2008)) 
    There has been other methods introduced in literature to normalize of FN-curves that include 
exposed populations. To compare the background risks to the risks of a given project, Hungr and 
Wong (2007) proposed that the FN-line associated with the background risks must be normalized 
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to the size of the group exposed to a specific project 15. Therefore, Hungr and Wong (2007), by 
considering the total FN-curve of human-caused accidents as background risk, proposed a 
scaling to the cumulative frequency, F(N), for landslide risk assessment in which the plotted data 
on the y-axis is normalized by the exposed population, in their example, the population of the 
USA, Fig. 2.15. As shown in Fig. 2.15, the original Rasmussen (1975) data of the total human-
caused accidents (air crashes, dam failures, explosions and chlorine releases) [solid black line on 
top] is normalized to 1 by dividing the Rasmussen data by the population of USA, 1×107 [solid 
black line at the bottom]. Since the cumulative frequency of accidents per year with the unit of 
(1/time) is being divided by the population of the USA with the unit of (number), this approach 
is not mathematically and logically justifiable, although it acknowledges the difference between 
the acceptable risk criteria of natural hazards (here, landslides) and the industrial accidents. In 
section 2.4.3  we further introduce the use of FN-curves for natural hazard risk assessment. 
 
Figure 2.15: Scaling method proposed by Hungr-and-Wong-2007 for normalization of the FN-curve of USA human-
caused accidents to 1 [solid black line at the bottom, near a dashed line] , by dividing the cumulative frequency/year 
of the Rasmussen (1975) data of total human-caused events [solid black line on top] by the population of the USA 
(1×107) on the y-axis. (reproduced from Hungr-and-Wong-2007, Fig.2)  
                                                
15 Because, 1) “the line represents a summation of many types of hazards that constitute the background risk.” 
and “it is questionable as to whether it is a suitable ‘yardstick’ for evaluation of risk tolerability of only a single 
hazard, i.e. landslides.”(Hungr and Wong (2007), P. 5) 
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2.4.3  FN-curves and Natural Hazard Risk Assessment 
    FN-diagrams, both with acceptable criteria lines and with real-data curves, have been used for 
non-natural risk assessment more than natural hazard risk assessment has. Rasmussen (1975) and 
some other pioneers used natural hazard FN-curves to define the acceptable criteria for industrial 
and human-caused accidents. 
The FN-based criteria are imposed on and compared with both industrial activities and natural 
events without differentiation, although natural events have fewer controllable factors, i.e., 
nature is not controllable. Fig. 2.16 illustrates the difference between the acceptable risk criteria 
of some European countries and the FN-curves of the European countries’ natural hazards 
(earthquakes, landslides, volcanic activities, floods, wind storms, wild fires, extreme 
temperatures, drought and epidemics16) real data. In Fig. 2.16, we use the EM-DAT database for 
natural disasters that killed more than 1 person17 between 1950 and 2012 in 32 European 
countries (shown by blue dots). Table 2.5 shows the list of European countries and number of 
fatalities due to each natural hazard. These data are compared to acceptable risk criteria defined 
by some of the European countries including the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE, 2001) R2P2 (Reducing Risk, Protecting People, which limits 50 or more fatalities with a 
frequency of 1 in 5000 per annum and imposes a slope of -1, risk neutral) shown by a red dot on 
Fig. 2.16; France (with a slope of zero, no criterion on aversion, neutrality or proneness), the 
green line on Fig. 2.16; Denmark, the Netherlands and Czech Republic (with slopes of -2, risk 
averse) (Jonkman et al. (2003), Ale (2005), and Trbojevic (2005)) shown by orange, purple and 
light blue lines on Fig.2.16, respectively; and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
criteria (HSE, 1989) that limit the minimum and maximum fatalities between 10−3 to 10−5 per 
year with two lines of slope -1 (risk neutral) shown by black lines on Fig. 2.16. The average 
slope for the FN-curve of natural hazards in European countries (the blue zone on Fig. 2.16) is 
−0.5 (risk prone), which is not even risk neutral. As can be seen from Fig. 2.16, the acceptable 
criteria imposed for risk assessment are far below the real FN-curve trend of natural hazards. 
                                                
16 EM-DAT database considers epidemic as a natural disaster. In this research, we don’t consider epidemics as a 
natural disaster. Although EM-DAT is not a complete database, but since it is the only integrated database for 
losses in natural disasters, we use it for comparison purposes. 
17  due to small number of over 1,000-fatality events, we use over 1-fatality events  
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This suggests that the criteria being used in some countries are too conservative for natural 
hazard risk assessment. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: FN-curve of fatality (greater than 1) caused by natural hazards (earthquakes, landslides, volcanic 
activities, floods, wind storms, wild fires, extreme temperatures, drought and epidemics) in 32 European countries 
(thick blue lines) with respect to acceptable risk criteria in some of them. Red dot is the Health and Safety Executive 
criteria (HSE, 2001) and colored lines are dark red line, United Kingdom; green, France; orange, Denmark; purple, 
Netherlands and light blue, Czech Republic criteria (Jonkman et al. (2003); Trbojevic (2005); Ale (2005)). Thin 
black lines are based on the ALARP criteria (HSE, 1989). The European fatality data is obtained from EM_DAT 
database. 
 
Fig. 2.17 compares the normalized FN−curve for natural disasters in European countries. We 
used the population of countries in the year that the events occurred in order to normalize the 
FN-curves generated from the data of fatalities due to natural disasters in the European countries. 
Population data was obtained from the World Bank (2008-2012) record 
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(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL). We also put the normalized R2P2 (by the 
current population of United Kingdom) as a reference on Fig. 2.1. As can be seen, the R2P2 is 
around 3 orders of magnitude lower that the average of normalized FN-curve of European 
countries. Furthermore, in most of the countries, there is a break-point (aka saturation) observed 
on the normalized FN-curve. 
 
Figure 2.17: Normalized FN-curve of fatality (greater than 1) caused by natural hazards (earthquakes, landslides, 
volcanic activities, floods, wind storms, wild fires, extreme temperatures, drought and epidemics) in 32 European 
countries (thick blue lines) with respect to the R2P2 acceptable point 
 
Break Points on FN-curves 
From the comparison of Fig. 2.16 and Fig. 2.17, most of the normalized plots hold distinct 
curvatures18 or as Nishenko and Barton (1995) stated, they have break points. The breakpoints 
are actually representing transitions between lines of different slopes. The reason behind these 
breaks can be because of the selection and reporting criteria of fatalities in different countries (as 
                                                
18 We show some examples of these curvatures using black fitted lines on Fig. 2.18 
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reasoned by Nishenko and Barton (1995)). From a statistical point of view, these break-points 
are effects of saturation and inhomogeneity in the sequence of the data. 
We use another societal analogy to explain this effect on FN-curves. The fact that, for example, 
F(10) on an FN-curve is associated with 10 fatalities, however, F(0.0001), on a normalized FN-
curve can be associated with both 
10
100000 and 
1
10000, suggests that the normalized FN-curves 
include some sort of superposition of data which may help to analyze the underlying societal 
factors of risk in the countries. In other words, (normalized) FN-curves bring unification to the 
comparison of risk (e.g., 1 fatality in a community of 10,000 population implies as high risk as 
10 fatalities in a community of 100,000 population). The breaking points on Fig. 2.17 change the 
slope of the fitted lines (shown in black on Fig. 2.17) of the two parts of the curve from a shallow 
to a steeper slope. Using risk-prone, risk neutral and risk-averse expressions here, we could say 
that at the breaking points of a normalized FN-curve, a certain society transform from a risk-
prone situation19, to a risk-averse situation20 at the breaking points of the curve.  
In Fig. 2.18 we compare four countries’ natural hazard data to compare their normalized FN-
curves. We chose Greece, Italy, Ukraine and UK as our examples. The best power-law fits to the 
lower part of the FN-curves of these countries, and their confidence intervals are listed in Table 
2.6. 
Although, the best fit to the countries’ normalized FN-curve shows similar slopes in the steeper 
part of the curves, between -0.47 (Ukraine) to -0.63 (Greece) with 95% confidence intervals that 
overlap, we argue that even the small differences on the fit reveal information on the feedback of 
the countries to natural hazards. 
Fig. 2.18a (Greece) and Fig. 2.18b (Italy) are examples of countries which hold breaking points. 
In Greece, the slope is changing from -0.15 to -0.63, and for Italy, from -0.19 to -0.49. This 
means that Greece and Italy are less responsive (risk prone) to the low fatality/population-rate 
events, while for high rates of consequences, they are both risk averse (more responsive).  
If no breaking point exists on the curve may imply that the response of the society to both 
situations of high and low consequence events are almost the same. This can be because of a 
                                                
19 more likely to cause much smaller fatalities than the exposed population 
20 less likely to cause number of fatalities closer to the number of the exposed population 
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constructive strategy for risk reduction in the country, e.g., Fig. 2.18c (UK), or because of the 
low hazard characteristics of the area, e.g., Fig. 2.18d (Ukraine). Response-analysis of these two 
countries (UK and Ukraine) need more information on the frequency of hazard in the countries, 
i.e., if the country is in a hazardous region, no-break-point is due to its preparedness and 
responsive actions to disasters, while when it is not in a hazardous area, lack of break-point on its 
normalized FN-curve is due to the nature of the region. 
This information (the place of the breaking point of a normalized FN-curve and the different 
slopes of the curve before and after the breaking point) can be useful in comparative societal risk 
assessment of societies from the respond perspective of the countries. 
Table 2.5: List of European countries and fatalities due to natural hazards (1900-2012) based on 
EM_DAT natural hazard database 
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Figure 2.18: Normalized FN-curve of fatality in Greece (a) and Italy (b) as examples of countries that have break 
points on the curve, and in United Kingdom (c) and Ukraine (d) as examples of countries with no breaking point in 
the curve. 
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Table 2.6: List of the best power-law fits to the lower part of the FN-data of Greece, Italy, 
Ukraine, and United Kingdom shown in Fig. 2.18 (after the breaking points). 
  Power-Law fit R2 95% confidence interval of slope 
Greece Log(Y)=-4.2-0.63x 0.96 (n=24) -0.69 to -0.56 
Italy Log(Y)=-3.5-0.49x 0.98 (n=21) -0.53 to -0.45 
United Kingdom Log(Y)=-4.61-0.59x 0.98 (n=27) -0.65 to -0.55 
Ukraine Log(Y)=-3.95-0.47x 0.97 (n=12) -0.54 to -0.4 
 
 
2.5  Summary and discussion 
 Summary: 
In this chapter, we summarized the history, mathematics and application of FN-curves. We 
showed that FN-curves are useful tools for (comparative) risk assessment of natural hazards. 
Furthermore, we proved that these curves are mathematically adequate, and therefore, can be 
used for the analysis of loss data, for decision making purposes and defining acceptable criteria 
for risk. However, to improve these curves for risk assessment of natural hazards, we propose 
normalizing the number of fatalities used in the FN-curves by the number of exposed population.  
We also compared the acceptable criteria in certain European countries with FN-curves and 
concluded that the acceptable criteria used for industrial activities and engineering practice are 
far too conservative for natural hazard risk assessment practice. We compared the FN-curve of 
natural hazards in Europe with the normalized FN-curves. We introduced a new analogy for 
explaining the break points on the normalized FN-curves, which indicates that they are due to the 
difference between the response of the countries to low and high consequence events. If 
normalization does not cause any break point it might mean that the response of the society to 
both high and low consequence events are almost the same. The locations of the breaking points 
and the slopes before and after these points are the new characteristics that can be used for 
comparative risk assessment of natural hazards using FN-curves.  
Discussion: 
Normalization by exposed population is a rational idea when we want to compare two events 
with the same impacts but different exposures, e.g. 10 fatalities in a flooded village indicates 
different situation from 10 fatalities in a tsunami that affects more than 1 country. Now, how 
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does normalization on FN-curves help in terms of risk analysis? If normalization is done based 
on the population of the country as an index of exposed population to the event, which is what 
we have done to normalize the FN-curves of Italy, Greece, Ukraine, and UK, and we do not 
consider the precise number of exposure in an event, one might argue that the result only shifts 
the trend of the non-normalized curve on y-axis. However, since the normalization is done based 
on the yearly population of the country and in case that we have access to the detailed number of 
population exposed to each event, we will be able to distinguish differences in the trend of the 
curves and more information will be revealed. The more precise approach is something that can 
be pursued in following studies. 
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Appendix I. Comparison of disutility criterion with FN-criterion 
Disutlity Criterion 
    Based on Evans and Verlander (1998) it is assumed that fatal accidents occur as a Poisson 
process with mean frequency, f, per unit time and once it happened, the probability of n fatalities 
would be p(n), where n is a range of integer numbers between 1 and nmax. The mean frequency 
of exact n fatalities is defined as f(n)=f.p(n), therefore, p(n) is: 
 p(n) = f(n)f  (2.24) 
According to the theory of decision making under uncertainty, if tolerability decisions must be 
made , they are on the basis of so-called expected disutility (Evans and Verlander, 1998). The 
first step in the decision making process is to associate a number, u(n) with an accident having n 
fatalities, as a measure of its harm, Eq. 2.25 (Eq. 6 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). 
 u(n) = nβ (2.25) 
where β is a parameter for weighting the large and small accidents or “aversion to high 
consequence accidents” which must be greater than 1 if u(n) is greater than n. Disutility of an 
accident, ua, of uncertain size in the engineering system is given in Eq. 2.26 (Eq. 7 in Evans and 
Verlander (1998)). 
 ua = ∑
n
 u(n)p(n) (2.26) 
The disutility of k accidents each with disutility of ua in a given period, t, is kua. Using the 
expected disutility theorem, disutility per unit time, u, is ∑
k
 kuap(k)=ua ∑
k
 kp(k)=ftua, where p(k) 
is the probability of exactly k events in a Poisson distribution with mean ft (Evans and Verlander, 
1998). Therefore, the disutility per unit time, u, of such a process is fua. Eq. 2.26 will then 
become as Eq. 2.27 (Eq. 8 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). 
 u = f ∑
n
 u(n)p(n)= ∑
n
 u(n)f(n) (2.27) 
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Combining Eq. 2.25 with Eq. 2.27, we get Eq. 2.28 (Eq. 9 in Evans and Verlander (1998)) . 
 u = ∑
n
 nβf(n) (2.28) 
For decision makers, if u exceeds some threshold, U, the risk is intolerable and if u is less 
than or equal to U, the risks are tolerable.  
FN-Criterion 
   According to Evans and Verlander (1998), F(n) is the mean absolute frequency of accidents 
with n or more fatalities. In an FN-curve plot, F(n) is plotted against n, in log-log scale. f(n) is 
the mean frequency of accidents with exactly n fatalities. The relationship between F(n) and f(n) 
is given in Eq. 2.29 (Eq. 1 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). 
 F(n) = ∑
i=1
nmax
 f(i) (2.29) 
where nmax is the largest possible number of fatalities in a single accident and f(n)=F(n)−F(n+1) 
(Eq. 2 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). f is the frequency of fatal accidents of all sizes, therefore, 
f= ∑
i=1
nmax
 f(i)=F(1) (Eq. 3 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). Tolerable criterion defined here is 
F=F(n) and intolerable criterion is F=C(n). The tolerability if a system is judged by comparing 
F(n) and C(n), therefore, a tolerable system has to satisfy tolerable condition of 
log[F(n)]−log[C(n)]≤0 for all n values. This condition suggests nmax{log[F(n)]−log[C(n)]}≤0. 
The system is just tolerable of equality holds, Eq. 2.30 (Eq. 4 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). 
 nmax{log( F(n)C(n))}=0 
 nmax { F(n)C(n)} =1 (2.30) 
In a general case of F=νC(n), where ν is a positive number from 0 to ∞ (defined as the 
intolerability measure of the system , Evans and Verlander (1998)), Eq. 2.30 can be generalized 
to Eq. 2.31 (Eq. 5 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). 
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 ν = nmax{ F(n)C(n)} (2.31) 
If the criterion function is a line with slope of −β in a double-logarithmic scale, Eq. 2.32 is 
applicable for C(n). This changes Eq. 2.31 to Eq. 2.33. 
 C(n) = α
nβ
 (2.32) 
 v = nmax{ F(n)n
β
α } (2.33) 
Consistency check of disutility criterion and FN-criterion 
    Based on what we introduced according to Evans and Verlander (1998)) about disutility and 
FN criteria in the last two sections, if we consider two systems combined into a single system 
without any changes in the risks (assuming the disutility of accidents of size n is u(n), tolerability 
thresholds are U1 and U2, and the FN-criterion for two systems are C1(n) and C2(n) ) then, 
based on Eq. 2.26, we can find the disutility function of the combined system from summation of 
f(n)s, f(n)=f1(n)+f2(n) (Eq. 11 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). 
The tolerability threshold based on the disutility function, U, for the combined system using Eq. 
2.27, is U=f(n)u(n)=[f1(n)+f2(n)]u(n)=U1+U2 (Eq. 13 in Evans and Verlander (1998)). The 
overall criterion based on FN-intolerability, C(n), and FN-tolerability, F(n), in Evans and 
Verlander (1998), are assumed similar to disutility function (linear), therefore, C1(n)+C2(n) (Eq. 
14 in Evans and Verlander (1998)) and F1(n)+F2(n) (Eq. 12 in Evans and Verlander (1998)), 
respectively. We argue that the linear summation is not rational when the functions of C(n) and 
F(n) are non-linear with respect to n, Eq. 2.32. Our suggestion for the overall intolerable 
criterion, C(n), is based on a non-linear summation of C(n), Eq. 2.35. For the tolerable criterion, 
F(n), Eq. 2.36 is derived based on the non-linear summation of F(n). Here, for the sake of 
simplicity β=1 is assumed. 
 
1
C(n) = 
1
C1(n)
+ 
1
C2(n)
 (2.34) 
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 C(n) = 
C1(n)C2(n)
C1(n)+C2(n)
 (2.35) 
 F(n) = 
F1(n)F2(n)
F1(n)+F2(n)
 (2.36) 
To check the general consistency condition, its is assumed that systems 1 and 2 are just 
tolerable, therefore, the combined system should also be tolerable. The logical criteria that have 
to be satisfied by each approach are:   
• for the disutility function: if u1=U1 and u2=U2,then u must be U1+U2 . (Eq. 15 in Evans 
and Verlander (1998)) (Condition 1)   
• for FN-criterion intolerability measure, Eq. 2.31, if ν1=1 and ν2=1,then ν must be 1, 
where νi=nmax{ 
Fi(n)
Ci(n)
} and ν is the combination of νis. (Eq. 16 in Evans and Verlander (1998)) 
(Condition 2)  
    From Evans and Verlander (1998), the first condition is logically proved using Eq. 2.27. 
However, in a defined example by Evans and Verlander (1998), the second causal sentence fails, 
since in a linear approach the FN-criterion does not satisfy the Condition 2. Here, using the same 
examples (from Evans and Verlander (1998)), we show that with the non-linear summation, Eq. 
2.35, this condition will be satisfied and their conclusion about the misfunctionality of FN-curves 
based on this approach will be falsified.  
 
 Example (modified from Evans and Verlander (1998)):  
 Suppose that system 1 has a mean frequency of 0.1 accidents per year, in which there are 
exactly 10 fatalities, and C1(n)= 
1
n  (slope of FN-line is -1), then 
ν1=nmax{ 
F1(n)
C1(n)
}=nmax{nF1(n)}=0.1×10=1, therefore, risk of this system is just tolerable. The 
mean frequency of system 2 is supposedly 0.01 accidents per year with exactly 100 fatalities and 
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C2(n)= 
1
n, then ν2=nmax{ 
F2(n)
C2(n)
}=nmax{nF2(n)}=0.01×100=1 which is also just tolerable and 
meet the condition 2. Combining system 1 and system 2 using Eq. 2.35 and Eq. 2.36 in Eq. 2.31, 
we get ν=nmax{ 
[ 
F1(n)F2(2)
F1(n)+F2(n)
]
[ 
C1(n)C2(n)
C1(n)+C2(n)
]
}= 
 
0.1×0.1
0.1+0.1
 
 
1
10× 
1
100
 
1
10+ 
1
100
=1 which is again tolerable and meet the condition 
2.  This means that if we include the non-linearity of the FN function in calculating the 
tolerability and intolerability of an overall system, combination of two tolerable systems is also 
tolerable which is the conclusion that comes out of disutility criterion.  
Appendix Conclusion 
 Considering non-linear relationship between frequency and the size of events in FN-curves, 
FN-criterion does not fail any mathematical conditions and suggests that these curves can also be 
used for decision making beside disutility functions.  
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Chapter 3 Resistance in natural disaster systems: the case of 
earthquakes and the 2010 Haiti event   
3.1 Introduction  
3.1.1 Background 
Natural disasters in the last decade (2004-2012) have resulted in the deaths of over 1.2 Million 
people (Swiss Re Sigma reports 2005-2013, http://www.swissre.com/sigma/). These events have 
included the 2004 Great Sumatra, 2008 Cyclone Nargis and the 2010 Haiti earthquake all of 
which have reportedly caused over 100,000 deaths. The asymmetrical distribution of the number 
of disasters as well as the magnitude of associated losses in developing countries (e.g., Kahn, 
2005; Keefer et al., 2011) has given rise to a renewed interest in the role of resilience and 
vulnerability in natural disaster losses (Adger et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2010). Further, in the face 
of increased global urbanization, a focus has emerged on the characteristics of urban disaster risk 
(Bilham, 2009); In the same time period major developments have taken place in concepts and 
quantitative analysis of risk with application mainly to technological risks (e.g., Aven, 2009, 
2011; Jonkman et al., 2010; Zio and Aven, 2013). Meanwhile, the discussion around the concept 
of Black Swan events (Aven, 2009; Paté-Cornell, 2012; Stein et al., 2012), following the 
publication of Taleb (2007, 2010) illustrate the need to re-examine the nature of the occurrence 
and loss behavior of natural hazard systems, particularly as they relate to natural disasters.  
Here, we examine life loss in natural disasters. Whilst there has been much recent discussion of 
economic losses in natural disasters (e.g, Noy 2009; Cavallo et al., 2010; Neumayer and Barthel, 
2011; and Schumacher and Strobl 2011) there have been fewer attempts at rigorous analysis of the 
factors that lead to life loss in natural disasters. Exceptions are Kahn (2005) and Vranes and 
Pielke (2009) and more recent work by Holzer and Savage (2013), Keefer et al., (2011), and 
Doocy et al. (2013). This is despite the occurrence of hyper-life-loss in recent natural disasters as 
noted above and that the frequency of natural disasters appears to be increasing (Swisse Re, 
Sigma No. 2/2013, http://www.swissre.com/sigma/). Geospatial life-loss analysis reached its nadir 
in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake when the inability of the world is illustrated by the wide 
range of estimates of the Haiti death toll vary from 65,000 to 350,000 is unprecedented. 
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At the outset, it is worth noting that the investigation of life loss in natural disasters became a 
significant scientific and societal issue in the 1960s in the context of industrial safety and nuclear 
power development where industrial risk was compared to the natural disasters’ risk on graphs 
called FN-curves by Farmer (1967), Beattie (1967), Rasmussen (1975), and Farmer (1980). 
3.1.2 Definition of disaster  
A disaster is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "a sudden accident or a natural 
catastrophe that causes great damage or loss of life". In more detail, a disaster happens when "an 
extreme event occurs in the context of societal vulnerability" (Pielke, 2006, p. 138) that disrupts 
the functioning of a society (UNISDR, 2009) and results in losses that exceed a threshold 
determined by the characteristics and behavior of the loss system of the society affected. This 
definition is an example of a disaster occurrence conditioned by vulnerability. A disaster can also 
occur when a natural hazard event of extreme magnitude overwhelms any resistance in the society 
affected and causes losses above the same threshold. In this case the disaster occurrence is 
conditioned by hazard. Disasters imply a sudden-onset impact, a disruption of immediate effect, 
with or without warning.   
For the purposes of this paper, losses are life loss and the disaster threshold of loss is defined as 
1,000 fatalities, which is considered as the minimum number of fatalities that has been called 
disastrous; it is at this threshold that the natural disaster system is activated. 
This threshold (and the magnitude of losses above it) is determined by the manner/mechanism in 
which the societal system resists the impact of the natural hazard. We term this natural disaster 
resistance.  
3.1.3 Natural disaster systems 
A natural disaster system can be viewed as a complex system, i.e., a system consisting of many 
elements that interact in a disordered way, but result in a robust response pattern, that possesses 
memory (Ladyman et al., 2013). In a natural disaster scenario, it consists of an interaction 
between a natural hazard, which itself is a complex dynamic of nature, and a society, which also 
involves a highly dynamic behavior of engineering infrastructure (buildings and lifelines) and an 
exposed population. The nature of this interaction defines a destructive outcome, which is 
conditioned by such factors as the nature of the building stock, population density, building 
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construction quality, buildings, preparedness, warning. In addition, the geophysical characteristics 
of the impacted area may amplify or dampen the hazard (as in the case of seismic amplification 
resulting from foundation conditions); both hazard and its impact may also be amplified by 
cascade (domino) effects which can be initiated by the occurrence of a natural hazard.   
Thus the losses in a natural disaster is a complex consequence of the occurrence of a forcing 
natural hazard event and its interaction with the society impacted; they are thus not a simple 
function of event magnitude or necessarily the result of an "extreme natural hazard" (cf. McGuire 
et al. , 2006). Fig. 3.1 illustrates a disaster system in a schematic loss model. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Schematic loss model of elements involved in a natural disaster system 
 
 
3.1.4 Objectives  
Our objectives here are i) to outline a simple conceptual model of a natural disaster system in 
which a natural hazard as input, an immediate preventative reaction by the affected society or 
region (which we call resistance) and a destructive consequence as output (which in this context is 
life loss), ii) to explore the possibilities of quantifying resistance as defined in i), in an analysis of 
global and international earthquake fatality data, iii) to explore the mathematical linkage between 
power-law historical frequency-fatality relations and the conventional risk equation, iv) to apply 
these results to an after-event international analysis of loss data from the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
(event-specific resistance), and v) to evaluate global resistance to earthquake disasters 
(comparison with Bam and Kobe).   
FN-curves are power-law graphs that hold the history of losses in the areas. We examine the 
slopes of these curves as measures of resistance towards earthquakes in these areas.  
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3.2 Resistance in the Natural Disaster System  
3.2.1 Resistance and the risk equation (Resilience, robustness) 
We attempt to place resistance in the natural disaster system within the current definitions of risk. 
As Aven (2009) has noted there are many conceptual and quantitative definitions of risk. All 
involve (or imply) some combination or product of the probability of an event and its negative 
consequences (e.g., HSE, 2001; UNDP, 2004; Baecher and Christian, 2003; Porske 2008; and 
UNISDR, 2009).   
According to ISO 31000-2009 risk is the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (Aven, 2011a) 
which is often quantified as probability of occurrence of a dangerous event, times its negative 
impact (loss or damage) (Helbing, 2013).  
The conventional risk equation, as stated by Birkman (2006), for example, summarizes the 
definition of risk as multiplication of hazard, vulnerability and exposure (Eq. 3.1).  
Risk (R) =Hazard (H) × Vulnerability (V) × Exposure (E)           (3.1) 
Where Hazard (H) is the likelihood of a dangerous event occurrence (Aven, 2011), most 
frequently expressed as an annual probability of occurrence, vulnerability (V) is the state of 
susceptibility to harm due to the stresses of an environmental and social change or due to 
incapability to adapt with it (Adger, 2006), and exposure (E) is the number of elements at risk 
(Aven, 2011). Hazard has the unit of 1/time (1/year), Vulnerability may have a value between 0 
and 1 (if the vulnerability is zero no risk exists) with no unit, and exposure has a counting unit of 
numbers. Thus the unit of risk in Eq. 3.1 is numbers/year, which indicates loss/year and so risk in 
this type of equation is expressed as a loss rate.  
Vulnerability (V) is defined in many ways (Cutter, 1996, 2003), Watts and Bohle (1993) define 
vulnerability as a multidimensional variable integrating the environmental, social, economic and 
political situations of people in a society in the case of potential harm. Generally, vulnerability is 
used in a passive sense.  
Related to the concept of vulnerability is the concept of resilience. One of the many formulations 
of vulnerability is linked to the socio-ecological term, "resilience" (Adger, 2006). Scholz et al. 
(2012) argued that vulnerability and resilience are “highly similar, and in many respects, identical 
concepts”. We would like to capture this similarity in the quantification of resistance. 
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In the context of natural hazards our concern is loss of life due to natural disasters; hence, our 
definition for vulnerability includes the extent of losses in occurrence of natural disasters. Since 
we also use resistance as an equivalent to resilience, our definition of vulnerability provides a 
measure of resistance to the impact of natural disasters. Pelling (2003) uses the terms resistance 
and resilience besides the term exposure as components of a vulnerability of the cities in a social 
perspective for environmental risk/disaster events model.  
Resistance, is used here in an active sense, is an equivalent to the definition of "resilience"21 in 
civil engineering i.e., the risk-absorption level of a system (Aven (2011b), p. 26). As we define it 
here, resistance is an immediate reaction to a natural hazard event. In this sense it contrasts to the 
use of resilience as used in engineering and the social sciences which implies a longer-
term/delayed process of coping and recovery in the aftermath of a hazard impact. It is thus more 
in the original meaning of Holling (1973, p. 17) in ecology.  
With this redefinition, we consider a natural hazard as posing potential societal harm to a 
population, harm that can be resisted by human effort (e.g., engineering measures, warning 
systems, disaster mitigation and preparedness). Furthermore, in civil engineering, the definition 
and measurement of resistance is based on the capability of a structure to withstand possible 
sources of destruction represented by natural hazards such as earthquakes (e.g., Coburn and 
Spence, 1992; Dowrick, 2009).  
By indicating the new definition of vulnerability in the loss model, Fig. 3.1, and risk equation (Eq. 
3.1), vulnerability can be replaced by 1/Resistance (1/R), Eq. 3.2. We justify this replacement by 
the argument of a highly vulnerable society is less resistant towards a disaster. 
Risk =Hazard×1/Resistance ×Exposure            (3.2) 
The value of 1/Resistance, as in the case of vulnerability, integrates various properties of the 
affected region. For example, the economic capability of the region for developing and adopting 
technology for damage prevention is one of the main factors influencing resistance. Using the 
natural disaster system loss model in Fig. 3.1 and Eq. 3.2 we are able to quantify the resistance of 
an affected area after a disaster event by back-calculation to detect the most vulnerable areas. In 
this way, without going into details of socioeconomic factors of a society, we can estimate the 
disaster response of a society. We apply this strategy to the 2010 Haiti earthquake to estimate the 
                                                
21 Not to be confused with resilience in social sciences  
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resistance at an urban scale of  grid cell level of 100 m2 based on the destruction imagery of the 
satellite GeoEye-1 and population density according to the United states Census Bureau data 
(USCB, 2003, http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/statecounty/maps/2003.html) for the 
city of Port au Prince in the section 3.3.  
3.2.2 Characterizing loss behavior - Resistance based on FN-curves 
We introduced FN-curves in Chapter 2. FN-curves are power-law graphs on a log-log scale used 
for the quantitative societal risk assessment of natural and industrial disasters. Societal risk 
assessment is the risk assessment method that considers multiple-fatality events and therefore, the 
overall risk to a society. In FN-curves, F, which is the frequency of exceedance of losses (in this 
case loss of life), is plotted against the value of losses, N. These curves may be summarized by an 
inverse power-law equation, y=ax-b, relating the frequency of loss, y, to the value of loss, x. For 
actual data this equation is calculated by regression to determine the slope, -b, and a intercept, a, 
on a log-log graph. Slope and intercept of real-data plots are naturally determined by the 
characteristics of the data, i.e., risk aversion, slope of >1, proneness, slope of <1, and neutral, 
slope of 1, are not common terms used for real-data FN-curves.  
The slope of FN-curves generated based on real-data, i.e, that it represents the resistance of the 
affected area to losses generated by a hazard. A schematic plot in Fig. 3.2, shows that as the slope 
of the FN-curve decreases, the resistance also decreases while we keep the intercept the same. A 
shallower slope, -0.5, implies a higher number of fatalities at the same event frequency as the line 
with a steeper slope, -1, i.e., the hazard encountered with a less resistant environment or society in 
the shallower slope case. 
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Figure 3.2: Schematic effect of the slope of the FN-curve on the societal resistance. As the slope decreases from -1 to 
-0.5, the resistance also decreases. 
 
3.2.3 Why slope of FN is a measure of resistance: 
Although, the risk-proneness is not used for FN-curves produced based on real data, this concept 
can be borrowed from the industrial criteria to analyze the behavior of the real-data curves. Thus, 
for example, if the slope of a real-data curve is <1, the data suggests a risk-prone background of 
the region under consideration, i.e., the area suffers from a low resistance. This means that steeper 
curves are generated in higher resistance environments/regions. Since the loss behavior of the 
curve is controlled by the frequency of the larger events (Kagan, 1997), we could conclude that 
the slope of FN-curve is a measure of resistance towards large events.  
3.3 Global comparison on FN-curve - the case of earthquakes  
3.3.1 Global earthquake disasters 1950-2010 
For the remainder of the paper we focus on natural disasters caused by earthquakes in an attempt 
to quantify resistance in earthquake disaster systems at global, national, and international scales.   
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As noted above, we define a disaster as a natural hazard event resulting in 1,000 or more fatalities. 
We assembled a database of earthquake disasters for the period 1950-2012, a period of 62 years. 
The selection of the time period was arbitrary but determined by the data availability. 
Data sources consisted of i) the USGS table of earthquakes with 1,000 or more deaths since 1900, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/world_deaths.php, ii) the list of deadly earthquakes 
in the world: 1500-2000 compiled by Utsu (2002), and iii) significant earthquakes database, 
NGDC-NOAA, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1. The accuracy 
of data is very important in risk assessment of past events. Inconsistency in the number of losses 
reported in various databases brings difficulty for judgment. Extra care and investigation is 
needed for these types of data. For example, for the case of Haiti earthquake in 2010, the number 
of casualties reported varies between 65,000 to 330,000. We also note that precise numbers of life 
loss in mass casualty events has always been subject to significant debate. Some of these debates 
come from the fact that deaths in earthquakes are mostly result of collapsed buildings and 
identifying the number of people in the buildings and the type of building that was collapsed are 
not trivial, specially, in case of lack of documentation in a region. 
According to our disaster criteria of 1,000 fatalities and more, there were 75 earthquake disasters 
between 1950 and 2012 in which there were an approximate total of 1,240,000 fatalities (see data 
in Supplementary information).    
We plotted cumulative annual frequency of N deaths or more (Y axis) versus number of deaths 
(N) in the earthquake disaster event (X axis) for the 75 events in the period 1950-2012 following 
the method of Clauset et al. (2009). We modified the method by expressing the frequency on the y 
axis as frequency of N (or more) per year, i.e., an annual frequency).  
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Figure 3.3: Historical fatality frequency (FN) plot for global earthquake disasters (n=75) where N≥ 1,000 fatalities, 
1950-2012. Green dots are two scenarios of fatalities for Haiti, 2010 as discussed in text. The fitted line is a power 
law curve which represents the trend of Frequency-Fatality in 62 years and the slope (-0.56) shows the resistance of 
the global earthquake disaster system. Data sources are given in the supplementary information. 
 
As in plots of similar data of death tolls in natural disasters, e.g. Knopoff and Sornette (1995), 
Nishenko and Barton (1995), Guzzetti et al. (2002), Evans (2006); Petley, (2012) the plot yields a 
robust power law. The power law in Fig. 3.3 is expressed as Y= 1.77X-0.56 (R2=0.99) (n= 75) with 
the 95% confidence interval of (-0.54, -0.57) for the slope of the fitted line. Saturation at high 
magnitudes is evident at N~250,000. Fig. 3.3 also indicates that earthquake disasters as defined 
here are a yearly occurrence. Disasters involving 10,000 and 100,000 fatalities or more occur with 
an annual frequency of approximately 3 years and 10 years respectively.   
It is of interest to compare the slope of the FN plot in Fig. 3.3 to FN plots in industrial safety and 
risk analysis. In industrial accidents (e.g., road tunnels (Meng et al, 2011)) real-data FN-curves 
generate slopes that are much steeper (e.g., ~2 for road tunnels) than these curves. Only based on 
the difference between slopes of these two types of disasters, we could conclude that the 
resistance towards road tunnel accidents is much higher than earthquake disasters. 
62 
 
3.3.2 Earthquake disaster resistance - an inter-national comparison  
To explore further the earthquake disaster resistance in different countries, as an example, we 
compare the FN-curve of earthquake fatalities of 1 and greater in three countries of Japan, Iran, 
and Haiti in Fig. 3.4. We compare the best power-law fit to the data of each country and the 95% 
confidence interval of the slopes in Table 3.1. Although, in the assessment of global earthquake 
disasters, fatalities of more than 1,000 is considered as minimum threshold, here by choosing 1 
fatalities as the minimum fatalities in these three countries, the statistical comparison become 
possible, since Haiti holds very few earthquake fatality data. 
As Fig. 3.4 and Table 3.1 illustrate, Haiti holds the smallest slope among Japan, Iran, and Haiti 
which means the lowest resistance. On the other hand, Haiti is located lower on the FN-curve 
which means that frequency of earthquake disasters in Haiti is smaller than Japan and Iran. This 
suggests that lower frequency disasters do not necessarily cause less losses in the world. 
 
Figure 3.4: FN-curves of earthquake fatalities (greater than 1) in Iran (orange triangles, n=117), Japan (green squares, 
n=53), and Haiti (red dots, n=8) during the period of 1900-2010. Data are obtained from the USGS Pager catalogue 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/data/pager/), EM_DAT (http://www.emdat.be/), and Utsu (2002); data listed in 
Supplementary Information. 
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Table 3.1 Equations of the power-law fit to the real-data FN-curve (N≥1) of Iran, Japan, and Haiti, shown 
on Fig. 3.3 (a), with R2 values and 95% confidence intervals of the slopes. 
  Power-Law fit R2 Slope Confidence Interval 
Iran Log(Y) =0.02-0.24x 0.98 (n=117) -0.25 to -0.24 
Japan Log(Y) =-0.32-0.25x 0.97 (n=53) -0.26 to -0.23 
Haiti Log(Y) =-1.15-0.22x 0.96 (n=8) -0.28 to -0.16 
 
The slopes of the power-law fits to the countries’ plots on Fig. 3.4 only vary between -0.16 to -
0.28 (Table 3.1). Small variations of slopes in these curves suggest that the resistances of these 
countries are not significantly different from each other while they all are indicating very shallow 
curves (slope <1). However, this result is counter-intuitive, since earthquake events in Haiti have 
consequences that are hugely different from Japan or Iran. Why do they carry the same societal 
resistance on FN-curves, then? This result is rooted in the variation of fatalities with respect to the 
frequency of fatal events in these countries. For example, if the frequencies of large events were 
significantly smaller that small events on the FN-curve (or the scaled FN-curve), the slope of the 
curve would become steeper since the ratio of the range of frequencies to the range of fatalities 
would be a larger number, and consequently, the resistance would be greater. In the case of Iran, 
Japan, and Haiti this is not the case, i.e., the ratio of the range of frequencies to the range of 
fatalities for each country is almost constant, and therefore, the resistance is the same. 
3.4 Resistance in terms of Power-law equation 
Risk in Eq. 3.2 is the expected loss due to the hazard. If we replace Hazard by P(H), Resistance by 
R, and Exposure by Exp.Pop, Eq. 3.2’ would be 
Loss=P(H)×1/R×Exp.Pop  (3.2’) 
P(H) is the probability of hazard that can be estimated based on the probability of occurrence of 
exceeding a certain magnitude of hazard, e.g., a certain magnitude of earthquake or a peak ground 
acceleration.  
On the other hand, from Jonkman et al. (2003), it is derived that the expected loss of life (Loss) 
can be estimated from the area underneath the power-law fit of the frequency-fatality curve of 
natural disasters (FN-curve), e.g., Fig. 3.3. (Eq. 3.3), between certain values of x (loss), d1 and d2 
are the minimum and maximum number of fatalities reported in the data, respectively. 
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(3.3) 
We use absolute value because Loss cannot be negative, and in case of b>1, the integral would 
become negative.  
Since the left side of Eq. 3.2’ and Eq. 3.3 are the same, we equate the right sides of Eq. 3.2’ and 
Eq. 3.3 in Eq. 3.4. !!!!! !!!!!! − !!!!!! = !!×! ! ×!"#.!"#                        (3.4) 
Eq. 3.4 is an equation that is a function of a, b, d1, d2, R, P(H), and Exp.Pop. Rearranging Eq. 3.4., 
we could express resistance in terms of parameters of the power-law fit to the frequency-fatality 
curve and the equation of loss for certain countries in Eq. 3.5. Rc is called the country-specific 
resistance. 
Rc =
C(a,b)
D(b) !P(H )!Exp.Pop                                                     (3.5) 
Where D(b)=  !!!!!! − !!!!!!, and !(!, !) = !!!!  
Eq.3.5 shows the relationship between resistance and the slope of power-law fit. From Eq. 3.5, Rc 
is a function of D(b) which varies by different values of d1, d2, and b; therefore, the precision in 
data collection of fatalities affect the values of d1 and d2 and consequently Rc. As the slope 
increases (become steeper), the resistance also increases while the slope is b≠1. In case of b=1, the 
integral of Eq.3.3 would lead to Loss=a (ln|d2|-ln|d1|), which results in  ! = ! ! ×!"#.!"#!  (!" !! !!" !! ).  
b=1 is the slope that is considered as risk neutral in FN-diagrams. It is compared to b>1 (risk 
averse) and b<1 (risk prone). In many cases of natural hazards, b<1 is observed, however, in 
industrial hazards, such as railroad accidents, b>1 is observed. For risk assessment purposes, 
imposed slope criteria are mainly b=1 (UK) and b=2 (Netherlands).  
Fig. 3.5 shows the relationship between Log(R) and different slopes for the example of Haiti, with 
P(H)=0.04, Exp.Pop=10,173,775, a=0.07, and a death interval of d2=65,000, d1=1 where P(H) is 
calculated based on the probability of occurrence of magnitudes greater than 5.5 in Haiti, 
Exp.Pop. is the population of Haiti in 2010, a is the intercept of the FN-curve of Haiti from Table 
3.1, d2 is one of the scenarios of the number of fatalities in Haiti 2010 earthquake that we believe 
is closer to reality, and d1 is the minimum number of reported death due to earthquakes in Haiti. 
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The actual b value of the fit to FN-curve of Haiti from Table 3.1 is 0.22 which leads to 
Log(R)=2.9. However, in Fig. 3.5 we assume different slope values in order to examine the effect 
of the value of b  (slope) on the value of resistance.  
 
Figure 3.5: Log of resistance values with respect to different b  values in Eq. 3.5 for Haiti with P(H)=0.04, 
Exp.Pop=10,173,775, a=0.07, and a death interval of d2=65,000, d1=1. The actual b-value of the fit to FN-curve of 
Haiti is 0.22. 
 
As shown in Fig. 3.5, as the slope gets steeper (greater b), the resistance increases. Thus, our 
comparison of power-law fit to real-data FN-curves with the concepts of risk-avers, risk-prone, 
and risk neutral is valid, i.e., steeper slope means a risk-averse situation, it means a more resistant 
situation in a country. 
3.4.1 Country-specific resistance comparison 
We compared Haiti with Japan, and Iran in Fig. 3.4 and Table 3.1 in terms of their FN-curves. 
Now, after introducing the country-specific resistance in Eq. 3.5, we are going to compare their 
resistance based on some assumptions. Our first assumption is that the exposed population of the 
country is an index of exposure to earthquake disasters, Exp.Pop. The second assumption, here, is 
that moment magnitude can be considered as the earthquake hazard in these countries; therefore, 
we choose magnitude of 5.5 as the minimum threshold for causing earthquake disasters, since, 
based on our data of 75 disastrous earthquakes since 1950, the lowest moment magnitude that 
caused 1,000 fatalities is 5.5. Our final assumption is that probability of occurrence of magnitude 
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5.5 based on the Poisson probability distribution function is a good estimate for probability of 
hazard, P(H), since the occurrence of earthquakes can be considered as Poisson process 
(Scheidegger, 1975). 
However, for estimation of the event-specific resistance that we introduce later, the P(H) is the 
probability of exceeding a peak ground acceleration, PGA, threshold that is meaningful for that 
event, considering the distance to the epicenter. We will see an example of this method for the 
Kobe 1995, Bam 2003, and Haiti 2010, in section 3.7. 
For now, to calculate the P(H) of Haiti, Iran, and Japan, we gathered the total number of 
earthquakes with any magnitude greater than 5.5 in the earthquake catalogue (NEIC) over the 
period of 1973-2013, and estimated the parameter of Poisson probability distribution function, λ,  
for each year in order to calculate the yearly value of P(H). The average value of the yearly P(H)s 
is our estimate for the probability of hazard of the country. 
The resistance of Haiti, Iran, and Japan, based on the values of P(M≥5.5) of the countries, the 
exposed population of the country, and parameters of their FN-curves are calculated according to 
Eq. 3.5 (Table 3.2). We used NEIC catalogue (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/) for 
the period of 1900-2013, start_time=1900/01/01,00:00:00, end_time=2013/01/01,00:00:00 at the 
latitudes and longitudes in which these countries are surrounded. Table 3.2 lists the parameters 
used to calculate Rc from Eq. 3.5. 
Table 3.2 List of number of events with magnitude M≥5.5, probability of occurrence of magnitude 5.5 in the period of 
1900-2013 (based on Poisson probability distribution function), current exposed population of the countries, intercept, 
a, and slope, b, of the power-law fit to the FN-curve of the countries of Iran, Japan, and Haiti, in order to calculate the 
resistance from Eq. 3.5, and log(R). Population data is based on World Bank (2008-2012) record 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) 
  Lat. Long. P(M≥5.5) Exp.pop (2008-2012) a b d1 d2  Rc log(Rc) 
Iran 18-42 N 42-63 E 0.347 76,424,443 1.05 0.24 1 45000 5598.35 3.75 
Japan 40-50 N 130-150 E 0.695 127,561,489 0.48 0.25 1 142807 127868.2 5.11 
Haiti 18-20 N 71.5-75 W 0.011 10,173,775 0.07 0.22 1 65000 32.13 1.51 
 
From Table 3.2, log(Rc) of Haiti is the lowest value among the others. The very low probability of 
earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 5.5 in this area seems to play an important role in the 
case of Haiti. This suggests that, since the country doesn’t experience earthquakes so often, the 
resistance of the country towards earthquakes has not strengthened accordingly.  
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3.4.2 Resistance of the global earthquake system 
Here, we would like to investigate the resistance of the global earthquake disaster system as one 
country based on Eq. 3.5 and Fig. 3.3. In order to find the P(H) for the global earthquake system, 
we need to find the probability of occurrence of earthquakes with certain magnitudes, during 
1900-2013. From NEIC catalogue (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/), we gathered 
the global number of earthquakes with magnitude equal or greater than 5.5, which is the threshold 
of magnitude that can cause 1,000 fatalities in the period of 1900-2013, 
start_time=1900/01/01,00:00:00, end_time=2013/01/01,00:00:00. The number of recorded 
earthquake in this period is 24,276	  earthquakes. The average probability of hazard, based on the 
Poisson probability distribution function, is around 0.99. Hence, the resistance of the global 
earthquake system, using Eq. 3.5 with a=58.88, b=0.56, Exp.Pop =7,046,368,812, d1=1 and 
d2=255,000 would be 218773.4, therefore, Log(R)=5.34. This value is an average of global 
resistance towards earthquakes with magnitude 5.5 and greater per year. This suggests that the 
background resistance of the world, based on 113 years of data, is quite high with respect to 
specific countries such as Iran, and Haiti. However, Japan’s Log(Rc) is very close to the global 
societal resistance towards earthquake disasters. This means that the advancements of 
technologies in Japan in order to reduce the effects of earthquake disasters have been so 
successful that they have reached to the norm of global resistance towards earthquake disasters.  
3.5 Structure of a Natural Disaster System (with resistance) - the 2010 Haiti 
Earthquake  
3.5.1 Haiti - Overview  
The Haiti earthquake on January 12, 2010 with Mw= 7.0 (Hayes et al., 2010), is reportedly among 
the most destructive earthquakes in recorded history and it is considered as a natural disaster 
system in this study, i.e., it caused more than 1,000 fatalities.  
The death toll announced by the Government of Haiti exceeds 230,000 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8507531.stm). More than 5 million people live in the area 
directly affected by the earthquake (Eberhard et al., 2010). The Republic of Haiti covers 27,750 
km2 of the island of Hispaniola, and has a total population of approximately 9 million. Port-au-
Prince is the largest city in Haiti that has an estimated population of between 2.5 and 3 million 
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people within the metropolitan area and is located 25 km east- northeast of the epicenter with an 
area of 36.04 km² (Eberhard et al., 2010). Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, 
with an estimated 80 percent of its people living under the poverty line (CIA, 2010, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html).  
3.5.2 Historical Earthquakes  
Haiti has also been impacted by other earthquakes with magnitude of 7.0 and greater before, we 
have defined a rectangle polygon of Greater Antilles region (15o-19oN, 77o-68oW) in which Haiti 
is located. We analyzed historical seismic activities in this region between 1500-2010. We found 
that there have been earthquakes in 1564, 1692, 1751, 1770, 1842, 1860, 1887, 1899, 1916, 1946, 
and 1948 (Ghahramani, 2011). Table 3.3 summarize these earthquakes with their latitude, 
longitude of the epicenters, moment magnitude of the earthquakes and the refernce that the 
information gathered from. Fig. 3.6 is the map of Hispaniola and some of the historical 
earthquakes in the region. The magnitude-frequency of these earthquakes are plotted in Fig. 3.7. 
The equation of the fitted log-linear line is y=10-0.9x+4.9 (n=9, R2=0.97) with 95% confidence 
interval slope of (-1.1,-0.7), and intercept of (3.8,6.2). 
Table 3.3 List of 12 largest earthquakes from 1500 to 2010 in Haiti 
Date latitude longitude Mw Reference 
1564 19.38141 -70.5913 7 Scherer (2012) and Utsu1 
1692 17.8 -76.7 7.5 Utsu 
1751 18.45966 -72.2439 7.5 Scherer (2012) and Utsu 
1770 18.34708 -72.8683 7.3 Scherer (2012) and Utsu  
1842 19.84992 -72.837 8 Scherer (2012) and Utsu 
1860 18.38 -73 7 Scherer (2012) and Utsu 
1887 19.7 -73.1 7 Scherer (2012) and Utsu 
1899 18 -77 7.5 Utsu  
1916 18.5 -68 7.8 PAGER2 
1946 19.25 -69 7.9 PAGER 
1948 19.25 -69.25 7.1 PAGER 
2010 18.447 -72.55 7 USGS3 
1.UTSU online searchable catalog: (http://iisee.kenken.go.jp/utsu/index_eng.html). 
2.  Pager catalog. Available at (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/data/pager/). 
3. U.S. Geological Survey, 2010, U.S. Geological Survey, significant earthquakes; magnitude 7.0 Haiti region, 2010 
January 12, 21:53:10 UTC [http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/ accessed on 
March 2, 2010]. 
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Figure 3.6: Location map of Hispaniola and Some historical Earthquakes within Haiti as well as the location of 2010 
Earthquake. 
 
Figure 3.7: Annual magnitude Frequency plot of the earthquakes with M≥5 within the rectangle polygon of Greater 
Antilles region (15o-19oN, 77o-68oW) from 1500 to 2010. Equation of the log-linear fitted line is y=10-0.9x+4.9 (n=9, 
R2=0.97). 
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Other natural hazards for Haiti are hurricane, severe storms from June to October, occasional 
flooding, and periodic droughts. For instance, in 2008, more than 800 people were killed by a 
series of four hurricanes and tropical storms that struck Haiti during a two-month period (CIA, 
2010, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html). 
3.5.3 Seismic hazard of Port-au-Prince   
Based on our conceptual loss model summarised in Fig. 3.1 and Eq. 3.2, the assessment of losses 
in an earthquake disaster system requires the determination of hazard (in this case ground 
acceleration), the resistance of the area to the ground motion, and the number of people exposed 
to the hazard..  
Based on the analysis of historical earthquakes in the Port au Prince region (Fig. 3.7) we found 
that that the return period of the 2010 Haiti M7.0 earthquake is almost 250 years. In order to 
estimate the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for Port-au-Prince (Presidential Palace at  
18.543261N, 72.338861W) (Fig.3.8) Since there no attenuation relation for the city of Port-Au-
Prince has been published, we used the Boore and Atkinson (2008) attenuation equation to 
estimate PGA. Fig. 3.9 shows the frequency-attenuation curve of historical earthquakes listed in 
Table 3.3 at the Presidential Palace of Port au Prince (Ghahramani, 2011) which holds the 
attenuation relation of y=0.0134e-6.63x . 
 
Figure 3.8: Map of Port au Prince with respect to the Haiti 2010 earthqake epicenter at the 18.44◦ N,   72.57◦ W 
(orange icon), the location of Port au Prince is estimated at the Presidential Palace at the 18.543261N, 72.338861W 
(red and purple icon, A) [Google Earth]. 
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Figure 3.9: Annual frequency of exceedance versus PGA for the city of Port-au-Prince based on Boore and Atkinson 
(2008) attenuation relation is y=0.0134e-6.63x  (Reproduced from Ghahramani (2011)). 
 
Since the PGA of 2010 Haiti is 0.18 g, we choose the PGA threshold of damage as 0.18g 
(Ghahramani, 2011) (Fig. 3.9). Furthermore, among all historical events, earthquake in 1860 has 
been considered to cause the lowest damage on Port au Prince; as a result, the PGA for threshold 
of damage is approximately 7.3 % of g, with the return period of 125 years.  
One result that we obtained from the frequency-PGA analysisi of the region of Port au Prince was 
that based on Fig. 3.9, it seems to be an underestimation of PGA values in the global seismic 
hazard map with the return period of 475 years (Ghahramani, 2011). 
3.5.5 Population characterisitics, building damage, and life loss in affected area  
The pre-earthquake population of Haiti can be estimated from two sources: the 2003 Haitian 
Census conducted by the United States Census Bureau (USCB, 2003, 
http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/statecounty/maps/2003.html) and the 2009 census 
(IHSI, 2009). The 2009 population of Haiti was estimated at 9.923 M (IHSI, 2009). This 
population has lived on an area of 27,751 km², which yield a population density of around 360 
p/km2; p stands for people. Damage mapping by the European Union-World Bank-UN 
consortium, summarized by Kemper et al. (2010) and Corbane et al. (2011) indicates that 11 
communes were heavily damaged by the earthquake. The total population of these communes in 
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2009 was estimated at 3.091 M, 31% of Haiti's total population (IHSI, 2009). This number 
constitutes the exposed population for the 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster. The affected communes 
covered an area of 1,992.8 km2, about 7% of Haiti's total area. The highest population density was 
in Port-au-Prince commune where it reached 24,913 p/km2. 
3.5.6 Occupants per building 
Loss of life in earthquakes is largely a result of building damage and collapse. We aim to estimate 
the total number of fatalities due to building collapse in the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The number of 
residential buildings and family units in each commune is provided by the 2003 Haitian Census 
data. However, a pre numeration of households (menages) of the affected area was carried out as 
part of the 2003 Census.  
From Census data we could calculate the number of persons per building in each of the affected 
communes in 2003. It should be pointed out that the number of buildings and occupants might 
have changed since 2003; however, the data is not available. If we assume that this number is the 
same in 2009, by dividing the number of persons per building into the estimated 2009 population 
of these communes, we are able to obtain the number of buildings present in 2009. This estimate 
is thus the number of exposed buildings in the Haiti Earthquake. For the commune of Port au 
Prince, the number of buildings is reported as 129,183 and Census (2003) recorded the total 
number of families in this commune as 158,790, while the total exposed population is 736,618 
(USCB, 2003, http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/statecounty/maps/2003.html). From 
these numbers, we could estimate the average person per building as 5.7 (p/bldg); bldg. stands for 
building. 
The detailed damage survey work of Kemper et al., 2010 and Corbane et al. (2011) indicates that 
in the 11 affected communes, 58,562 buildings were classified as destroyed or badly damaged 
according to the EMS-98 building damage scale (i.e., damage grade 4 and 5). This number 
constitutes 9.4% of the estimated exposed building stock in 2009.     
UNOSAT, http://www.unitar.org/unosat/maps/hti, estimates the number of damaged buildings in 
all districts of Haiti. 27,694 out of 92,740 buildings in Port au Prince were damaged as follows; 
totally damaged (11,663), heavily damaged (10,801), and substantially damaged (5,230).  
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Thus the following question emerges; what proportion of the occupants of these destroyed or 
badly damaged buildings were killed as a result of the 2010 earthquake-generated housing 
damage?  
Schwartz et al. (2011) in a controversial report, have estimated the 2010 Haiti death toll to be 
between 46,190 and 84,961, much lower than official estimates. In a more recent paper, Doocy et 
al. (2013) reported the results of a stratified cluster survey in metropolitan Port-Au-Prince. They 
concluded that the number of fatalities was defined by the range 49,033 and 86,555, a range 
almost precisely the same as reported by Schwartz et al. (2011) and corresponds roughly to 2% of 
the exposed population in the Haiti event.  
Schwartz et al. (2011) estimate is equivalent to 0.79 to 1.45 deaths per destroyed building (fatality 
rate 17-32%) whereas the Doocy et al. (2013) estimate is equivalent to 0.84 to 1.48 deaths per 
destroyed building (fatality rate 18-32%). Taking the mean of these numbers we obtain a mean 
deaths per building 1.5 per destroyed building, which is equivalent to a  (fatality rate 25%).   
Now, we use a sequence of steps shown in Table 3.4 to estimate the number of fatalities due to 
building collapse. By having the number of occupancy per building, we are able to estimate the 
total number of buildings per grid cell (BPG) by dividing the population at the grid cell by the 
occupancy estimate. The total number of destructed buildings would be the result of 
multiplication of BPG by the percentage of destruction in the buildings. Having the ratio of the 
number of deaths at buildings to the number of destroyed buildings, the total number of deaths at 
all building destroyed due to earthquakes would be that ratio times the number of destructed 
buildings. This ratio is assumed to be 1.5. We apply this method to estimate the total number of 
deaths due to building collapse in the commune of Port au Prince due to the Haiti 2010 
earthquake. 
Table 3.4 List of components, equations, and calculations needed to calculate number of deaths at 
buildings destructed at Haiti 2010 earthquake. 
Occupancy per building in Haiti= 5.7 person (based on Census, 2003) 
Total number of buildings per grid cell (BPG)=  population of the grid cell/5.7 
Number of destructed buildings in a grid cell=  BPG× percentage of destruction in buildings  
number of deaths at buildings/number of 
buildings destroyed =  1.5 
Number of deaths at buildings=  1.5 × number of destructed buildings 
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Numbers of deaths and destructed buildings in the total grid cells of 3585 (Port au Prince 
Commune) at all three estimations of the population from gridded population (2003), census 2003 
(USCB, 2003), and census 2009 (IHSI, 2009) are listed in Table 3.5. In Table 3.5 calculation of 
fatalities is based on 1.5 numbers of deaths in the buildings per number of buildings destroyed at 
both lower and upper limits of destruction map of Haiti which are estimated in section 3.5.5. 
Table 3.5 Three scenarios of the exposed population (Ex.Pop) gathered from gridded population 
data (http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/mapping/demobase.html), 2003 
census, and 2009 census data. The total number of destructed buildings (upper and lower limits) 
are calculated based on Table 3.4, and the number of deaths at destructed buildings of Haiti 2010 
event is calculated by considering 1.5 number of deaths per building destroyed. 
 Exp.Pop 
Number of 
destructed 
buildings -
Upper 
limit 
Number of 
destructed 
buildings-
Lower 
limit 
Number of deaths 
based on upper limit 
destruction and 1.5 
death/building 
Number of deaths 
based on lower limit 
destruction and 1.5 
death/building 
gridded 
population 
2003 598,811 29286.6 17851.9 43929.9 26777.9 
Census 2003 736,618 36022.5 21957.9 54033.7 32936.8 
Census 2009 897,859 43900.6 26760.0 65850.9 40140.1 
 
From the range of total destructed buildings in the commune of Port au Prince, between 17,852 
and 43,901, we can see that our results is very compatible with the UNOSAT report of destructed 
buildings (27,694). The total damaged buildings based on Kemper et al (2010) and Corbane et al. 
(2011) is 58,562 in the 11 communes. Thus, based on the range of damaged buildings in Port au 
Prince (Table 3.5), we could conclude that between 31%-75% of the whole earthquake damage 
occurred in the commune of Port au Prince. 
The total lower and upper estimates of deaths in the three scenarios of exposed population in the 
2010 Haiti earthquake indicate that the range of fatalities in the commune of Port au Prince is 
between 26,778 and 65,851. This estimate range, is much closer to the range of total deaths that 
Schwartz et al. (2011) and Doocy et al (2013) suggested which we think are more reasonable 
estimates.  
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3.6 Fatalities and Gridded Resistance in Port-Au-Prince Commune  
3.6.1 Damage mapping in Port-au-Prince 
In order to quantify the earthquake-generated urban damage that occurred in Port au Prince, we 
conducted a damage assessment using high resolution satellite imagery provided by GeoEye-1. 
The GeoEye-1 satellite produces images showing 225 km2 at a resolution of <0.2 m. A 100 m2 
grid was overlain on the satellite imagery of Port-au-Prince and damage was assessed on a square 
by square basis (Delaney, 2011). Each grid square was assigned a value from 0 to 6 corresponding 
to the level of damage. Values of 0 (no building present) and 1 (unaffected buildings) expressed 
areas of no damage. The values of 2 through 6 denoted grid squares which contained damage and 
collapsed structures. Table 3.6 summarizes the list of the number of grid cells based on the 
percentage of building damage categories. The damage was determined through visual inspection 
with each class representing 20% intervals (Delaney, 2011). The destruction map of Port au 
Prince is shown in Fig. 3.10. 
Table 3.6 Damage categories used for destruction assessment of the commune of Port au Prince 
based on the GeoEye-1 satellite images (total of 3585 grid cells with the area of 100m×100m). 
Damage code 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Definition of the 
damage code 
No building and 
no damage 
Buildings but 
no damage 
<20% 
Damage 
20%-40% 
Damage 
40%-60% 
Damage 
60%-80% 
Damage 
>80% 
Damage 
Number of grid 
cells 1098 972 1032 202 138 71 72 
Total area (m2) 1 10,980,000 9,720,000 10,320,000 2,020,000 1,380,000 710,000 720,000 
Percentage to 
the total area 
(%)2 
30.6 27.1 28.8 5.6 3.9 2.0 2.0 
1 Total area of damage coded square(s) = (number of grid cells) × (10,000m2) 
2 Percentage to the total area= (Area of squares) / 35,850,000m2 
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Figure 3.10: Destruction map of the commune of Port au Prince. The range of damage is between green (0), and red 
(6) based on the codes in Table 3.6 
3.6.2 Number of deaths in gridded Port-au-Prince map 
After preparing the damage percentage of each grid cell, in order to estimate the number of deaths 
in each grid cell, we follow the steps explained in the previous section, Table 3.4. The assumption, 
here, again is 5.7 person occupancy in each building and 1.5 fatalities per buildings destroyed. 
Estimated values of fatalities in each grid cells are used for two purposes in this study. The first 
use was to calculate the lower and upper estimates of total number of fatalities in Port au Prince 
which showed in Table 3.5, and the second use is to estimate the resistance of each grid-cell using 
the steps that we will explain in the section 3.6.3. 
3.6.3 Resistance of Port au Prince grid-cells to the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
The loss equation that we introduced in Eq. 3.2’ provides a relationship between the number of 
fatalities, Loss, probability of exceeding a certain peak ground acceleration, P(H), population 
exposed to the PGA, Exp.Pop, and resistance, R. If there is only one unknown parameter in this 
equation, by solving the equation we could estimate the value of the unknown. Here, the values of 
resistance of the grid cells of Port au Prince are our unknown parameters. Eq. 3.6 is derived from 
re-arranging Eq. 3.2’, where resistance is written with respect to probability of hazard, P(H), 
exposed population, Exp.Pop, and life-loss, Loss. 
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 R = P(H)×Exp.PopLoss  (3.6) 
To estimate the resistance of each grid cell (total of 5272 grid cells for four main districts of Port 
au Prince) to the impact of the M7.0 2010 Haiti earthquake, we defined the values in Eq. 3.6 as 
follows;  
Loss - the estimated destruction level in each gridded cell based on the methodology explained in 
section 3.5.5 (Delaney, 2011):  
P(H), the exceedance probability of the peak ground acceleration that strike the grid cell. The 
PGA is calculated from Boore and Atkinson (2008) and the exceeding probability is estimated 
based on the annual frequency-PGA curve of the region, Fig. 3.9 (Ghahramani, 2011). 
Exp. Pop - the population of the gridded cell based on the population density of the gridded 
cells obtained from the Census (2003). 
Gridded resistance estimates calculated by Eq. 3.6 are depicted on Fig. 3.11 in which red cells 
show the lowest resistance areas and green cells show the highest resistance areas.  
Comparing the number of losses with respect to the resistance of the grids, we observe that less 
losses occur at more resistant areas, Fig. 3.12. Furthermore, Fig. 3.12 shows that the number of 
grid cells that have very large number of deaths and have very low resistance are much smaller 
than the number of grid cells that have small number of deaths and occur in high resistant areas. 
This reflects the characteristics of the population distribution and the urbanization of the city of 
Port au Prince. 
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Figure 3.11: Resistance of gridded cells of the city of Port au Prince, Haiti calculated from Eq. 3.6. Here, red shows 
grid cells with low resistance and green shows high resistance grid cells. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Estimated number of deaths in each grid cell with respect to the resistance of the grid (calculated from 
Eq. 3.6).  
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3.7 Comparison of resistance of earthquake disasters (event-specific resistance) 
According to the disaster risk index table of countries (UNDP, 2004), every year, there are an 
average of 93.14 people are killed on streets of Haiti. This suggests that we need to eliminate the 
number of fatalities due to other causes by considering daily death rate of the country in our 
country-based comparisons. We compare resistance of different earthquake events in different 
countries by modifying Eq. 3.6 using the daily death rate, DDR, number of deaths per year per 
1,000 people, in the equation, Eq. 3.7. Daily death rate is the rate of death due to normal, non-
disastrous effects (crude death rate) (UNdata, 
http://data.un.org/Glossary.aspx?q=Crude+death+rate+%28CDR%29, 2010). We use a modified 
resistance equation in Eq. 3.7, where the sub-index of e stands for event-specific. 
Re =
P(H )!Exp.Pop
Loss!D.D.R  (3.7) 
In Eq. 3.6, P(H) is the probability of hazard, i.e., the probability of exceeding a certain PGA based 
on the attenuation of the earthquake at the center of the nearest city affected by the event, Exp.Pop 
is the population of the country affected by the event at the time of the event, Loss is the number 
of fatalities in the event and DDR is the daily death rate of the country (UNData, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Crude&d=SOWC&f=inID%3a91, 2010).  
In section 3.2, we introduced the concept of resistance represented by the slope of the FN-curves 
and in Fig. 3.4 we compared the slope of the FN-curves of earthquake fatalities in the three 
countries of Haiti, Iran, and Japan. We also compared the country-specific resistance of these 
countries in Table 3.2. Here, we estimate the resistance of three specific events in these three 
countries and compare the results with the results of the country-specific resistance in Table 3.7.  
Eq. 3.5 is used for calculation of the event-specific resistance, Re. We use Eq. 3.5 to back-
calculate the life-loss resistance of Haiti in case of both scenarios of 65,000 and 230,000 fatalities.  
We compare these estimates with Bam (2003) and Kobe (1997) in Table 3.7. Table 3.7 lists the 
components required to calculate event specific resistance, Re and log(Re).  
One of the components listed in Table 3.7 is the PGA and P(PGA) of the events. The peak ground 
attenuations of the events are calculated at the nearest city to the epicenters of the earthquakes; 
Haiti at the National Palace (Lat: 18.5, Long: -72.39), Bam at the center of the city (Lat: 29.00, 
Long: 58.34), and Kobe at the city center (Lat: 34.683, Long: 135.183) based on Boore and 
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Atkinson (2008). To calculate P(PGA), we use hazard curves (frequency-PGA) of these cities. 
These curves are plotted based on the previous record of earthquakes in the area at the given 
latitude and longitudes. Earthquake data, i.e., magnitude, depth, and location (to calculate the 
distance) are gathered from Utsu (2002). Fig. 3.13 shows the hazard curves of Haiti, Bam, and 
Kobe which are plotted to estimate the P(PGA) of the three events listed in Table 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.13: Hazard curves (Frequency-PGA) of Haiti, Bam, and Kobe based on Boore and Atkinson (2008) 
attenuation relation. Earthquake data is gathered from Utsu (2002). 
Table 3.7 Components of the event-specific resistance, Re, equation: P(PGA), life-loss, daily death rate 
(DDR), and calculated values of Re and log (Re) for Haiti 2010, Bam 2003, and Kobe 1995 earthquake 
events. 
Event PGA P(PGA) life loss 
Source  
(life loss) DDR Exp.Pop 
Source 
(Population) Re log(Re) 
Haiti 
2010 0.18 0.0035 
65,000 
Schwartz 
(2011) 0.009 3,091,000 IHIS, 2009 18.49 1.27 
230,000 
Bilham 
(2010) 5.23 0.72 
Bam 
2003 
0.23 0.0024 31,383 
Ghafory-
Ashtiany & 
Hosseini 
(2008) 
0.0058 90,000 Kuwata et al. (2005) 1.19 0.07 
Kobe 
1995 0.16 0.004 4,571 
Kobe City 
Statistics 0.0075 1,529,365 
Kobe City 
Statistics  178.44 2.25 
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Table 3.7 illustrate that even with the scenario of 230,000 fatalities, the resistance of Bam is much 
lower than Haiti. This result is very interesting since in Table 3.2, Haiti has the lowest country-
specific resistance. This means that Haiti 2010 event was not an extraordinary event with respect 
to the resistance of the country that it occurred in. The comparison between event specific 
resistance and the country-specific resistance of Haiti, Iran, and Japan is shown in Table 3.8 
Table 3.8 Comparison between event specific resistance, log(Re), calculated from Eq. 3.7 and 
country-based resistance, log(Rc), calculated from Eq,. 3.5 of Haiti, Iran, and Japan. 
Country log(Re) log(Rc) 
Haiti  1.27 (Haiti 2010, 65,000 fatalities) 1.51 0.72 (Haiti 2010, 230,000 fatalities) 
Iran 0.07 (Bam 2003, 31,383 fatalities) 3.75 
Japan 2.25 (Kobe 1995, 4,571 fatalities) 5.11 
 
From Table 3.8 we can see that, resistances of events are lower than resistance of the countries 
they occurred in. For both cases of Bam 2003 and Kobe 1995, the event’s resistances are almost 3 
orders of magnitude less resistant to earthquakes than Iran and Japan, in general. Haiti 2010 event 
has two scenarios of resistance, 1.27 for 65,000 fatalities and 0.72 for 230,000 fatalities. Both are 
smaller than the value for Haiti, in general. It worth mentioning that the Log(Re) for 65,000-
fatality scenario is much closer to the Log(Rc) of Haiti, which suggests that, this scenario is more 
reasonable and acceptable. Moreover, it can be interpreted that, the resistance of the country 
towards earthquake disasters like Haiti 2010 is almost as low as what is expected from this 
country, based on its background disaster experiences.  
3.8  Summary and discussion 
In this chapter, we mainly focused on the transformer component, resistance, of a natural disaster 
system in our conceptual loss model of Hazard, Resistance, and Loss. We reviewed the two 
methods that define resistance, one based on the slope of FN-curves, and another based on back-
calculation of losses in great disasters. It was shown that the results of these two methodologies 
are consistent with each other. However, each of these methods are useful for different purposes. 
For example, the FN-curve method is a very good approach for comparative and global 
assessments, while the loss model is also applicable for local regions. We used Haiti earthquake 
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data, both past events data, and gridded data of the 2010 event, to illustrate the comparison of 
these two methods. In both methodologies, the results show Haiti, 2010 has the lowest resistance 
among the other earthquakes in Iran (2003), and Japan (1995). We also estimated the total number 
of fatalities in the commune of Port au Prince, between 26,778 and 65,851, based on three 
exposed population scenarios. Although this range is only for one of the 11 affected communes of 
Haiti, since the most affected commune was Port au Prince, we could conclude that the total 
fatalities will not exceed 100,000. This estimate is much smaller than the estimate of the Haitian 
government, 230,000. 
Discussion:  
The event specific resistance of Port au Prince, based on the numbers listed in Table 3.5 and 
P(PGA)=0.0035, DDR=0.009 would be Re=5.3, log(Re)=0.72. Since the number of exposed 
population affect the number of fatalities, their proportion would be the same for calculation of 
resistance. Re of 0.72 is much closer to the resistance calculated for 230,000 scenario of Haiti 
2010 (Table 3.7). This similarity suggests that the estimation of 230,000 fatalities is an upscale of 
the fatalities in the commune of Port au Prince which includes almost 50% of the total population 
of Haiti. This is a wrong estimation, because destruction of other communes are much smaller 
than Port au Prince. 
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Supplementary Data 
List of 75 global earthquake disasters with fatalities greater than 1000 (1950-2012). Data is a combination 
of the USGS table of earthquakes with 1000 or more deaths since 1900, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/world_deaths.php, significant earthquakes database, 
NGDC-NOAA, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1, and the list of deadly 
earthquakes in the world (Utsu, 2002), using our judgment. 
Year Lat Long Country M death Source 
1950 28.5 96.5 China 8.6 4000 Utsu/USGS 
1951 -88.4 6.5 Nicaragua 6.5 1100 Utsu/USGS 
1953 40.0 27.5 Turkey 7.4 1103 Utsu/USGS 
1954 36.3 1.5 Algeria 6.7 1409 Utsu/USGS 
1957 36.2 52.7 Iran 7.1 1200 Utsu/USGS 
1957 34.5 48.0 Iran 7.2 2000 Utsu/USGS 
1960 30.5 -9.6 Morocco 5.7 15000 USGS/Utsu 
1960 -39.5 -74.5 Chile 8.5 5700 Utsu/USGS 
1962 35.6 49.9 Iran 7.2 12225 Utsu/USGS 
1963 35.6 49.9 Skopje 6.0 1100 USGS/Utsu 
1966 37.4 114.9 China 7.0 1000 USGS 
1966 37.5 115.1 China 7.2 8064 Utsu/USGS 
1966 39.1 41.48 Turkey 6.8 2529 USGS/Utsu 
1968 34.0 59.0 Iran 7.3 15000 Utsu/USGS 
1969 21.61 111.83 China 5.9 3000 USGS 
1970 24.2 102.7 China 7.8 15621 Utsu/USGS 
1970 39.2 29.5 Turkey 7.1 1086 Utsu/USGS 
1970 -9.4 -78.9 Peru 7.9 70000 USGS/Utsu 
1971 38.83 40.52 Turkey 6.9 1000 USGS/Utsu 
1972 28.4 52.8 Iran 7.1 5054 USGS/Utsu 
1972 12.3 -86.1 Nicaragua 6.2 6000 Utsu/USGS 
1973 31.3 100.7 China 7.6 2175 Utsu 
1974 28.2 104.0 China 6.8 20000 USGS/Utsu 
1974 72.8 6.2 Pakistan 6.2 5300 Utsu/USGS 
1975 40.6 122.5 China 7 2000 USGS/Utsu 
1975 38.5 40.7 Turkey 6.7 2300 USGS/Utsu 
1976 15.3 -89.1 Guatemala 7.5 23000 Utsu/USGS 
1976 46.4 13.3  Italy 6.5 1000 USGS/Utsu 
1976 -4.6 140.0 Indonesia 7.1 6000 Utsu 
1976 39.4 118.0 China 7.5 242800 Utsu/USGS 
1976 6.2 124.0  Philippines 7.9 8000 Utsu/USGS 
1976 -4.5 139.9 Indonesia 7.2 6000 Utsu 
1976 39.1 44.0 Iran 7.3 5000 USGS/Utsu 
1977 45.8 26.8 Romania 7.2 1581 Utsu/USGS 
1978 33.4 57.4 Iran 7.4 18220 Utsu/USGS 
1980 36.1 1.4 Algeria 7.7 5000 USGS/Utsu 
1980 40.9 15.3 Italy 6.5 2735 USGS/Utsu 
1981 29.9 57.7 Iran 6.9 3000 Utsu/USGS 
1981 30.0 57.8 Iran 7.3 1500 Utsu/USGS 
1981 -4.6 139.2 Indonesia 6.7 1300 Utsu 
1982 14.7 44.4 Yemen 6.0 2800 Utsu/USGS 
1983 40.3 42.2 Turkey 6.9 1400 Utsu/USGS 
1985 18.2 -102.5 Mexico 8.1 9500 Utsu/USGS 
1986 13.8 -89.1 El Salvador 5.4 1500 Utsu/USGS 
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Year Lat Long Country M death Source 
1987 0.2 -77.8 Colombia 7 5000 Utsu/USGS 
1988 26.8 86.6 Nepal 6.6 1450 Utsu/USGS 
1988 41.0 44.2 Armenia 6.8 25000 Utsu/USGS 
1990 37.0 49.4 Iran 7.4 50000 USGS/Utsu 
1990 15.7 121.2 Philippine Islands 7.8 2430 Utsu/USGS 
1991 30.8 78.8 India 7.0 2000 Utsu/USGS 
1992 -8.5 121.9 Indonesia 7.5 2500 USGS/Utsu 
1993 18.1 76.5 India 6.2 9748 Utsu/USGS 
1995 34.6 135.0 Japan 7.2 6435 Utsu/USGS 
1995 52.6 142.8 Russia 7.5 1989 Utsu/USGS 
1997 33.8 59.8 Iran 7.3 1572 Utsu/USGS 
1997 38.1 48.1 Iran 6.1 1100 Utsu 
1998 37.1 70.1 Afghanistan 6.1 2323 Utsu/USGS 
1998 37.1 70.1 Afghanistan 6.9 4000 Utsu/USGS 
1998 03.0 141.9 Papua New Guinea 7.1 2700 Utsu/USGS 
1999 4.5 -75.7 Colombia 5.7 1900 Utsu/USGS 
1999 40.8 29.9 Turkey 7.8 17118 Utsu/USGS 
1999 23.8 121.0 Taiwan 7.7 2413 Utsu/USGS 
2001 23.3 70.3  India 7.6 20085 USGS 
2002 35.9 69.2 Afghanistan 6.1 1000 USGS 
2003 36.9 3.7 Algeria 6.8 2266 USGS 
2003 28.9 58.3 Iran 6.6 31000 USGS 
2004 3.3 95.9 Indonesia 9.1 227898 USGS 
2005 2.1 97.0 Indonesia 8.6 1313 USGS 
2005 34.5 73.6 Pakistan 7.6 86000 USGS 
2006 -7.9 110.4 Indonesia 6.3 5749 USGS 
2008 31.0 103.3 China 7.9 87652 USGS 
2009 -0.7 99.9  Indonesia 7.5 1117 USGS 
2010 33.2 96.5 China 6.9 2200 USGS 
2010 18.4 -72.6 Haiti 7.0 65000 * 
2011 38.3 142.4 Japan 9 20896 USGS 
* Record of earthquake fatalities in Haiti varies between literatures. We choose 65,000 as an 
accurate estimation of life loss in Haiti based on Doocy et al. (2013) and Scwartz et al. (2011). 
 
List of 12 largest earthquakes in Haiti from 1500 to 2010 
Date latitude longitude Mw Reference 
1564 19.38141 -70.5913 7 Schere, 1912  
1692 17.8 -76.7 7.5 Utsu 
1751 18.45966 -72.2439 7.5 Schere, 1912 
1770 18.34708 -72.8683 7.3 Schere, 1912 
1842 19.84992 -72.837 8 Schere, 1912 
1860 18.38 -73 7 Schere, 1912 
1887 19.7 -73.1 7 Schere, 1912 
1899 18 -77 7.5 Utsu 
1916 18.5 -68 7.8 Pager 
1946 19.25 -69 7.9 Pager 
1948 19.25 -69.25 7.1 Pager 
2010 18.447 -72.55 7 USGS 
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List of earthquakes with more than 1 fatalities in Haiti (8 events), Chile (42 events), Japan (53 events), and Iran (117 events) between 
1900-2009, based on Pager Catalogue (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/data/pager/), EM_DAT (http://www.emdat.be/), and Utsu 
(2002). 
 
HAITI CHILE JAPAN IRAN 
year M death Source Year M Death Source Year M Death Source Year M Death Source 
1907   1000 UTSU 1906 8.4 20000 EM-DAT 1901   18 EMDAT 1903 6.4 200 UTSU 
1932   8   1922 8.5 1100 EM-DAT 1905   41 EMDAT 1909 7.3 5500 UTSU 
1946   100 UTSU 1928 8 220 EM-DAT 1907   41 EMDAT 1911 6.2 700 UTSU 
1952 5.9 6 UTSU 1939 7.8 30000 EM-DAT 1909 6.8 41 UTSU 1913 5.8 11 UTSU 
1953 5.7 2 UTSU 1942 - 5 EM-DAT 1914 7.1 94 UTSU 1923 5.5 2219 UTSU 
1962   1   1943 7.9 18 UTSU 1914 7.1 35 UTSU 1923 6.7 290 UTSU 
1994 5.4 4 PAGER 1945 7.1 4 UTSU 1922 6.9 26 UTSU 1923 6.4 157 UTSU 
2010 7.3 200000 UTSU 1946 7.5 2 UTSU 1923 7.9 142807 UTSU 1925 5.5 500 UTSU 
        1949 7.3 57 UTSU 1925 6.8 428 UTSU 1925 5.5 2 UTSU 
        1949 7.8 3 UTSU 1927 7.3 2925 UTSU 1928 5.4 10 UTSU 
        1949 7.8 1 UTSU 1930 7 272 UTSU 1928 5 10 UTSU 
        1950 8 4 UTSU 1931 7 16 UTSU 1928 5.5 4 UTSU 
        1953 7.6 15 EM-DAT 1933 8.1 3064 UTSU 1929 7.2 3300 EMDAT 
        1960 9 5700 UTSU 1939 6.8 27 UTSU 1930 7.3 2500 EMDAT 
        1960 9.5 142 UTSU 1943 7.2 1083 EMDAT 1932 5.4 1070 UTSU 
        1963 - 280 EM-DAT 1944 7.9 1251 UTSU 1933 6.2 4 UTSU 
        1965 7.3 400 EM-DAT 1945 6.8 2306 UTSU 1935 6.4 500 UTSU 
        1966 7.8 4 EM-DAT 1946 8 2000 EMDAT 1935 6 60 UTSU 
        1971 7.5 83 UTSU 1948 7.1 5131 EMDAT 1941 6.4 680 UTSU 
        1971 7 1 UTSU 1952 8.2 33 UTSU 1944 4.8 20 UTSU 
        1975 6.9 2 PAGER 1960   138 EMDAT 1945 8 300 UTSU 
        1976 7.5 1 PAGER 1964 7.5 26 UTSU 1947 6.9 500 UTSU 
        1981 5.7 10 PAGER 1968 7.9 52 UTSU 1948 NA 200 EMDAT 
        1981 7.1 1 PAGER 1974 6.7 30 PAGER 1950 5.8 20 UTSU 
        1983 7.6 5 PAGER 1974 5.6 2 PAGER 1953 6.3 1000 EMDAT 
        1985 7.9 200 PAGER 1978 7.6 28 UTSU 1954 5 1 UTSU 
        1985 7.9 177 PAGER 1978 6.6 25 PAGER 1956 5.9 410 UTSU 
        1985 7.1 2 PAGER 1979   27 EMDAT 1957 7.2 2000 UTSU 
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HAITI CHILE JAPAN IRAN 
year M death Source year M death Source year M death Source year M death Source 
        1985 6.5 1 PAGER 1980 6 2 PAGER 1957 7.1 1200 UTSU 
        1987 7.2 5 PAGER 1980 5.3 1 PAGER 1957 5 1 UTSU 
        1987 7.5 1 PAGER 1983 7.7 108 UTSU 1958 6.7 191 EMDAT 
        1995 8 3 PAGER 1983 5.4 1 PAGER 1960 6 480 EMDAT 
        1997 7.1 8 PAGER 1983 5.6 1 PAGER 1961 7.2 60 EMDAT 
        1998 6.4 2 PAGER 1984 6.2 29 PAGER 1962 7.2 12225 UTSU 
        1998 7 1 PAGER 1984 7.4 1 PAGER 1962 5 6 UTSU 
        2000 6 1 UTSU 1987 6.5 2 PAGER 1962 5.5 2 UTSU 
        2001 8.2 130 UTSU 1987 6.6 1 PAGER 1963 5.2 5 UTSU 
        2001 6.3 1 PAGER 1989 5.5 1 PAGER 1963 4.5 4 UTSU 
        2005 7.8 11 PAGER 1993 7.7 230 PAGER 1963 7 4 UTSU 
        2007 6.2 10 PAGER 1993 7.6 2 PAGER 1965 5.1 20 UTSU 
        2007 7.7 2 PAGER 1993 7.6 2 PAGER 1968 7.3 15000 UTSU 
        2010 8.5 547 UTSU 1993 6.9 1 PAGER 1968 6.4 900 UTSU 
                1994 7.7 3 PAGER  1968 5.6 61 UTSU 
                1995 7.2 6432 PAGER 1969 5.4 50 EMDAT 
                2000 6.1 1 PAGER 1970 6.7 220 UTSU 
                2001 6.8 2 PAGER 1971 5.9 1 UTSU 
                2003   2 EMDAT 1971 6 1 UTSU 
                2004 6.6 48 PAGER 1971 5.3 1 UTSU 
                2005 6.6 1 PAGER 1972 6.8 5057 EMDAT 
                2007 6.6 9 PAGER 1973 5.5 1 PAGER 
                2007 6.7 1 PAGER 1975 6.1 7 PAGER 
                2008 6.6 13 PAGER 1975 5.2 2 UTSU 
                2009   1 EMDAT 1976 7.3 3900 UTSU 
                        1976 6 17 PAGER 
                        1976 5 3 UTSU 
                        1977 5.9 665 PAGER 
                        1977 6 366 PAGER 
                        1977 6.7 167 PAGER 
                        1977 5.6 3 PAGER 
                        1977 5.6 3 PAGER 
                        1978 7.4 18220 PAGER 
                        1978 6.3 100 UTSU 
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HAITI CHILE JAPAN IRAN 
year M death Source year M death Source year M death Source year M death Source 
                        1978 6.1 76 PAGER 
                        1979 6.5 280 PAGER 
                        1979 6.5 200 PAGER 
                        1979 7 17 PAGER 
                        1980 6.2 26 PAGER 
                        1980 5.7 3 PAGER 
                        1980 5.5 1 PAGER 
                        1981 6.6 3000 PAGER 
                        1981 7.2 1500 PAGER 
                        1983 5.4 100 PAGER 
                        1983 5.6 3 PAGER 
                        1985 5.4 1 PAGER 
                        1986 5.7 1 PAGER 
                        1987 5.3 2 PAGER 
                        1988 5.8 1 PAGER 
                        1988 6 1 PAGER 
                        1989 5.9 3 PAGER 
                        1990 7.4 45000 PAGER 
                        1990 6.6 22 PAGER 
                        1990 5.7 20 PAGER 
                        1991 5.6 1 PAGER 
                        1992 5.1 6 PAGER 
                        1992 5.6 1 PAGER 
                        1994 6.1 6 PAGER 
                        1994 5.9 3 PAGER 
                        1994 6 2 PAGER 
                        1997 7.2 1572 PAGER 
                        1997 6.1 1100 PAGER 
                        1997 6.5 100 PAGER 
                        1997 4.5 1 PAGER 
                        1998 5.7 12 PAGER 
                        1998 5.4 5 PAGER 
                        1998 6.6 5 PAGER 
                        1999 6.2 26 PAGER 
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 HAITI CHILE JAPAN IRAN 
year M death Source year M death Source year M death Source year M death Source 
                        1999 4.5 1 PAGER 
                        1999 4.5 1 PAGER 
                        2000 5.3 1 PAGER 
                        2002 6.5 227 PAGER 
                        2002 5.4 2 PAGER 
                        2002 5.3 1 PAGER 
                        2003 6.6 26271 PAGER 
                        2003 5.7 1 PAGER 
                        2003 4.6 1 PAGER 
                        2004 6.3 35 PAGER 
                        2005 6.4 612 PAGER 
                        2005 5.9 13 PAGER 
                        2005 4.9 4 PAGER 
                        2006 6.1 70 PAGER 
                        2006 5.1 2 PAGER 
                        2006 5.9 1 PAGER 
                        2008 6 7 UTSU 
                        2010 6.7 7 UTSU 
                        2010 5.5 3 UTSU 
                        2010 5.6 1 UTSU 
                        2010 5.6 1 UTSU 
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Chapter 4 The magnitude and frequency of natural disasters caused 
by geological hazards 
4.1 Introduction  
Geological hazards have threatened human life throughout the history. Some of these natural 
events caused huge destructions and fatalities. During the past 50 years there have been 7 
geological hazards (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic activities and landslides) that caused more 
than 50,000 casualties and more than USD $10,000,000 damage to the human communities 
(Table 4.1). These events are either called black swans or dragon kings by Taleb (2007, 2010), 
Sornette (2009), and Pate-Cornell (2012) due to their rareness and unpredictability. Black swan 
is a term used for rare events that are extremely unlikely to happen. However, they are not 
unpredictable events (Sornette, 2009). Dragon king is another term used for extreme events that 
are different from the rest of their neighbors both from statistical point of view [they are not 
predictable] and from mechanistically point of view [they seem to have different cause and effect 
from the rest of the data, thus they don’t follow the trend of rest of the data] (Paté-Cornel, 2012).  
Among the most destructive and fatal geological hazards listed in Table 4.1, Sumatra earthquake 
(Indonesia) in 2004 which cause a huge tsunami with 227,898 fatalities, and USD $ 10,000 M is 
the most disastrous event in the past 50 years. However, an earthquake with magnitude 9.1 is a 
rare event (black swan) and it lead to an extreme result. However, the rest of the events in the list 
are not rare events while they caused extreme damages and fatalities (dragon kings). This 
suggests that extreme geological disasters are not necessarily resulting from extreme geological 
hazards. Other factors such as resistance (social and technical), exposed population (population 
density and daily death rate), and monetary condition (GDP and corruption) of the affected areas 
also determine the extent of the disaster. 
One of the objectives of this study is to assemble a database of natural disasters caused by 
geological hazards, map the geography of loss, and analyze the magnitude and frequency 
characteristics of disaster events. We also would like to define a loss threshold for a disaster and 
identify the most destructive geological processes that impose more risk on the global 
population. 
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Table 4.1: List of 7 most destructive and fatal geological hazards (1960-2010). Data is from 
National Geophysical Data Center / World Data Service (NGDC/WDS), available at 
http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/. 
Yr Mon Day Hr Min Sec Type F-depth Mw Country Lat Long Death 
Damage 
-M$ 
1970 5 31 20 23 27.3 Eq 43 7.9 PERU -9.20 -78.80 66794 530 
1976 7 27 19 42 54.6 Eq 23 7.5 CHINA 39.57 117.98 242769 5600 
1990 6 20 21 0 9.9 Eq 19  7.7 IRAN 36.96 49.41 50000 8000 
2004 12 26 0 58 53.4 Ts 30 9.1 
INDONE
SIA 3.30 95.98 227898 10000 
2005 10 8 3 50 40.8 Eq 26 7.6 
PAKIST
AN 34.54 73.59 80361 5200 
2008 5 12 6 28 1.5 Eq 19 7.9 CHINA 31.00 103.32 87652 86000 
2010 1 12 21 53 10 Eq 13 7 HAITI 18.46 -72.53 650001 8000 
1 The original number of fatalities in Haiti was reported as 316,000 that we changed to 65,000 based on our results 
from Chapter 3. 
 
Neumayer and Barthel (2011) looked at the trend of the normalized monetary loss due to natural 
disasters and showed that there is no significant trend in the $USD loss due to natural disasters 
during 1980-2010. This suggests that our advancements in knowledge and technology over the 
last 50 years have not changed the impacts of these events on human being. Our last objective in 
this chapter is to analyze the trend of the frequency of geological disasters and also their 
effectiveness in fatality.  
4.2 Geological Hazards-review of the disaster-generating process 
Geological hazards that we consider here are earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic activities, and 
landslides which are processes that have been studied in many literature. The physical process 
and the way that their occurrence and magnitude are estimated and recorded are the focus of 
many research papers, such as Gutenberg and Richter (1942, 1956) (E), Yokoyama (1965) (V), 
Schuster and Krizek (1978) (L), Kanamori (1977, 1983) (E), Kagan and Knopoff (1980, 1987) 
(E), Abe (1989) (T), Ho (1996) (V), Kagan (1997) (E), Tanguy et al (1998), Gerassimos (2001) 
(T), Guzzetti et al. (2002) (L), Glade (2003) (L), Bardet et al. (2003) (T), Kanamori and Brodsky 
(2004) (E), Mason et al. (2004) (V), Gutierrez et al. (2005) (E, D), Witham (2005) (V), Evans 
(2006, 2008) (L), Evans and Alcantara-Ayala (2007) (L), Boore and Atkinson (2008) (E), 
Guthrie et al. (2008) (L), Siebert et al. (2011) (V), Sachs et al. (2012), Lovholt et al. (2012) (T), 
Tang et al. (2012) (T). The letters E, V, L, and T are abbreviations for earthquakes, volcanic 
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activities, landslides, and tsunamis, respectively. Furthermore, in many books, such as 
Scheidegger (1975), Bolt et al. (1975), and Woo (1999, 2002) the physics, mathematics, and 
general process of all natural hazards are gathered and summarized. Here, we briefly review the 
measures of magnitude for each of geological hazards based on some of the abovementioned 
literature. 
4.2.1 Earthquakes 
 Earthquakes are caused by the sudden release of slowly accumulated strain energy along a fault 
in the earth's crust which creates seismic waves. Seismic activity is the frequency, type, and size 
of earthquakes over a period of time. 
Earthquakes, due to their irregular time intervals between their events and their lack of adequate 
forecasting, are sources of severe threat. Some of the hazards associated to earthquakes are listed 
here based on Bender (1991)22: 
- Ground shaking is a direct hazard to any structure located near the earthquake's center. 
Structural failure takes many human lives in densely populated areas. 
- Faulting, or breaches of the surface material, occurs as the separation of bedrock along 
lines of weakness. 
- Landslides occur because of ground shaking in areas having relatively steep topography 
and poor slope stability. 
- Liquefaction of gently sloping unconsolidated material can be triggered by ground 
shaking. Rows and lateral spreads (liquefaction phenomena) are among the most 
destructive geologic hazards. 
- Subsidence or surface depressions result from the settling of loose or unconsolidated 
sediment. Subsidence occurs in waterlogged soils, fill, alluvium, and other materials that 
are prone to settle. 
                                                
22 These points are gathered from Bender (1991). 
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- Tsunamis or seismic sea waves, usually generated by seismic activity under the ocean 
floor, cause flooding in coastal areas and can affect areas thousands of kilometers from 
the earthquake center. 
The main measures for the magnitude of earthquakes: 1) moment magnitude, Mw, which is the 
accurate quantified measure of earthquake size calculated based on the seismic moment, M0, of 
the region 23, in logarithmic scale, 07.6
5.1
log 010 −=
M
MW  (M0 in Nm); Nm stands for Newton-
meter. The frequency of the magnitude of earthquakes is presented as Gutenberg-Richter law 
(Gutenberg and Richter, 1956) which follows a power-law distribution. Due to the seismic 
activity of a region, the frequencies vary; however, in most parts of the world, the frequency of 
small earthquakes (magnitude 3-4) is around 10 per year, the frequency of moderate earthquakes 
(magnitude 5-6) is 1 in 10 years, and the frequency of large earthquakes (more than magnitude 7) 
is less than 1 in 100 years (Kagan, 1997).  
4.2.2 Tsunamis 
Tsunami is a Japanese word for "harbor wave" which is associated with a series of water waves 
caused by the displacement of a large volume of a body of water, generally an ocean or a large 
lake. Tsunamis waves can be triggered by disturbances such as earthquakes, landslides, and 
volcanic eruptions. The crests of these waves can exceed heights of 25 meters on reaching 
shallow water. The unique characteristics of tsunamis (wave lengths commonly exceeding 100 
km, deep-ocean velocities of up to 700 km/hour, and small crest heights in deep water) make 
their detection and monitoring difficult. Tsunamis can cause coastal flooding similar to storm 
surges. Storm surges are an abnormal rise in sea water level.  
Most often, destruction by a storm surge can be associated either by the passing of the wave front 
and causing physical shock on the objects, or the hydrostatic/dynamic forces which lift the water 
and carry the objects. The most significant damages often result from the direct impact of waves 
                                                
23 M0=µDS, where µ is the rigidity (shear modulus) of the material surrounding the fault (in dyn/cm
2), D is the 
average displacement of the fault (in cm ) and S is the area of the rupture along the fault (in cm2). Since M0 
depends on the state of the fault before and after an earthquake, it does not depend on the actual time history of 
faulting; therefore, it is a static parameter (Kanamori and Brodsky, 2004). 
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on fixed structures. Indirect impacts include flooding and undermining of major infrastructure 
such as highways and railroads. 
One magnitude scale used for tsunamis, Mt, is based on the amplitude of tsunami waves and the 
distance from the earthquake epicenter in logarithmic scale, DaHMt +Δ+= 1010 loglog , 
where H is the maximum single amplitude of tsunami waves (in m) measured by tide gages, ∆ is 
the distance (in km) from the earthquake epicenter to the tide station along the shortest oceanic 
path, and a and D are constants (Abe, 1989). The source strength and the amplification factors of 
the sea floor can also affect the tsunami wave height (Shuto, 2005). 
4.2.3 Volcanoes 
Volcanoes are cracks in the earth's crust through which hot lava, volcanic ash, molten rock, and 
gases escape from the magma chamber to the surface.  There are two classes of eruptions for 
volcanic activities: 1) Explosive eruptions which originate in the rapid dissolution and expansion 
of gas from the molten rock as it nears the earth's surface. Explosions pose a risk by scattering 
rock blocks, tephra, and lava at varying distances from the source. 2) Effusive eruptions in which 
lava flows rather than any explosion. Lava flows are governed by gravity, surrounding 
topography, and material viscosity (Self, 2006). Both of these types can occur in the extent of a 
few thousand cubic meters of magma, up to a thousand cubic kilometers of magma in extreme 
cases. 
Hazards associated with volcanic eruptions include lava flows, falling ash and projectiles, 
mudflows, and toxic gases. Volcanic activity may also trigger other natural hazardous events 
including local tsunamis, deformation of the landscape, floods when lakes are breached or when 
streams and rivers are dammed, and tremor-provoked landslides (Bender, 1991). 
One of the measures of the magnitude of volcanic eruptions is called the Volcanic Explosivity 
Index (VEI) which is based on the volume of the magma (in km3) plus other parameters; with the 
indices between 0 and 8. The scale is logarithmic; an increase of 1 index indicates an eruption 
that is 10 times as powerful. The known magnitude measure for volcanic eruptions is based on 
the mass of erupted magma (in kg). The scale is again logarithmic, M= log10(erupted mass, kg)-
7.0 (Self, 2006). Frequencies associated with different magnitudes of volcanic eruptions are from 
around 1 eruption per year (magnitude of 4) to 1 eruption in 100,000 years (magnitude of 8) 
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(Self, 2006, Fig. 3). The frequency of volcanic eruptions follows the power-law distribution (Ho, 
1996), similar to earthquakes and tsunamis. 
4.2.4 Landslides  
The term landslide includes topple, fall, slide, lateral spread, flow and complex movement of 
unconsolidated materials. Landslides can be triggered by earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, soils 
saturated by heavy rain or groundwater rise, and river undercutting. Earthquake shaking of 
saturated soils creates particularly dangerous conditions. Although landslides are highly 
localized, they can be particularly hazardous due to their frequency of occurrence. Classes of 
landslide based on summary of Bolt et al. (1975), and Bender (1991) include24: 
- Rockfalls, which are characterized by free-falling rocks from overlying hills. These often 
collect at the bottom of the hill in a cliff-shape form of slopes which may pose an additional risk. 
- Slides and avalanches, which are chaotic movements of overburden due to the reduction of 
internal shearing strength of the soil material. Avalanches are much more rapid than slides. If 
the displacement occurs in surface material without total deformation it is called a slump. 
- Flows and lateral spreads, which occur in recent unconsolidated material associated with a 
low pore pressure. Although they are associated with a gentle topography, these liquefaction 
phenomena can travel significant distances from their origin. 
The impact of these events depends on the specific nature of the landslide. Rockfalls are obvious 
dangers to life and property but, in general, they pose only a localized threat due to their limited 
areal influence. In contrast, slides, avalanches, flows, and lateral spreads, due to having great 
areal extents, can cause massive loss of lives and property. Mudflows that are associated with 
volcanic eruptions can travel at great speed from their point of origin and are one of the most 
destructive volcanic hazards. 
Landslides are basically results of mass movement due to gravitational forces. Landslides can 
also trigger tsunamis if the slides occur into the water (e.g., Vajont Dam in 1963 and Lituya Bay 
in 1958). The magnitude of landslides is based on the volume of the displaced mass and the rate 
of movement (Glade et al., 2005). The frequency of small landslides is as often as 1 per year to 
                                                
24 These points are summarized and gathered from Bolt et al. (1975) and Bender (1991). 
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as rare as 1 in 800,000 years. The magnitude-frequency relation of landslides also follows the 
power-law trend (Guthrie et al., 2008). 
4.3. Geological Disasters  
The risk and the impact of the geological hazards, summarized in section 4.2, on human societies 
are studied for many years, particularly to analyze the underlying factors and to reduce the loss 
of life due to their occurrence. In literature such as Lomnitz (1970) (E), Schuster and Krizek 
(1978) (L) Bilham (1988, 1996, 2004, 2011) (E), Knopoff and Sornette (1995) (E), Tanguy et al 
(1998) (V), Evans and DeGraff (2002) (L), Guzzetti et al. (2002) (L), Glade et al. (2005) (L), 
Gutierrez et al. (2005) (E), Fell et al. (2005) (L), Anbarci et al. (2005) (E), Shuto (2005) (T), 
Witham (2005) (V), Self (2006), Jackson (2006) (E), Hungr and Wong (2007) (L), Porter et al. 
(2007) (E), Evans (2006, 2008, 2011) (L, L, T), Evans and Alcantara-Ayala (2007) (L) Dowrick 
(2009) (E), Jaiswal et al. (2009, 2011) (E), Jaiswal et al. (2011) (L), Bangash (2011) (E), Shearer 
and Phillip (2012) (E), Lovholt et al. (2012) (T), Porter (2012) (L), Petley (2012) (L), So and 
Spence (2013) (E), there are studies that look at the impact of geological disasters and the 
methods of their risk assessment.  
Furthermore, there is a literature in which more than one of geological disasters are analyzed in 
terms of their risk or underlying effects, such as Bender (1991), Degg (1992), Nishenko and 
Barton (1995), Pelling (2003), Dilley et al. (2005), Smolka (2006), Birkmann (2006), Grünthal et 
al. (2006), Houtsonen and Peltonen (2007), Kim (2012), Mishra et al. (2012), Sachs et al. (2012), 
and Pisarenko and Rodkin (2014). 
However, the word disaster is not well defined, quantitatively. Different experiences and 
backgrounds define different meaning for the word catastrophe or disaster. In order to have a 
common ground for studies related to global disasters, having a threshold of loss is essential. We 
use 1,000 fatalities as the threshold of life-loss for geological disasters, i.e., any of the geological 
hazards that caused more than 1,000 fatalities is considered as a disaster. Although, the life of 
every human-being worth being considered as a threshold of loss, the threshold of 1,000 deaths 
is chosen based on the better data accuracy in the high numbers of fatality events. For events 
occurred in the past, due to the lack of data collection and information spread, the numbers of 
fatalities in small events are not recorded as reliably as large events, because there are not 
enough resources to compare and validate the data with. However, in large events, due to their 
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larger extent and more attentions, there are more records of the numbers which make the data 
more reliable. 
4.3.1 Database of geological disasters 1600-2012 
Considering 1,000 fatalities as a threshold of life-loss in geological hazards, we have gathered all 
the geological hazards recorded in literature and catalogues as disasters for our database. 
However, in some of the recorded events, there have been discrepancies about the figures for 
which we used our judgment based on the credibility of the catalogue to decide on the number 
we picked.  
Nevertheless, there are lack quality and consistency in some of the recorded data, since the 
sources of information may not have been reliable, or some cautions made by the governments 
that reported the data. For example, in the case of Haiti 2010, the government of Haiti reported 
230,000 fatalities, while in some literature the fatalities are estimated as around 65,000. Also, in 
the case of Tangshan earthquake, 1976, the numbers are underestimated as suggested in some 
literature. In this study, we use the figures that are reported in the available trustworthy 
databases. However, there might be some over- or under- estimations in our data. 
For earthquakes, the main data source that we used is Utsu (2002). We used NGDC-NOAA 
database (http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1) with limiting 
criteria of years between 1600 and 2013, and deaths greater than 1000 as our secondary source of 
data. We cross checked the data with John Hopkins Report of earthquakes affected human 
between 1980 and 2009 (http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/center-for-
refugee-and-disaster-response/natural_disasters/_Event_Earthquakes.html). Furthermore, we 
used USGS list of earthquakes with more than 1,000 fatalities 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/world_deaths.php) to double check some of the 
fatality records. 
For tsunamis, NGDC-NOAA database 
(http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=70&d=7) is used as the main source 
of data. Our search criteria are: years between 1600 and 2013, deaths more than 1000. John 
Hopkins Report on earthquakes affected human (http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-
institutes/center-for-refugee-and-disaster-response/natural_disasters/_Event_Tsunamis.html) is 
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used to compare the data in NGDC-NOAA. Furthermore, we cross-checked the tsunami disasters 
recorded in the Cred dataset on EM-DAT (http://www.emdat.be/advanced-search).  
For volcanoes, NGDC-NOAA database 
(http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/servlet/ShowDatasets?dataset=102557&search_look=50&displ
ay_look=50) is used as the main source of data. Our search criteria are: years between 1600 and 
2013, deaths more than 1000. John Hopkins Report on volcanic activities affected humans 
(http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/center-for-refugee-and-disaster-
response/natural_disasters/_Event_Volcanoes.html) is used to compare the data in NGDC-
NOAA. To double-check the range of fatalities in our data, we used Witham (2005). 
Furthermore, Volcanoes of the world (Siebert et al., 2010) (Pg. 40) is used to double-check some 
of the fatality numbers. For landslides we used the database of Evans (2008). Lists of all of the 
geological disasters and their selection criteria are given in the supplementary information. 
Based on our geological disasters data base, in the period of 1600-2012, there are 285 earthquake 
disasters, 59 tsunamis, 44 volcanic disasters and 35 landslide disasters (total of 423 events). Fig. 
4.1 is a global map that shows the place of all of geological disasters. As shown in Fig. 4.1, green 
dots are earthquake disasters, purple triangles are volcanic disasters, black squares are tsunamis, 
and orange ovals are landslide disasters if the world since 1600. The concentration of earthquake 
disasters is in the Middle East, China, North Africa and south of Europe, while volcanic disasters 
mainly have affected the center and south of America, south east of Asia, and Indonesia. 
Disastrous tsunamis are spread between the South Pacific Ocean coasts of central and south of 
America, Indonesia, Philippines, and south of India. The affected regions by landslide disasters 
are mostly in the South East Asia, China, and central and south of America. 
Among 424 geological disasters, there are 11 mega-disasters with over 100,000 fatalities among 
which there are 2 tsunamis (1737 in India and 2004 in Indonesia), 1 landslides (1786 in China), 
and 8 earthquakes (1662 in China, 1703 in Japan, 1731 in China, 1779 in Iran, 1876 in India, 
1920 in Italy, 1923 in Japan, and 1976 in China). The return period of the mega-disasters is 
around 3 every 100 years which is not relatively rare. 
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Figure 4.1: Spatial distribution of earthquake disasters (green dots, n=285), tsunamis (black squares, n=59), volcanic 
disasters (purple triangles, n=44), and landslide disasters (orange ovals, n=35) during 1600-2012. The main sources 
of data are Utsu (2002) for earthquakes, NGDC-NOAA for tsunamis and volcanic activities, and Evans (2008) for 
landslides. The detailed references of our database are given in the supplementary data. 
4.3.2 Temporal analysis of cumulative fatalities 
If we plot the cumulative trend of fatalities due to each geological disaster (Fig. 4.2) comparing 
to each other and to the overall trend of all geological disasters over the period of 1600 and 2012, 
we observe that earthquakes among earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, and landslides, is on top 
of the graph with the highest record of disaster fatalities. The overall trend, the red line, is very 
close to the earthquake line; therefore, we can conclude that the contribution of other geological 
disasters is very small in the overall trend. Here, we also can compare the yearly trend of the 
geological disasters with themselves and with each other, e.g., in 1786 there is a jump in the 
landslide fatality trend which identifies a mega-disaster in that year (China). Furthermore, from 
Fig. 4.2, the total number of fatalities due to each disaster-generating process can be estimated as 
4,320,722; 868,802; 171,091; and 221,475, respectively.  
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative number of fatalities due to geological disasters [earthquakes in green, tsunamis in black, 
volcanoes in purple and landslides in orange] compared to the cumulative number of fatalities in all geological 
disasters in red during the period of (1600-2012). Data is given in the supplementary information. 
4.4 Geological Hazards II - a unifying energy scale of hazard magnitude  
In section 4.1, we introduced the different magnitude scales that are used for each of the 
geological hazards. In order to be able to compare the extent of magnitudes and their potential 
strength for imposing any impact on human life, we need to unify the scale of these hazards. We 
introduce Log of energy (J) released at the source of geological hazards, to compare the extent of 
geological hazards with each other. For example, comparing Chilean earthquake with Mw of 9.5 
in 1960 which released an energy of 1.12×1019 Joules (Kanamori, 1977); Tsunami in Japan 
(2011) with earthquake Mw of 9.1 that released tsunami energy of 3×1015 Joules (Tang et al., 
2012); Tambora eruption with ejecta volume of 1×1017 m3 in 1815 which released an energy of 
8.4×1019 Joules (Yokoyama, 1965); and Frank slide in Alberta (1903) with volume of 3×106 m3 
which released an energy of 3.2×1014 Joules (Lucchitta, 1978) are more comparable to each other 
than using only magnitudes of Meq=9.5, Mt=9.1, Volv= 1×1017, and Voll =3×106. This can be 
expanded to other hazard assessment that requires a unified magnitude scale. 
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Here, we summarize the methodologies suggested in literature for estimating the source energy 
of each of the geological hazards. However they are physically rigorous, there is room for 
improvement in these estimations. In this study, we used certain modifications needed for 
implementing the suggested methodologies. The methodologies explained in the following are 
used to calculate the source energy of the geological hazards generated disasters between 1600-
2012. However, the information needed for these calculations were not available for all of the 
recorded hazards, especially for historical landslides; therefore, we only did the calculations for 
the ones where sufficient certain information was available to do so. List of these events and the 
estimated energies are provided in the supplementary information. 
4.4.1 Earthquakes: 
For earthquakes, we use Gutenberg’s equation (Gutenberg and Richter, 1956) for radiated energy 
from earthquakes, log(Eeq) =11.8+1.5 Ms (ergs), where Ms is the surface magnitude of 
earthquakes. Kanamori (1983) compared the relationship between different magnitude scales and 
showed that for earthquakes Ms≤8, Ms=Mw where Mw is a magnitude scale based on seismic 
moment of earthquakes and called moment magnitude. As Kanamori (1983) mention that Mw is 
a useful magnitude scale since it quantifies earthquakes based on the radiated energy; therefore, 
current earthquake catalogues record the moment magnitude as the main magnitude scale for 
earthquakes. However the magnitude scales are measured differently, their values do not vary 
significantly for the purpose of this paper. Therefore, we assume all the magnitudes recorded for 
the past events are also based on moment magnitude. We convert this energy, Eeq, to joules 
(energy (dyn)×10-7) as an estimate of the source energy of earthquakes at the epicenter. The 
range of energies that radiated from earthquake-generated disasters between 1600-2012 were 
between 7.8×1012 -1.12×1019 (J). List of all the energies released by all geological disasters is 
provided in the supplementary tables. 
4.4.2 Tsunamis: 
For tsunamis that are caused by earthquakes which are 76% of 59 tsunamis disasters, we use an 
empirical relationship between moment-magnitude, Mw, and tsunami energy, Et. Tang et al. 
(2012) compare the relationship between these two, Et and Mw, in their paper (Table 3 in Tang et 
al., 2012). We used this table to plot Et versus Mw and find their empirical relationship based on 
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the linear regression of the data for estimating the best fit. The best fit to the plot of Et versus Mw 
is ET=0.029e4.37Mw (J) (R2=0.95, 95% confidence interval of slope: 4.28-4.45) (Fig. 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3: Tsunami energy (ET) versus earthquake moment magnitude (MW) based on Table 3 of tsunami energy of 
past events from Tang et al. (2011). Best fit to the data is ET=0.029e4.37Mw (J) (R2=0.95, 95% confidence interval of 
slope: 4.28-4.45). This equation is used to estimate the energy of tsunamis during 1600-2012. 
The range of energy-released by tsunami disasters generated from earthquakes during 1600-2012 
is between 4.6×109 and 3.1×1016 (J). The detailed list of tsunami disasters is provided in the 
supplementary information. 
4.4.3 Volcanic activities: 
The energy release from volcanic eruptions is calculated based on two main components; the 
kinetic energy of the ejecta, and thermal energy (Mason et al., 2004). Here, we use the potential 
energy from lava flow as the source energy of events using Ev=ρv Vv g hv , where ρv is the 
density of lava (assumed to be 2669.9 (kg/m3) from magma density estimation [Bottinga et al. 
(1982)]), Vv is the volume of the lava or tephra flow based on the recorded VEI (VEI=0 
(V=1E+04), VEI=1 (V=1E+06), VEI=2 (V=1E+07), VEI=3 (V=1E+08), VEI=4 (V=1E+09), 
VEI=5 (V=1E+10), VEI=6 (V=1E+11), VEI=7 (V=1E+12), VEI=8 (V>1E+12) [Siebert et al. 
(2010)]), g is the gravity of the Earth (=9.8 m/s2), and hv is the height of the mountain. The 
estimated energy of volcanic eruptions during 1600-2012 is in the range of 6.13×1013 and 
7.5×1019 (J). List of the energy of volcanic disasters that we could find their details of Vv and hv 
are provided in the supplementary information. 
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4.4.4 Landslides: 
For landslides, the energy release is calculated based on the potential energy of the displacement 
mass (McSaveney, 2002). Here, again we use the potential energy of slides based on Els= ρls Vls 
g hls, where ρls is assumed to be ~2500 (kg/m3) (rock) (Verruijt, 2010), Vls is the volume of the 
slide that is reported, g is the gravity of the Earth (=9.8 m/s2), and hls is the height at which the 
landslide occurred. However, the volume and height of past landslides are not recorded properly; 
therefore, we only calculated energy for the ones that data was available for the landslide 
disasters of 1600-2012. The list is provided in the supplementary data. 
4.5 Energy magnitude-frequency graphs of geological disasters: 
Similar to the magnitude-frequency graphs that are plotted for earthquakes which are log-log 
graphs that commonly hold a power-law equation, y=ax-b, where a and b are parameters that 
vary by the characteristics of the region and the dataset, respectively. Here we plot the unified 
magnitude scale of geological disasters (Fig. 4.4). Fig. 4.4 compares the log(energy)-frequency 
graph of earthquakes (green dots), volcanic activities (purple triangles), tsunamis (black ovals), 
and landslides (orange squares) with each other and with the overall log(energy)-frequency curve 
of geological disasters (1600-2012). Fig. 4.4 illustrates a roll-over effect in the low energy-high 
frequency geological disasters, which is mainly caused by earthquakes. One of the interpretations 
of this roll-over on the frequency-energy graph is that even low energy events can cause more 
than 1,000 fatalities. Furthermore, using Fig. 4.4, we can compare the return period of a range of 
energy-releases by geological disasters. For example, the return period of energy of 1010 (J) is 
around 1 per year, while the return period of 1015 (J) is around 3 in 5 years, and 1017 (J) is around 
1 in 100 years. Based on the energy released from geological disasters (listed in the 
supplementary data), the nominal energy threshold for geological disasters (that caused more 
than 1000 fatalities) is 4.6×109 (J) which is related to the tsunami in 1783 which was triggered 
by an earthquake of magnitude 5.9.    
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Figure 4.4: Frequency of energy-scale of geological disasters (fatalities≥1000), earthquakes (1600-2012), 
earthquakes (green circles), tsunamis (black ovals), volcanic activities (purple triangles), and landslides (orange 
squares) comparing with the overall frequency-energy of geological disasters. Earthquakes are dominant. Data used 
for energy are based on datasets developed from various databases given in supplementary data. 
4.5.1 Energy efficiency of geological disasters: 
Here, we introduce a new parameter that can be used to analyze the energy efficiency of 
geological disasters in causing life-loss. The total estimated energy release by geological 
disasters for the period of 1600-2013, for earthquakes is ~1019, tsunamis ~1018, volcanoes ~1020, 
and landslides ~1016.  Total fatalities during this period are 4,320,722; 868,802; 171,091; and 
221,475, respectively. 
The ratio of number of deaths due to a geological disaster to the energy released by the disaster is 
considered as the energy efficiency of the geological disaster. This ratio allows comparing the 
deadliness of disasters with each other with units of death per joules (D/J). The average 
efficiency of earthquakes is ~10-11 (D/J), tsunamis ~10-8 (D/J), volcanoes ~ 10-13 (D/J), and 
landslides 10-9 (D/J). These average ratios suggest that tsunamis are the most efficient disasters 
among other geological disasters, i.e., the number of people killed by them with respect to the 
energy they release is the highest. Volcanoes have the lowest D/J efficiency which means that 
their energy release is less effective in life-loss. 
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4.6 Analysis: Risk of Geological Disasters  
4.6.1 Introduction to FN-curves  
Frequency-number (FN) curves are generally log-log plots that illustrate a frequency-number 
trend. These plots are traditionally generated from a set of data gathered over a period of time 
about a specific concept. In these plots, frequency of exceedance of the data is on the y-axis and 
value of the data is on the x-axis. A representative formula for a fitted line to a real-data FN-plot 
is power-law, F(N)=a×N−b, which is often plotted on a log-log scale, log(y)=log(a)−b×log(x), 
where log(a) is the intercept and b is the slope. Since these curves are frequency-fatality plots, 
the slopes represent the ratio of low frequency fatalities to high frequency fatalities. More 
precisely, as Baek et al (2011) argued using Random Group Formation (RGF) theory, the slope 
is determined by the size of the largest group of fatalities here; i.e., the more frequent events (less 
number of fatalities) mainly influence on the trend of FN-curves. 
However, there are other ways to construct frequency-number (FN) curves. Since first 
developed, these curves have also used for designing requirements (Lees (1996), Chapter 9). For 
the latter use, different countries impose different criteria for the shape of the FN-curve 
according to their desire for risk reduction. A summary of FN-curve-based criteria for societal 
risk reduction in industrial activities in certain countries has been gathered by Ball and Floyd 
(1998), and a complete overview of FN-curves is presented by Porske (2008) (Chapter 3.7). 
Table 4.2 is a summary of the criteria (on slope and intercept of FN-diagram) undertaken by 
certain countries. The values are based on Jonkman et al. (2003) and Trbojevic (2005). 
Table 4.2 Summary of FN-curve based criteria for societal risk reduction used in some countries 
(based on Jonkman-et.al-2003)  
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4.6.2 FN-curve of all geological disasters 
In literature that use real data on FN-curves for comparative risk assessment, such as from 
Ramussen (1975) and Mendes-Victor et al. (2009), the comparisons are based on the position of 
the plot, i.e., the disaster whose data on the FN-plot stands higher, is riskier. However, as showed 
in Table 4.2, the slope of the FN-curve is used for risk reduction purposed in some of the 
countries. 
Here, using real historical geological disaster data (given in the supplementary information) on 
FN-diagrams, we compare the global risk of geological disasters to human life according to their 
fitted parameters (slope and intercept).  Fig. 4.5 shows the FN-curve of global geological 
disasters with respect to each other. According to Fig. 4.5, the frequency of earthquake disasters 
is far above that of the other geological disasters causing the highest risk to the world.  
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Figure 4.5: FN-curve of geological disasters (1600-2012), earthquakes (green circles), tsunamis (black ovals), 
volcanic activities (purple triangles), and landslides (orange squares) compared with the FN-curve of all geological 
disasters. Earthquakes are dominant. 
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Table 4.3 compares the power-law fits to the FN-curves of geological disasters. As can be seen, 
earthquakes and tsunamis have slopes that are closer to the overall FN-curve. Landslides and 
volcanic activities have similar slopes close to -1 which shows risk neutrality of the world to 
these disasters. 
Table 4.3 Power-law fit of FN-curves plotted in Fig. 4.5; the R2 values, and 95% confidence 
intervals of the slope of the curves. 
Disaster Power-law fit R2 95% confidence interval of slope 
Earthquake Log(Y)=1.54-0.56Log(x) 0.99 (n=286) (-0.5713 to -0.5553) 
Tsunami Log(Y)=0.92-0.59Log(x) 0.98 (n=59) (-0.6126 to -0.5622) 
Volcano Log(Y)=2.1-1.02Log(x) 0.99 (n=44) (-1.069 to -0.9775) 
Landslide Log(Y)=1.77-0.94Log(x) 0.98 (n=35) (-1.002 to -0.8820) 
All Log(Y)=1.89-0.62Log(x) 0.99 (n=426) (-0.6287 to -0.6166) 
 
Slopes of FN-curves (power-law fits to the frequenc-sfatality curves) of geological disasters are 
linearly related to their resistance (Khaleghy-Rad and Evans, 2014), i.e., the greater the slope, the 
higher the resistance). We use the slope and intercept of the power-law fit to the frequency-
fatality curves to introduce a new factor that we call risk factor. 
4.6.3 Risk factor of geological disasters: 
In order to make a comparative quantitative risk assessment of individual disaster-generating 
geological processes, we propose a new parameter based on the slope and intercept of linear fits 
of real disaster data on FN-curves. We multiply the annual frequency of 1,000 or more fatalities, 
a1000, by the inverse of the absolute value of the slope, 
1
b , to define the Risk Factor (RF) as in  
RF = α1000× 
1
b                                  (Eq. 4.1). 
Due to the linear relationship between slope and resistance (Khaleghy-Rad and Evans, 2014), we 
associate the term  
1
b to the inverse of resistance to geological disaster, i.e., 1/Resistance”, where 
Resistance is the risk-absorption level of a system (Aven (2011b), pg. 12). The values of RF for 
each group of geological disasters is summarized in Table 4.4. 
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Eq. 4.1 is similar to the standard risk equation, Risk=Hazard×Vulnerability(×Exposure) (e.g., 
Birkmann, 2006) with 1/Resistance replacing vulnerability. We note that the Exposure term is 
not considered in the Risk Factor (Eq. 4.1) and because in the context of global geological 
disasters, we assume that geological disasters affect the whole world (due to their extensive 
impact), therefore, Exposure is the world’s population. Since world’s population and its 
variations are the same for all of the geological disasters, its effect will be cancelled in 
comparison. 
From Table 4.4 we could conclude that the world is more prone to earthquake disasters than any 
other geological disasters, because the frequency of 1,000 or more fatalities due to earthquakes is 
around 0.72 and the slope is -0.56, therefore, the risk factor is 1.29. The other disasters’ 
parameters are much less than this (Table 4.4). This could suggest that the higher the risk factor, 
the more fatalities in the disasters. To evaluate this hypothesis, we compare the RFs listed in 
Table 4.4 for earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic activities, and landslides with the total number of 
fatalities in the period of 1600-2012. This comparison reveals that if we exclude landslides, the 
sequence of RF and total number of fatalities due to the disasters are comparable. We justify this 
with the doubt that some of the volcanic disaster fatalities are counted in the landslide disasters. 
This can happen if flows, such as mudflow triggered by volcanic eruptions cause fatalities. 
Table 4.4 List of F(N≥1000) and slope of the fitted power-law to the fatality-frequency (FN) 
curve of geological disasters, based on Table 4.3 and Fig. 4.5, and the associated risk factor 
(multiplication of the frequency of 1,000 fatalities and more by the inverse of the absolute value 
of the slope) 
Disaster 
Annual frequency of 1,000 fatalities and 
more Slope Risk factor 
Earthquake 0.72 -0.56 1.29 
Tsunami 0.14 -0.59 0.24 
Volcano 0.11 -1.02 0.11 
Landslide 0.09 -0.94 0.09 
All 1.07 -0.62 1.73 
 
As we introduced in section 4.6.1, FN-curves are used for risk reduction in some countries, such 
as UK, and Netherlands (Table 4.2), To compare the total risk of geological disasters (red circles 
on Fig. 4.6, with the acceptable level of risk in some countries such as the UK (blue dashed line 
on Fig. 4.6) and Netherlands (red dot-dashed line), the acceptable criteria in those countries are 
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plotted in comparison with the overall FN-curve of geological disasters. The acceptable criteria 
of the UK and the Netherlands are up-scaled for the world population to create a comparable 
scale. For that, we calculated the corresponding number of individuals in the world according to 
one individual in the UK and the Netherlands. The acceptable criteria for the Netherlands impose 
an intercept of 0.001 and slope of -2 (Jonkman et al., 2003). One individual in the Netherlands is 
equal to about 412 individuals in the world (with the population of the Netherlands assumed to 
be 16.6 Million (UNdata, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Population&d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3a12, 2012) and the 
population of the world to be 6.8 billion). This number for the UK is about 100 individuals in the 
world (with the population of the UK assumed to be 62 million (UNdata, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Population&d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3a12, 2012); the 
acceptable criteria for UK imposes an intercept of 0.01 and slope of -1 (Jonkman et al., 2003). 
Thus, the intercept associated with each acceptable level (of the UK and the Netherlands) shifted 
up. 
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Figure 4.6: Overall frequency-fatality (FN) curve of global geological disasters (1600-2012) (red circles) in 
comparison with the acceptable criteria of UK (dashed blue line) and the Netherlands (dot-dashed green line) up-
scaled for the world population 
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As shown on Fig. 4.6, the overall trend of geological disasters are far above the acceptable level 
of risk in the UK and the Netherlands. Quantitatively, the risk factor corresponding to the 
acceptable criteria in these two countries are 0.001 and 0.0000000015, respectively. The risk 
factor for the overall FN-curve of geological disasters is 0.5 which is 500 times greater than the 
acceptable risk factor in the UK and almost 3×108 times greater than the risk factor in the 
Netherlands. The huge difference between the Netherlands and the UK is due to the risk aversion 
criteria, slope of -2, in the Netherlands. 
4.7 Statistical test on frequency and energy of events over time:  
We examine the trend of frequency of geological disasters over time (1600-2012) using linear 
regression. We found that the P-value of linear regression for frequency of events versus time is 
significantly increasing (P<0.01) by factor of 0.004 over the last 412 years. Doocy et al. (2013, 
EQs, Fig. 3) compares the frequency of earthquake events that affected human life is increasing 
parallel to the growth of number of deaths due to earthquakes. Although the period of time that 
they considered is between 1900 and 2009, and their threshold of fatalities is 1, our result is in 
agreement with Doocy et al. (2013). The result of increasing frequency of geological disasters 
trend suggest that more geological hazards that cause over 1000 fatalities are expected. However, 
it must be noted that as the global population increased, the threshold that defines disasters also 
increased throughout 412 years. Considering this fact as a filter for gathering geological disasters 
might change our result dramatically, and possibly lead into a non-significant increase of 
frequency of disasters. The statistical method and results are given in Appendix II, and more 
elaboration on the effect of threshold is given the discussion session.  
Furthermore, we analyze the temporal trend of energy released by geological disasters (1600-
2012). The linear regression method (given in the Appendix II) show that the trend is not 
significantly increasing or decreasing over time either (p=0.4), i.e., there is no evidence that the 
energy released by geological disasters has been increasing or decreasing during the last 412 
years. This confirms that the release of global geological disaster system has not significantly 
changed during the last 412 years. However, as we showed, the frequency of geological disasters 
has been increasing significantly. Putting these results together, we could conclude that the 
increase of the frequency of geological disasters is due to the increase of the global population, 
 110 
 
which evidently causes an increase to the population, exposed to the geological disaster-prone 
areas. 
4.7.1 Does the efficiency of geological disasters increase or decrease?  
In the section 4.5.1, we introduced a new parameter, called geological disaster efficiency which 
holds the unit of death per joules (D/J). Here, we use a linear regression analysis to find the trend 
of D/J of geological disasters over time. The statistical method is provided in Appendix II. The 
result of our regression analysis shows that there is no evidence of significant (P=0.7) increase or 
decrease in the trend of D/J in the period of 1600-2012. Fig. 4.7 shows the plot of death per 
energy (D/J) values versus years of events. The median value of the data is at 1.804e-012 (D/J) 
(red line on Fig. 4.7) (median is used instead of average because the data is skewed). 
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Figure 4.7: Trend of geological disasters’ efficiency (death/energy, D/J) over time (black dots). The red line is at the 
median of 1.804e-012 (D/J). 
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4.8 Summary, Conclusion, and Discussion  
Summary 
In this study, we introduced several factors that help comparing both the extent and the impact of 
geological hazards. We first introduced a unified magnitude scale based on the source energy of 
hazards for a better comparison of geological hazards. Based on the total energy-release of 
hazards generated disasters (caused more than 1,000 fatalities) of geological events during 1600-
2012, we found that volcanic disasters have had the highest total amount of energy-release that 
caused around 0.71 M fatalities. However, we also introduced another parameter which identifies 
the energy efficiency of the geological disasters (D/J). Our data shows that tsunami disasters 
have had the most efficient energy release in terms of life-loss, around 3.9 ×10-8. The other factor 
that we introduced for comparison of risk of geological disasters is the risk factor (RF). Using 
the best fit to the FN-curve of geological disasters, we found that earthquakes have been the most 
disastrous geological disasters since 1600.  
Furthermore, using statistical tests, we have shown that the frequency of geological disasters has 
been increasing over time. This result combined with the high risk factors of the geological 
disasters indicate that a serious global attempt is needed in order to reduce risk due to geological 
disasters in general and earthquakes, because of their highest risk factor, in particular. 
Conclusion 
Kagan (1997) claims that if an exponent value of a power-law is less than 1.0 for a set of 
fatalities, it means that the fatalities are mainly controlled by large events. The slopes gained 
from the datasets of geological disasters of 1600-2012 are all less than 1.0. This suggests that the 
fatalities due to geological disasters are mainly controlled by large events, and unless some risk-
reverse strategies are applied, maximum possible losses will occur (Kagan, 1997). From the 
power-law relation in the geological disasters’ FN-plots shown in Fig. 4.5 and using Kagan’s 
theory regarding risk-averse strategies, we conclude that, in order to increase the slope of the 
FN-curves, and therefore, increase the global resistance toward geological disasters, or to reduce 
the frequency of events with over 1000 fatalities to lower the risk factor, we need to apply better 
risk reduction and mitigation strategies. 
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Discussion 
In a statistical analysis, section 4.7, we showed that the frequency of geological disasters has 
been increasing since 1600 (with the factor of 0.004). We believe that this result is highly 
influenced by the threshold of 1000 fatalities for geological disasters, i.e., 1000 fatalities among 
7 billion people exposed is 1000 times less effective as 1000 fatalities among 7 million 
exposures. If we consider the 1000 fatality threshold for the population of the world today 
(WPtoday), the disaster threshold at year 1600 is (1000×WP1600)/WPtoday.  To have a better 
analysis for frequency of disasters, it is better to consider normalized death and therefore, a 
scaled threshold. Here, since we don’t have that complete set of data for smaller thresholds, we 
will just keep in mind that this result (increasing temporal trend for the frequency of geological 
disasters) will be different and may become balanced over time if we consider a scaled threshold 
for disasters. 
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Appendix II- Statistical analysis of temporal trends 
Frequency per year: 
The testing Equation is: Fr=aYr+b, where Fr is frequency of events (here geological disasters) 
per year, and Yr is year of events. a and b are constant, a with the unit of 1/yr2, and b with the 
unit of 1/yr. Our hypotheses are: H0: a=0; H1: a≠0. We use linear model in R: 
Call: 
lm(formula = FrYr ~ Yr) 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-2.2166 -1.0077 -0.1446  0.9554  4.9154  
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) -4.8184367  1.1152210  -4.321 1.94e-05 *** 
Yr           0.0039995  0.0005989   6.678 7.63e-11 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
Residual standard error: 1.397 on 424 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.09516,    Adjusted R-squared: 0.09303  
F-statistic: 44.59 on 1 and 424 DF,  p-value: 7.629e-11 
As the P-value is P<0.01, therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis and since the coefficient of 
Yr is positive (0.004) we could conclude that the frequency of geological disasters has been 
increasing by factor of 0.004 over the last 412 years significantly. 
Energy release per year: 
We use linear regression. The testing Equation is: E=aYr+b, where E is the source energy of 
events, and Yr is year of events. a and b are constant, a with the unit of joules/yr, and b with the 
unit of joules. Our hypotheses are: H0: a=0; H1: a≠0. We use linear model in R: 
Call: 
lm(formula = Energy ~ Yr) 
Residuals: 
       Min         1Q     Median         3Q        Max  
-7.029e+17 -3.784e+17 -2.107e+17 -1.120e+17  7.420e+19  
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept)  3.243e+18  3.555e+18   0.912    0.362 
Yr          -1.582e+15  1.900e+15  -0.833    0.406 
Residual standard error: 4.026e+18 on 351 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.001972,   Adjusted R-squared: -0.0008712  
F-statistic: 0.6936 on 1 and 351 DF,  p-value: 0.4055 
 
The P-value of linear regression between energy and time is not significant (0.4), therefore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, i.e., there is no evidence that the energy released by geological 
disasters has been increasing or decreasing over time.  
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Table1: Earthquake disasters (1600-2012) 
Yr Lat Long location Country M death Source Other death reports Energy (J) 
1605 19.9 110.5   China 7.5 2000 NOAA   1.12202E+16 
1606 23.6 102.8   China 6.5 2000 NOAA   3.54813E+14 
1611 37.6 139.8   Japan 6.9 3700 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1611 39 144   Japan 8.1 5000 Utsu   8.91251E+16 
1618 18.9 72.9   India 6.9 2000 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1618 46.3 9.5   Italy NA 1200 Utsu   NA 
1622 36.5 106.3   CHINA 7 12000 NOAA   1.99526E+15 
1626 39.4 114.2   China 7 5200 NOAA   1.99526E+15 
1627 41.733 15.35 Italy: Naples Italy 6.8 5000 Utsu   1E+15 
1638 39.033 16.283   Italy 7 30000 NOAA/Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1640 38.2 46.3   Ecuador NA 5000 Utsu   NA 
1641 37.9 46.1   Iran 6.8 12613 Utsi   1E+15 
1647 -33.4 -70.6   Chile 8.5 2000 NOAA/Utsu   3.54813E+17 
1648 38.3 43.5   Turkey 6.7 2000 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1652 25.4 100.5   China 6.8 3000 NOAA   1E+15 
1653 38.2 28.2   TURKEY   15000 NOAA/Utsu   63095.73445 
1654 34.3 105.5   CHINA 8 10400 NOAA   6.30957E+16 
1659 38.7 16.3   Italy 6.4 2035 Utsu   2.51189E+14 
1660 40 41.3   Turkey 6.5 1500 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1662 35.1 38.9 China     300000     63095.73445 
1666 37.1 138.2   Japan 6.8 1500 Utsu   1E+15 
1667 42.6 18.1   CROATIA 7.2 5000 NOAA   3.98107E+15 
1667 37.2 57.5   Iran 6.9 12000 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1667 40.6 48.6 Azerbaijan:Caucasus (Shemakha)     80000     63095.73445 
1668 38.4 27.1   TURKEY 6.6 17500 NOAA   5.01187E+14 
1668 35.3 118.6   CHINA 8.5 42578 NOAA   3.54813E+17 
1668 40.5 35   Turkey 8 8000 Utsu   6.30957E+16 
1669 40.6 48.6   AZERBAIJAN 5.7 7000 NOAA/Utsu   2.23872E+13 
1672 43.933 12.583   ITALY 5.6 1500 NOAA/Utsu 200 1.58489E+13 
1673 36.3 59.3   IRAN 7.1 5600 NOAA/Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1674 -3.5 128.2   Indonesia NA 2342 Utsu   NA 
1679 40.1 44.7   TURKEY   7600 NOAA   63095.73445 
1679 40 117   CHINA 8 13162 NOAA   6.30957E+16 
1680 25 101.5   CHINA 6.8 2700 NOAA   1E+15 
1683 38.7 112.7   CHINA 7 1001 NOAA   1.99526E+15 
1687 -15.2 -75.9   PERU 8.2 5000 NOAA/Utsu   1.25893E+17 
1688 41.3 14.6   Italy 6.6 10000 Utsu   5.01187E+14 
1688 38.4 26.9   TURKEY 7 17500 NOAA/Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1692 17.8 -76.7   Jamaica NA 3000 Utsu   NA 
1693 37.1 15 Italy: Sicily Italy 7.4 54000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1964 40.9 15.4   Italy 6.8 4820 Utsu   1E+15 
1695 39.6 116.2 China: Shanxi China 8 52600 NOAA 20000 6.30957E+16 
1703 42.467 13.2   Italy 6.7 9761 NOAA/Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1703 35 140 Japan:Edo Japan 8.1 200000 NOAA 5233 8.91251E+16 
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Yr Lat Long location Country M death Source Other death reports Energy (J) 
1706 42.1 14.1   Italy 6.7 2400 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1707 33.2 134.8   JAPAN 8.4 5000 NOAA   2.51189E+17 
1709 37.4 105.3   CHINA 7.5 2032 NOAA   1.12202E+16 
1711 34.3 134   JAPAN 6.7 1000 NOAA   7.07946E+14 
1713 25.4 103.2   CHINA 6.8 2100 NOAA   1E+15 
1716 36.9 2.9   Algeria NA 20000 Utsu   NA 
1718 35 105.2 China: Gansu China 7.5 40000 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1719 40.8 29.5   Turkey 7 1000 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1721 37.9 46.7   Iran 7.4 40000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1725 -9.2 -79.3   Peru 7.5 1500 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1727 38 46.2 Iran: Tabriz Iran  7.2 77000 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1731 36.7 104.9 China:Peking     100000     63095.73445 
1732 40.9 14.8   Italy NA 2000 Utsu   NA 
1732 41.1 15.1   Italy 6.6 1942 Utsu   5.01187E+14 
1739 38.8 106.5 China:Ningxia China 8 50000 Utsu   6.30957E+16 
1741 41.6 139.4   Japan NA 2000 Utsu   NA 
1746 -12 -77.2   Peru 8.4 18000 Utsu   2.51189E+17 
1749 39.5 -0.4   Spain NA 5000 Utsu   NA 
1750 36.3 22.8   Greece 7 2000 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1751 37.1 138.2   Japan 7.2 1541 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1752 35.5 35.5   Syria 7 20000 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1754 30 32   Egypt NA 40000 Utsu   NA 
1755 36 -11 Portugal: Lisbon Portugal NA 62000 Utsu   NA 
1755 34.1 -5.3   Morocco NA 3000 Utsu   NA 
1757 -0.9 -78.6   ECUADOR 7 1000 NOAA/Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1759 33.1 35.6   Syria 6.6 2000 Utsu   5.01187E+14 
1759 33.7 35.9   Lebanon 7.4 3000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1765 34.8 105   China 6.5 2068 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1766 40.7 140.6   Japan 7.3 1335 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1771 24 124.3   Japan 7.4 12000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1778 34 51.4   Iran 6.2 8000 Utsu   1.25893E+14 
1779 36 111.5 Iran:Tabriz   NA 100000     NA 
1780 34 58   Iran 6.5 3000 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1780 38.1 46.3 Iran:Tabriz Iran 7.4 50000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1783 38.4 16 Italy: Calabria Italy 6.9 35000 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1784 39.7 39.5   Turkey 7.6 5000 Utsu   1.58489E+16 
1789 39 40 Turkey:Palu Turkey 7 51000 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1792 32.8 130.3   Japan 6.4 15000 Utsu   2.51189E+14 
1797 -1.7 -78.6   Ecuador 8.3 40000 Utsu   1.77828E+17 
1799 23.8 102.4   China 6.5 2030 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1805 41.5 14.5   Italy 6.6 5573 Utsu   5.01187E+14 
1810 35.7 25   Greece 7.8 2000 Utsu   3.16228E+16 
1812 10.6 -66.9   Venezuela 6.3 20000 Utsu   1.77828E+14 
1815 34.8 111.2   China 6.8 13000 Utsu   1E+15 
1815 -8 115   INDONESIA 7 10253 NOAA   1.99526E+15 
1816 31.4 100.7   CHINA 6.5 2854 NOAA   3.54813E+14 
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Yr Lat Long location Country M death Source Other death reports Energy (J) 
1819 23 70   India 8.3 1440 Utsu   1.77828E+17 
1822 36.7 36.9   Syria 7.4 20000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1828 40.7 5.7   Azerbaijan 5.7 8000 Utsu   2.23872E+13 
1828 37.6 138.9   Japan 6.9 1681 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1830 36.4 114.2   CHINA 7.5 7477 NOAA   1.12202E+16 
1833 25.2 103   CHINA 8 6700 NOAA   6.30957E+16 
1837 33 35.5   Israel 7 5700 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1840 39.5 43.9   Turkey 7.4 1000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1842 19.75 -72.2   HAITI 8.1 5000 NOAA   8.91251E+16 
1843 16.5 -61   Guadaloupe 7.8 5000 Utsu   3.16228E+16 
1843 38.6 44.8   Iran 5.9 1000 Utsu   4.46684E+13 
1844 33.6 51.4   Iran 6.4 1500 Utsu   2.51189E+14 
1847 36.7 138.2   Japan 7.4 8174 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1848 24.1 120.5   China 6.8 2000 Utsu   1E+15 
1850 27.8 102.3   China 7.5 20650 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1851 36.8 58.5   Iran 6.9 2000 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1851 41 15.7   Italy 6.3 1000 Utsu   1.77828E+14 
1851 40.7 19.7   Albania 6.6 2000 Utsu   5.01187E+14 
1852 37.1 58.4   Iran 5.8 2000 Utsu   3.16228E+13 
1853 10.5 -64.2   Venezuela 6.7 1000 NOAA   7.07946E+14 
1853 29.6 52.5   Iran 6.2 9000 Utsu   1.25893E+14 
1854 13.8 -98.2   El Salvador 6.6 1000 Utsu   5.01187E+14 
1854 34.8 136   Japan 7.3 1600 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1854 34 137.8   Japan 8.4 2000 Utsu   2.51189E+17 
1855 40.2 29.1   Turkey 7.3 1900 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1855 40.2 29.1   Turkey 6.7 1300 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1855 35.7 139.8   JAPAN 6.9 7444 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1857 40.4 15.9   Italy 7 10939 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1859 -0.3 -78.5   Ecuador 6.3 5000 Utsu   1.77828E+14 
1859 40 41.5   Turkey 6.4 2000 Utsu   2.51189E+14 
1861 -32.9 -68.9   Argentina 7 18000 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1862 23.4 120   TAIWAN 6.5 2000 NOAA   3.54813E+14 
1863 38.1 48.5   Iran 6.1 1000 Utsu   8.91251E+13 
1868 -18.5 -71   Chile 8.5 25000 Utsu   3.54813E+17 
1868 0.3 -78.2 Ecuador/Colombia Ecuador 7.7 40000 Utsu   2.23872E+16 
1871 37.4 58.4   Iran 7.2 2000 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1872 37.1 58.4   Iran 6.3 4000 Utsu   1.77828E+14 
1872 36.4 36.5   Turkey 7.2 1800 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1875 38.1 30   Turkey 6.7 2000 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1875 7.9 -72.5   Venezuela 7.5 16000 NOAA/Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1876 38.12 46.29 India:Calcutta   NA 215000     NA 
1879 37.8 47.9   Iran 6.7 2000 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1879 33.2 104.7   China 8 22000 NOAA/Utsu   6.30957E+16 
1881 38.3 26.2   Greece 6.5 7866 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1883 40.8 13.9   Italy 5.6 2333 Utsu   1.58489E+13 
1883 38.3 26.2   TURKEY 7.3 15000 NOAA   5.62341E+15 
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Yr Lat Long location Country M death Source Other death reports Energy (J) 
1887 43.1 76.8   Kyrgyzstan 7.3 1800 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1891 35.6 136.6   Japan 8 7272 Utsu   6.30957E+16 
1893 38.3 38.5   Turkey 7 1500 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1893 37.1 58.4   Iran 7.1 10000 NOAA/Utsu 18000 2.81838E+15 
1895 37.1 58.4   Iran 6.8 1000 NOAA/Utsu 11000 1E+15 
1896 37.7 48.3   Iran 6.7 1100 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1896 39.5 144   Japan 8.2 22000 NOAA/Utsu 27122 1.25893E+17 
1897 26.9 56   Iran 6.4 1600 Utsu   2.51189E+14 
1897 26 91   India 8.3 1500 Utsu   1.77828E+17 
1899 37.9 28.8   Turkey 6.9 1117 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1899 -3 128.5   Indonesia 7.4 3864 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1902 14.9 -91.5   Guatemala 7.5 2000 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1902 39.9 76.2   China 7.7 2500 NOAA   2.23872E+16 
1902 40.8 72.3   Uzbakistan 6.4 4725 Utsu   2.51189E+14 
1903 39.1 42.7   Turkey 7 3560 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1903 40.9 42.8   Turkey 5.4 1000 Utsu   7.94328E+12 
1905 33 76   India 7.8 20000 Utsu   3.16228E+16 
1906 1 -81.5   Ecuador 8.6 1000 Utsu   5.01187E+17 
1906 23.6 120.5   China 6.8 1258 Utsu   1E+15 
1906 -33 -72   Chile 8.4 3760 Utsu   2.51189E+17 
1907 18.2 -76.7   Jamaica 6.5 1000 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1907 38.5 67.9   Uzbakistan 7.4 15000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1908 39.3 16.2 Italy: Messina Italy 7.1 82000 Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1908 39 40 Sicily; Italy     75000     63095.73445 
1909 33.4 49.1   Iran 7.3 5500 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1910 9.8 -83.9   Costa Rica 5.6 1750 Utsu   1.58489E+13 
1911 19.7 -103.7   Mexico 7.9 1300 Utsu   4.46684E+16 
1912 40.8 27.2   Turkey 7.4 2836 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1914 37.8 30.3   Turkey 7 4000 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1915 42 13.7   Italy 7 32610 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1917 -8.3 115   Indonesia 6.5 1300 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1917 28 104   China 6.8 1800 Utsu   1E+15 
1917 14.6 -90.6   Guatemala 6 2650 NOAA   6.30957E+13 
1918 24 117   China 7.3 2000 NOAA   5.62341E+15 
1920 44.3 10.3   Italy 5.8 1400 NOAA   3.16228E+13 
1920 36.7 104.9 China: Haiyuan China 8.5 220000 Utsu   3.54813E+17 
1922 -28.5 -70   Chile 8.3 1000 Utsu   1.77828E+17 
1923 31.5 101   China 7.3 4800 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1923 35.3 59.2   Iran 5.5 2219 Utsu   1.12202E+13 
1923 35.4 139.2 Japan: Kanto Japan 7.9 142807 Utsu   4.46684E+16 
1925 25.7 100.4   China 7 3600 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1927 35.6 134.9   Japan 7.3 2925 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1927 37.7 102.2 China:Nan-Shan China 8 35000 Utsu   6.30957E+16 
1929 37.8 57.8   Iran 7.2 3257 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1930 38 44.7   Iran 7.3 2514 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1930 41.1 15.4   Italy 6.7 1404 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
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1931 12.2 -86.3   Nicaragua 6 2450     6.30957E+13 
1931 39.4 46   Armenia 6.3 2890 NOAA/Utsu 390 1.77828E+14 
1931 47.1 89.8   China 8 10000 Utsu   6.30957E+16 
1933 39.2 144.5   Japan 8.1 3064 Utsu   8.91251E+16 
1933 31.9 103.4   China 7.5 6800 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1934 26.5 86.5   India 8.3 10700 Utsu   1.77828E+17 
1935 24.3 120.8   China 7.1 3276 Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1935 29.5 66.8 Pakistan Pakistan 7.5 60000 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1935 24.3 120.8   Taiwan 6.5 3276 NOAA/Utsu 44 3.54813E+14 
1939 -36.3 -72.3   Chile 8.3 28000 NOAA/Utsu   1.77828E+17 
1939 40.1 38.2   Turkey 7.8 32700 Utsu   3.16228E+16 
1940 45.8 26.8   Romania 7.3 1000 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1941 16.6 43.3   Yemen 5.8 1200 Utsu   3.16228E+13 
1942 40.7 36.8   Turkey 7.3 3000 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1943 35.5 134.2   Japan 7.2 1083 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1943 41 34   Turkey 7.6 4020 Utsu   1.58489E+16 
1944 -31.5 -68.6   Argentina 7.4 8000 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1944 41.5 32.5   Turkey 7.6 4000 Utsu   1.58489E+16 
1944 33.6 136.2   Japan 7.9 1251 Utsu   4.46684E+16 
1945 34.7 137.1   Japan 6.8 2306 Utsu   1E+15 
1945 25 63.5   Pakistan 8 4000 NOAA/Utsu 300 6.30957E+16 
1946 40 41.5   Turkey 6 1300 NOAA/Utsu 840 6.30957E+13 
1946 -8.5 -77.5   Peru 7.3 1400 NOAA/Utsu 800 5.62341E+15 
1946 33 135.6   Japan 8 1330 Utsu   6.30957E+16 
1948 36.2 136.3   Japan 7.1 3769 Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1948 37.7 58.7 Turkmenistan: Ashkhabad Turkmenistan 7.3 19800 NOAA/Utsu 110000 5.62341E+15 
1949 39.2 70.8   Tajikistan 7.4 12000 NOAA/Utsu 3500 7.94328E+15 
1949 -1.5 -78.3   Ecuador 6.8 6000 Utsu   1E+15 
1950 28.5 96.5 
Near Zhamo (Rima), Xizang (Tibet), China, "Assam-
Tibet" Earthquake China 8.6 4000 NOAA/Utsu 1530 5.01187E+17 
1951 13.5 -88.4 Cosiguina, Nicaragua Nicaragua 6.5 1100 Utsu   3.54813E+14 
1953 40 27.5 Yenice-Gonen, Turkey Turkey 7.4 1103 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1954 36.3 1.5 Chlef (Orleansville, El Asnam), Algeria Algeria 6.8 1409 Utsu   1E+15 
1957 36.14 52.7 Near Sang Chai, Mazandaran, Iran Iran 7.1 1200 Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1957 34.5 48 Sahneh, Iran Iran 7.2 2000 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1960 30.5 -9.6 Agadir, Morocco Morocco 5.7 13100 Utsu   2.23872E+13 
1960 -39.5 -74.5 Temuco-Valdivia, Chile Chile 8.5 5700 Utsu   3.54813E+17 
1962 35.6 49.9 Bu'in Zahra, Qazvin, Iran Iran 7.2 12225 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1963 42 21.4 
Skopje, Former Yugoslav Rep. of 
Macedonia(Makedonija, Yugoslavia) Skopje 6.1 1070 Utsu   8.91251E+13 
1966 37.3 114.9 East of Longyao, Hebei (Hopeh), China China 6.8 1000     1E+15 
1966 37.5 115.1 Southeast of Ningjin, Hebei (Hopeh), China China 7.2 8064 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1966 39.2 41.6 Varto, Turkey Turkey 6.8 2517 Utsu   1E+15 
1968 34 59 Dasht-e Bayaz, Iran Iran 7.3 15000 NOAA/Utsu 10488 5.62341E+15 
1969 22.3 111.8 Yangjiang, Guangdong, China China 6.4 3000 NOAA/Utsu 33 2.51189E+14 
1970 24.2 102.7 Tonghai, Yunnan Province, China China 7.8 15621 NOAA/Utsu 10000 3.16228E+16 
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1970 39.2 29.5 Gediz, Turkey Turkey 7.1 1086     2.81838E+15 
1970 -9.4 -78.9 Chimbote, Peru Peru 7.8 66794     3.16228E+16 
1971 38.8 40.5 Turkey Turkey 7 1000 NOAA/Utsu 995 1.99526E+15 
1972 28.4 52.8 southern Iran Iran 6.8 5010 NOAA/Utsu 30000 1E+15 
1972 12.3 -86.1 Nicaragua, Managua Nicaragua 6.2 6000 NOAA/Utsu 10000 1.25893E+14 
1973 31.3 100.7 China: Sichuan P.[Mangua E]  China 7.6 2175 Utsu   1.58489E+16 
1974 28.2 104.1 China China 7.1 1423 NOAA/Utsu 20000 2.81838E+15 
1974 35 72.8 Pakistan Pakistan 6.2 5300 Utsu   1.25893E+14 
1975 40.7 122.8 Haicheng, China China 7.3 1328 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1975 38.5 40.7 Turkey Turkey 6.7 2370 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1976 15.3 -89.1 Guatemala Guatemala 7.5 23000 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1976 46.4 13.3 northeastern Italy  Italy 6.1 965 Utsu   8.91251E+13 
1976 -4.6 140.1 Papua, Indonesia Indonesia 7.1 6000 Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1976 39.4 118 Tangshan, China China 7.8 242800 Utsu   3.16228E+16 
1976 6.2 124 Mindanao, Philippines  Philippines 7.9 8000 Utsu   4.46684E+16 
1976 -4.5 139.9 Indonesia (Irain Jaya) Indonesia 7.2 6000 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1976 39.1 44 Turkey-Iran border region Iran 7.3 3900 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1977 45.8 26.8 Romania Romania 7.3 1581 Utsu   5.62341E+15 
1978 33.4 57.4 Iran Iran 7.4 18220 Utsu   7.94328E+15 
1980 36.2 1.4 El Asnam, Algeria(formerly Orleansville) Algeria 7.3 3500 NOAA/Utsu 5000 5.62341E+15 
1980 40.9 15.3 southern Italy Italy 6.7 2483 NOAA/Utsu 4689 7.07946E+14 
1981 29.9 57.7 southern Iran Iran 6.7 3000 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1981 30 57.8 southern Iran Iran 7.1 1500 Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1981 -4.6 139.2 Indonesia(Irian Jaya) Indonesia 6.7 1300 Utsu   7.07946E+14 
1982 14.7 44.4 Yemen Yemen 6 2800 Utsu   6.30957E+13 
1983 40.3 42.2 Turkey Turkey 6.9 1400 NOAA/Utsu 1342 1.41254E+15 
1985 18.2 -102.5 Mexico, Michoacan Mexico 8.1 9500 Utsu   8.91251E+16 
1986 13.8 -89.1 El Salvador El Salvador 5.4 1500 NOAA/Utsu 1100 7.94328E+12 
1987 0.2 -77.8 Colombia-Ecuador Colombia 6.9 5000 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1988 26.8 86.6 Nepal-India border region Nepal 6.6 1450 NOAA/Utsu 1091 5.01187E+14 
1988 41 44.2 Spitak, Armenia Armenia 6.8 25000 Utsu   1E+15 
1990 37 49.4 Western Iran Iran 7.7 35000 NOAA/Utsu 50000 2.23872E+16 
1990 15.7 121.2 Luzon, Philippine Islands Philippine Islands 7.8 2430 Utsu   3.16228E+16 
1991 30.8 78.8 Northern India India 7 2000 Utsu   1.99526E+15 
1992 -8.5 121.9 Flores Region, Indonesia Indonesia 7.5 1740 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1993 18.1 76.5 Latur-Killari, India India 6.2 9748 NOAA/Utsu 11000 1.25893E+14 
1995 34.6 135 Kobe, Japan Japan 7.2 6435 Utsu   3.98107E+15 
1995 52.6 142.8 Sakhalin Island, Russia Russia 7.5 1989 Utsu   1.12202E+16 
1997 33.9 59.8 Northern Iran Iran 7.3 1572 NOAA/Utsu 1728 5.62341E+15 
1997 38.1 48.1 Iran: Ardebil Iran 6.1 1100 Utsu   8.91251E+13 
1998 37.1 70.1 Hindu Kush region, Afghanistan Afghanistan 6.1 2323 Utsu   8.91251E+13 
1998 37.1 70.1 Afghanistan-Tajikistan Border Region Afghanistan 6.9 4000 Utsu   1.41254E+15 
1998 -3 141.9 Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea 7.1 2700 Utsu   2.81838E+15 
1998         NA 80000     NA 
1999 4.5 -75.7 Colombia Colombia 5.7 1900 NOAA/Utsu 1185 2.23872E+13 
1999 40.7 29.9 Turkey Turkey 7.8 17118 Utsu   3.16228E+16 
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1999 23.8 121 Taiwan(Eastern Asia) Taiwan 7.7 2413 Utsu   2.23872E+16 
2001 23.4 70.2 Gujarat, India  India 7.8 20005 NOAA   3.16228E+16 
2002 36 69.3 Hindu Kush Region, Afghanistan Afghanistan 6.2 1000 NOAA   1.25893E+14 
2003 36.9 3.6 Northern Algeria Algeria 6.2 2266 NOAA   1.25893E+14 
2003 28.99 58.31 Southeastern Iran Iran 6.8 31000 NOAA   1E+15 
2004 3.3 95.87 Sumatra, Indonesia Indonesia 9.1 227898 USGS   2.81838E+18 
2004 35.142 -3.997   MOROCCO 6.4 628 NOAA   2.51189E+14 
2004 3.295 95.982   INDONESIA 8.8 1001 NOAA   1E+18 
2005 2.08 97.1 Northern Sumatra, Indonesia Indonesia 8.4 1303 NOAA/USGS 1313 2.51189E+17 
2005 34.53 73.58 Pakistan Pakistan 7.7 86000 NOAA   2.23872E+16 
2006 -7.961 110.446 Flores Region, Indonesia Indonesia 6.2 5749 NOAA   1.25893E+14 
2008 31 103.3 Eastern Sichuan, China China 8.1 87652 NOAA   8.91251E+16 
2009 -0.72 99.867 Southern Sumatra, Indonesia  Indonesia 7.5 1117 NOAA   1.12202E+16 
2010 33.165 96.548 Southern China China 6.9 2220 NOAA   1.41254E+15 
2010 18.4 -72.5 Haiti region Haiti 7.3 65000 
NOAA/Doocy 
et al. (2013)   5.62341E+15 
2011 38.297 142.373 Japan Japan 8.3 1400 NOAA   1.77828E+17 
                    
                    
                    
 BLUE Reported in EM-DAT or John Hopkins' report of EM-DAT             
  RED Reported in NOAA             
 Orange Reported in USGS earthquakes with more than 1000 fatalities list             
    Excluded because of no information             
    Excluded because of redundancy              
    Excluded because D<1000             
    Included because 965 deaths is considered as 1000             
    Caused Tsunami based on NGDC-NOAA             
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Table 2: Tsunami disasters (1600-2012) 
Year Lat Long Country Region Death Cause Source Notes 
Other Death 
reports 
Tsunami 
characteristics 
(Wave height (m), 
and Distance from 
Source (km)) 
Energy(J)-
Tang et al 
(2012) 
Et=0.029e4.37Mw 
1605 33 134.9 JAPAN 
KEICHO (Shishikui,Boso, 
Enshunada Sea) 10600 7.9 NOAA     5000 D 2.85461E+13 
1611 39 144.5 JAPAN Urukawa (Hokkaido) SANRIKU  4783 8.1 NOAA     5000 D 6.841E+13 
1640 42.07 140.68 JAPAN UCHIURA BAY 700 6.5 NOAA 
Kamagatake 
Volcano,     62882928134 
1674 -3.75 127.75 INDONESIA AMBON ISLAND, Malaku Islands  4300 6.8 NOAA     2244 D 2.33288E+11 
1687 -13.5 -76.5 PERU CALLAO 5000 8.5 NOAA       3.92886E+14 
1692 17.8 -76.7 JAMAICA PORT ROYAL 2200 7.7 NOAA Landslide?   2000 D 1.19117E+13 
1696     JAPAN   2450   NOAA         
1700 32.7 129.7 JAPAN 
HIZEN, NAGASAKI 
PREFECTURE 1001 7 NOAA       5.5907E+11 
1703 34.7 139.8 JAPAN GENROKU: Kamakura 5833 8.2 NOAA       1.05903E+14 
1707 34.1 137.8 JAPAN HOEI: Tosa Bay,Owase, Osaka  4910 8.4 NOAA     5000&2000 D 2.53793E+14 
1721 23 120.2 TAIWAN   2000   NOAA         
1737 20 77 INDIA 
HOOGLY RIVER/infamous 
Bilham event 300000   NOAA         
1741 41.5 139.37 JAPAN 
HOKKAIDO (Oshima Oshima 
Volcano) 2033 6.9 NOAA VOLCANO   1475 D 3.61143E+11 
1746 -11.996 -77.198 PERU CALLAO 4800 8 NOAA       4.41909E+13 
1751 37.2 138.1 JAPAN NAOETSUKO, NW HONSHU 2100 6.6 NOAA       97346299041 
1755 36 -11 PORTUGAL LISBON EQ 3000 8.8 NOAA     50000 D 1.45756E+15 
1765 23.12 113.25 CHINA SOUTH CHINA SEA 10000   NOAA         
1766 40.9 140.7 JAPAN AOMORI, SANRIKU 1700 6.9 NOAA       3.61143E+11 
1771 24 124.3 JAPAN/Okinawa 
MIYARA, ISHIGAKI ISL., 
Yaeyama tsunami  13486 7.4 NOAA 
Boulders 
moved     3.2108E+12 
1782 24.5 120.5 TAIWAN TAIWAN STRAIT 40000 7 NOAA       5.5907E+11 
1783 38.217 15.633 ITALY 
SCILLA, CALABRIA/Rockfall 
into OCEAN  1500 5.9 NOAA ROCKFALL     4568910227 
1792 32.75 130.3 JAPAN 
UTO, Ashikita [UNZEN] 
LANDSLIDE  5843 6.4 NOAA LANDSLIDE    14524 D 40620575098 
1793 38.5 144 JAPAN 
Fukushima to Hachinhoe 
[SANRIKU] 1000 6.9 NOAA     720 D 3.61143E+11 
1812 8 -66 VENEZUELA   NA             
1815 -8 115 INDONESIA BALI ISLAND/LANDSLIDE  10253 7 NOAA 
SUBMARINE 
LANDSLIDE    1200 D 5.5907E+11 
1815 -5 120 INDONESIA TAMBORA 5500 
VOLCANO 
(4600)           
1819 20 77 INDIA SINDREE 1543 
Rann of Kutch 
Q/Bilham           
1820 -7 119 INDONESIA BULUKUMBA, SULAWESI 500 7.5 NOAA       4.9705E+12 
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Year Lat Long Country Region Death Cause Source Notes 
Other Death 
reports 
Tsunami 
characteristics 
(Wave height (m), 
and Distance from 
Source (km)) 
Energy(J)-
Tang et al 
(2012) 
Et=0.029e4.37Mw 
1842 19.75 -72.2 HAITI CAP-HAITIAN 5000 8.1 NOAA     300 D 6.841E+13 
1853 8 -66 VENEZUELA   NA 
Cumana 
destroyed           
1854 33.1 135 JAPAN ANSEI [Nankaido] 5000 8.4 NOAA     3000 D 2.53793E+14 
1856 -5 120 INDONESIA Awu NA VOLCANO           
1861 -1 97.5 INDONESIA SIMUK ISLAND, SUMATRA 1000 8.5 NOAA     1105 D 3.92886E+14 
1861 0.009 98 INDONESIA PALAU TELO, SUMATRA 950 7 NOAA       5.5907E+11 
1868 -10 -76 PERU TAMBO, ARICA destroyed 25674             
1874 22 89 BANGLADESH SUNDERBANS 2000   NOAA         
1877 -21.5 -70.5 CHILE  FIJI ISLANDS (Chile?) 2477 8.3 NOAA       1.63943E+14 
1883 -6.102 105.423 INDONESIA SUNDA STRAIT/KRAKATOA 36000   NOAA VOLCANO       
1888 -6 147 PAPUA NEW GUINEA RITTER ISLAND  1100 VOLCANO           
1892 -5 120 INDONESIA Awu NA VOLCANO           
1896 39.5 144 JAPAN MEIJI SANRUKI 27122 8.3 NOAA       1.63943E+14 
1899 -3 128.5 INDONESIA PAULOHI, Tehoru, Banda Sea 3864 7.8 NOAA     2460 D 1.84399E+13 
1906 1 -81.5 COLOMBIA/ECUADOR Tumaco overwhelmed  1000 8.8 NOAA       1.45756E+15 
1908 38.183 15.683 ITALY MESSINA 4578 7.1 NOAA       8.65472E+11 
1915 -5 120 INDONESIA  BALI ISLAND  15000             
1923 36 138 JAPAN TAISHO KANTO: Sagami bay  2144 7.9 EM-DAT/JHSPH       2.85461E+13 
1927     Japan South-West Kyoto 1100   EM-DAT/JHSPH     2925 D/EM-DAT   
1930 17.3 96.5 MYANMAR (BURMA) PEGU, SITTANG RIVER 500 7.2 NOAA       1.3398E+12 
1933 39.1 144.7 JAPAN N. RIKUCHU, Miyako 3200 8.4 NOAA     
3022 D/6064 D/EM-
DAT 2.53793E+14 
1941 20 77 INDIA  Andaman Sea and E Coast India 5000             
1944 34 137.1 JAPAN TONANKAI 1251 8.1 NOAA     1223 D 6.841E+13 
1945 24.5 63 Pakistan  MAKRAN COAST 4200 8 NOAA     4000 D 4.41909E+13 
1946 19.3 -68.9 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC MATANZAS 1790 7.8 NOAA       1.84399E+13 
1946 33 135.6 JAPAN Nankaido 1330 8.1 NOAA     1362 D 6.841E+13 
1946     Unimak     8.5 Tang et al 3.58E+17 Es 7.21E+14 Et   3.92886E+14 
1951 13 -87.5 NICARAGUA POTOSI, GULF OF FONSECA 1000 6 NOAA 
LAHAR 
VOLCANO     7072929242 
1952 52.75 159.5 USSR KURIL 4000 9 NOAA     
2300 D/EM-
Dat/JHSPH 3.49301E+15 
1960 -39.5 -74.5 CHILE CHILE AS A WHOLE 1100 9.5 NOAA     1222 D 3.10551E+16 
1964     Alaska     9.2 Tang et al 4.02E+18 Es 4.24E+15 Et   8.37092E+15 
1976 6.262 124.023 PHILIPPINES MAGUINDANAO PROVINCE 8000 8.1 NOAA     4376 D 6.841E+13 
1979 -5 120 INDONESIA 
LOMBLEN ISLAND/Submarine 
landslide  1239 
SUBMARINE 
LANDSLIDE        
539 D/EM-
DAT/JHSPH   
1979 1.598 -79.358 COLOMBIA  Tumaco 600 7.7 NOAA       1.19117E+13 
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Year Lat Long Country Region Death Cause Source Notes 
Other Death 
reports 
Tsunami 
characteristics 
(Wave height (m), 
and Distance from 
Source (km)) 
Energy(J)-
Tang et al 
(2012) 
Et=0.029e4.37Mw 
1992 -8.48 121.896 INDONESIA Flores 1713 7.8 NOAA     
1169 D/1825 D/EM-
DAT/JHSPH 1.84399E+13 
1994     Kuril     8.3 Tang et al 1.79E+17 Es 7.53E+13Et   1.63943E+14 
1996     Andreanof     7.9 Tang et al 4.51E+16 Es 4.69E+13 Et   2.85461E+13 
1998 -2.961 141.926 PAPUA NEW GUINEA WARAPU/Arop 2182 7 NOAA 
SUBMARINE 
LANDSLIDE    
2205 D/2182 D/EM-
DAT 5.5907E+11 
2003     Rat Island     7.7 Tang et al 2.26E+16 Es 1.21E+13 Et   1.19117E+13 
2004 3.295 95.982 INDIAN OCEAN 
Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand 230000 9.1 NOAA 2.01 E+18 Es 1.66E+16 Et 226898 D 5.40738E+15 
2004     India   16389 9 EM-DAT/JHSPH       3.49301E+15 
2004     Indonesia   165708 9 EM-DAT/JHSPH       3.49301E+15 
2004     Sri Lanka   35399 9 EM-DAT/JHSPH       3.49301E+15 
2004     Thailand   8457 9 EM-DAT/JHSPH       3.49301E+15 
2006 -9.254 107.411 INDONESIA SOUTH OF JAVA 600 7.7 NOAA     
802 D/EM-
DAT/JHSPH 1.19117E+13 
2006     Tonga     8 Tang et al 6.37E+16 Es 7.29E+13 Et   4.41909E+13 
2006     Kuril     8.3 Tang et al 1.79E+17 Es 6.18E+13 Et   1.63943E+14 
2007     Nicobar     6.1 Tang et al 8.99E+13 Es 1.5E+10 Et   10949291096 
2007     Kuril     8.1 Tang et al 8.99E+16 Es 2.17E+13 Et   6.841E+13 
2009     New Zealand     7.8 Tang et al 3.19E+16 Es 1.42E+13 Et   1.84399E+13 
2009     Samoa     8.1 Tang et al 8.99E+16 Es 1.02E+14 Et   6.841E+13 
2010     Chile     8.8 Tang et al 1.01E+18 Es 1.63E+15 Et   1.45756E+15 
2010     Bonin     7.4 Tang et al 8.02E+15 Es 1.49E+12 Et   3.2108E+12 
2011 38.297 142.373 JAPAN SENDAI, SANRUKI 27000 9 NOAA 2.84E+18 Es 3.00E+15 Et 
17150 D/19846 
D/EM-DAT 3.49301E+15 
                        
  Excluded because of redundancy   
 
            
  Excluded because Death<1000   
 
            
  Excluded because no infor on death   
 
            
  Included because 950 deaths is considered as 1000                 
  Included because of NOAA reported deaths (not included before because of  NA)               
RED Reported in NOAA                   
BLUE 
Reported in EM-DAT or John Hopkins' report of 
EM-DAT                 
Purple Reported by Tang et al (2012) for energy estimates                 
Black Gathered by Evans and Khaleghy                 
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Table 3: Volcanic disasters (1600-2012) 
Yr Volcano Country Region Lat Long Killed Note VEI Source Elevation 
Other 
 death 
Lava 
volume 
Tephta 
Volume 
VEI-
>Volume 
Ek=(density 
(2669.9)* 
(VEI->Vol)*g*h 
1600 Huaynaputina Peru South Am. 
-
16.608 -70.85 1400   6 NOAA 4850       1.00E+11 4.19E+18 
1631 Vesuvius Italy Europe 40.821 14.426 1400 Tsu 4 NOAA 1281       1.00E+09 4.27E+16 
1638 Raung Indonesia   -8.125 114.042 1400   3 NOAA 3332       1.00E+08 4.29E+15 
1640 Tungurahua Ecuador South Am. -2 -77.5 5000                   
1660 Long Island Australia Melanesia -5.358 147.1199 2000 Tsu 4 NOAA 1280       1.00E+09 4.34E+16 
1672 Merapi Indonesia   -7.542 110.442 3000   4 NOAA 2947       1.00E+09 4.37E+16 
1684 Grimsvotn Iceland   65 -18 9350                   
1711 Awu Indonesia   3.67 125.5 3000   3 NOAA 1320       1.00E+08 4.48E+15 
1741 
Oshima-
Oshima Japan   36 138 1475                   
1760 Makian Indonesia   0.32 127.4 2000   4 NOAA 1357       1.00E+09 4.61E+16 
1772 Papandayan Indonesia   -7.32 107.73 2957   3 NOAA 2665       1.00E+08 4.64E+15 
1775 Gamalama Indonesia   0.8 127.325 1300   3 NOAA 1715       1.00E+08 4.64E+15 
1783 Asama Japan   36.4 138.53 1491 Siebert 4 NOAA 2560       1.00E+09 4.67E+16 
1783 Laki Iceland   65 -18 10521 Thorarinsson               0.00E+00 
1784 Grimsvton Iceland NE 64.42 -17.33 9350   4 NOAA 1725       1.00E+09 4.67E+16 
1790 Kilauea U.S.A Hawai 19.425 -155.292 5405 Douglas 4 NOAA 1222       1.00E+09 4.68E+16 
1792 Unzen Japan   36 138 14524 Siebert                 
1812 Awu Indonesia S-E Asia 3.67 125.5 953 Siebert 3 NOAA 1320       1.00E+08 4.74E+15 
1814 Mayon Philippines S-E Asia 13.257 123.685 1200   4 NOAA 2462       1.00E+09 4.75E+16 
1815 Awu Indonesia S-E Asia -8.25 118 60000 Tsu 7 NOAA 2850 10000     1.00E+12 4.75E+19 
1822 Galunggung Indonesia S-E Asia -7.25 108.05 4011   5 NOAA 2168       1.00E+10 4.77E+17 
1840 Ararat   Europe 39.7 44.3 1900                   
1845 Ruiz Columbia   4.89 -75.32 1000   2 NOAA 5321       1.00E+07 4.83E+14 
1856 Awu Indonesia S-E Asia 3.67 125.5 2806 Tsu 3 NOAa 1320       1.00E+08 4.86E+15 
1875 Mayon Philippines   13 122 1500                   
1883 Kralatau Indonesia S-E Asia -6.102 105.423 36417 Tsu 6 NOAA 813 2000     1.00E+11 4.93E+18 
1888 Ritter Island   Melanesia -5.5 148.11 3000                   
1892 Awu Indonesia S-E Asia 3.67 125.5 1532 Tsu 3 NOAA 1320       1.00E+08 4.95E+15 
1902 Santa Maria Guatmala Central Am. 14.756 -91.552 1500   4 NOAA 3772 
6000/EM-
DAT   2.00E+10 1.00E+09 4.98E+16 
1902 Soufriere St.Vincent Caribbean 13.33 -61.18 1680 Tsu 4 NOAA 1220 
1565/EM-
DAT   3.80E+08 1.00E+09 4.98E+16 
1902 Pelee Martinique Caribbean 14.82 -61.17 28000 Tsu 4 NOAA 1397 
30000/EM-
DAT 1.40E+08 2.00E+08 1.00E+09 4.98E+16 
1902 Pelee Martinique West Indies. 14.82 -61.17 1000 Tsu 4 NOAA 1397 1500   2.00E+10 1.00E+09 4.98E+16 
1909 Semeru Indonasia   -8.108 112.92 5500   2 
Em-
Dat   221/NOAA     1.00E+07 4.99E+14 
1911 Taal Philippines S-E Asia 14.002 120.993 1335 Tsu 4 NOAA 400     80000000 1.00E+09 5.00E+16 
1919 Kelut Indonasia S-E Asia -7.93 112.308 5110   4 NOAA 1731 5000   190000000 1.00E+09 5.02E+16 
1929 Santa Maria Guatmala Central Am. 14.756 -91.552 5000   3 
EM-
Dat   200/NOAA 1100000000 100000000 1.00E+08 5.05E+15 
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Yr Volcano Country Region Lat Long Killed Note VEI Source Elevation 
Other 
 death 
Lava 
volume 
Tephta 
Volume 
VEI-
>Volume 
Ek=(density 
(2669.9)* 
(VEI->Vol)*g*h 
1930 Merapi Indonasia S-E Asia -7.542 110.442 1369   3 NOAA 2974   1500000 1700000 1.00E+08 5.05E+15 
1931 Merapi Indonasia   -7.542 110.442 1300   3 
Em-
Dat     1500000 1700000 1.00E+08 5.05E+15 
1949 Paricutin Mexico AMRO 19.85 -102.25 1000   4 
EM-
Dat     700000000 130000000 1.00E+09 5.10E+16 
1951 Lamington 
Papua New 
Guinea oceania -8.95 148.15 2942   4 NOAA 1680 
3000/EM-
Dat 1000000000   1.00E+09 5.10E+16 
1951 Kelut Indonasia SEARO -7.93 112.308 1300   3 
EM-
Dat   7/NOAA     1.00E+08 5.10E+15 
1963 Agung Indonasia S-E Asia -8.342 115.508 1148 Tsu 5 NOAA 3142 
1584/EM-
Dat 100000000 1000000000 1.00E+10 5.14E+17 
1966 Kelut Indonasia   -7.93 112.308 1000   4 
Em-
Dat   215/NOAA   89000000 1.00E+09 5.14E+16 
1982 El Chichon Mexico Central Am. 17.36 -93.228 1879   5 NOAA 1150 100/Em-Dat   2500000000 1.00E+10 5.19E+17 
1985 
Nevado del 
Ruiz Colombia South Am. 4.89 -75.32 23080   3 NOAA 5321 
21800/Em-
Dat   48000000 1.00E+08 5.19E+15 
1986 Lake Nyos Cameroon Central Af. 6 12 1746               1.00E+05 5.20E+12 
1986 
Oku Volc 
Field   Africa/MidEast 6.5 10.5 1746   3 
EM-
DAT 3011 1700/NOAA     1.00E+08 5.20E+15 
1991 Pinatubo Philippines S-E Asia 13 122 932   6     
640/EM-
DAT/JHSPH   1.10E+10 1.00E+11 5.21E+18 
1998 San Cristobal   Central Am. 16.75 -92.63 1620                   
2006 Mayon Philippines   13.257 123.685 1266   1 NOAA  2462       1.00E+06 5.25E+13 
  Excluded because of redundancy 
  Excluded because of no confirmed information in Witham (2005) 
IN RED Reported in NOAA 
IN BLUE Reported in EM-DAT or John Hopkins' report of EM-DAT 
In Green  Witham (2005) 
In Purple Siebert et al (2010) 
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Table 4: Landslide disasters (1600-2012) 
Year Lat Long Country  
Area/ 
Locality Event Process  Deaths WP Volume Height 
E(J)=rho(2500kg/m2)*Vol*h 
(130m assumed if no height info) Source   
1618 46.33 9.42 Italy 
Piuro 
(Plurs) 
Rock avalanche (est volume  
~ 3-4 M m3) 2430 5.97E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1638 -8.125 114.04 Indonesia Raung Lahar and flood 1000 6.17E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1718 35.17 105.16 China Tongwei  Loess landslide 9000 7.37E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1725 -9.16 -77.58 Peru 
Cordillera 
Blanca 
Outburst flood/debris flow 
from moraine-dammed lake.  1750 7.59E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1741 41.28 139.36 Japan 
Oshima-
Oshima 
Landslide tsunami generated 
by partial flank collapse of 
volcano 1475 8.11E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1760 0.533 127.66 Indonesia Makian Lahar 2000 8.72E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1772 -7.32 107.73 Indonesia Papandayan  
Debris avalanche resulting 
from flank collapse 2957 9.1E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1783 36.4 138.516 Japan Asama 
Lahar formed by 
transformation of huge 
pyroclastic flow 1433 9.74E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1783 38.4 16 Italy Scilla   1500         Evans (unpublished data) 
1786 35 105 China  Sichuan 
Outburt flood due to 
landslide dam failure  100000 9.55E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1792 36.4 138.516 Japan 
Mayuyama 
and Ariake 
Sea 
Debris avalanche resulting 
from flank collapse and 
tsunami  15900 9.74E+08       Evans (unpublished data) 
1841 30 70 Pakistan Indus 
Outburst flood due to 
landslide dam failure 3000 1.24E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1845 4.89 -75.32 Colombia 
Nevado del 
Ruiz Lahar 1000 1.26E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1856 3.67 125.5 Indonesia Awu Lahars 2806 1.32E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1856 32.5 103.06 China Sichuan Rockslide  1000 1.32E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1870 30 96.11 China Sichuan Rockslide 2000 1.58E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1875 13.25 123.68 Philippines Mayon Lahars 1500 1.43E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1888 -5.5 148.117 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Ritter 
Island 
Landslide tsunami generated 
by collapse of volcano into 
sea.  3000 1.52E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1888 39.9 116.4 China Beijing   1000 1.52E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1891 35 105 China Sichuan   1000 1.52E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1892 3.67 125.5 Indonesia Awu Lahars 1532 1.56E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1907 41 64 Uzbekistan Karatagh Rock avalanche 3400 1.71E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1917 35 105 China Yunnan Rock avalanche  1800 1.85E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1919 -7.93 112.308 Indonesia Kelud, Java 
Lahars generated by crater 
lake ejection  5110 1.88E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1933 35 105 China Sichuan 
Landslide and subsequent 
outburst flood due to 
landslide dam failure  3076 2.08E+09 150000000   4.875E+13 Evans (unpublished data) 
1941 -9.53 -77.53 Peru Huaraz 
Outburst flood/debris flow 
from moraine-dammed lake.  5879 2.2E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1949 39 71 Tajikistan Khait Rock avalanche  4000 2.43E+09 60000000   1.95E+13 Evans (unpublished data) 
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Year Lat Long Country  
Area/ 
Locality Event Process  Deaths WP Volume Height 
E(J)=rho(2500kg/m2)*Vol*h 
(130m assumed if no height info) Source   
1962 -9.12 -77.6 Peru Huascarán Rock avalanche 4000 3.08E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1963 46.15 12.7 Italy Vajont Landslide-generated wave 1896 3.08E+09 292000000   9.49E+13 Evans (unpublished data) 
1970 -9.12 -77.6 Peru Huascarán Rock avalanche 6000 3.55E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1971 33 65 Afghanistan 
Khinjan 
Pass 
Outburst flood due to 
landslide dam failure  1000 3.62E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1974 15.6 -88 Honduras Choloma 
Outburst debris flood/debris 
flow due to landslide dam 
failure  2300 3.85E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1985 4.89 75.32 Colombia 
Nevado del 
Ruiz Lahar 23000 4.69E+09 180000000 40 1.8E+13 Voight (1990) 
1991 11 124.6 Philippines Ormoc Debris flow 5012 5.2E+09       Evans (unpublished data) 
1998 13 -85 Nicaragua Casita  
Rock avalanche and 
subsequent debris flow  1650 5.84E+09 1600000 6 2.40E+10 Kerle(2002) 
2005 30 70 Pakistan  
Hattian 
Bala Rock avalanche 1000 6.47E+09 68000000 130 2.21E+13 Dunning et al (2007) 
2006 10.33 125.083 Philippines 
Southern 
Leyte Rock avalanche 1125 6.55E+09 15000000 450 1.6875E+13 Evans et al (2007) 
2008 38 112 China  Shanxi   1600 6.71E+09 750000000 690 1.29375E+15 Tianbin (2008) 
2010 36.06 103.83 China Zhouqu   1744   2200000   7.15E+11 Tang et al (2011)  
  Excluded because of redundancy                 
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Chapter 5 Has global societal earthquake resistance improved since 
1973?  
5.1  Introduction 
Natural disaster is, as defined by Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 
(http://www.emdat.be/glossary/9), “a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, 
necessitating a request to a national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen 
and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”25. By this 
definition, the 2010 Haiti earthquake is a natural disaster, which highlighted several issues 
including the impact of a comparatively modest seismic event, the response of a vulnerable 
urban centre to seismic shaking (Ambraseys and Bilham, 2011) and the aetiology of earthquake-
generated urban disasters. In the aftermath of the Haiti event, we introduce the global societal 
earthquake resistance and review casualties of deadly earthquakes in the period 1973 to 2013 in 
which a total of around 800,000 people died. In this chapter we attempt to establish whether 
global societal earthquake resistance has improved as a result of such factors as a greater 
understanding of global and regional seismology, advances in building design and construction, 
development of sophisticated warning system technologies, implementation of building codes 
and increased societal awareness of earthquake hazards and their effects.  
To investigate possible changes in global societal earthquake resistance we examined a record of 
earthquake disasters, which we define as a seismic event that results in the loss of 1,000 or more 
lives. For the purposes of the present argument we do not distinguish direct (e.g., in building 
collapse) and indirect (e.g., in tsunami) deaths in earthquakes. Underlying the analysis is the 
assumption that the characteristics of these disasters are a close indicator of global societal 
earthquake resistance. We compiled a database of 54 events that fulfill this criterion in the period 
1973-2013 in Table 5.S.1 and their global distribution is shown in Fig. 5.1. Data initially 
collected from United States Geological Survey (USGS) table of earthquakes with more than 
1,000 fatalities (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/world_deaths.php). These data 
have been complemented by data from Utsu’s (2002) table of deadly earthquakes since 1500. 
The list of these disasters, 54 events in the period 1973 to 2013, has also been cross-checked 
                                                
25 This definition is borrowed from the website of the CRED. 
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with the data of the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) 
(http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1). 779,676 deaths occurred in 
the 54 events of which 22% occurred in West and South West Asia, 20 % in East Asia, 17% in 
Central and South Asia, 17% in South East Asia, 13% in North Africa and Europe, and 11% in 
Central and South America. Countries affected by earthquake disasters during 1973-2013 in each 
of these categories (based on continental locations), number of events in each country, the 
percentages of the total number of events in each category, and corresponding number of deaths 
are given in Table 5.1. According to Table 5.1, East Asia has the highest percentage of deaths 
among all categories (46%). Central and South Asia is the second highest (17%), and West and 
South West Asia is the third highest (15%) percentage of deaths. This suggests that the number 
of earthquake disasters is not linearly related to the number of fatalities due to them. Thus, we 
understand that underlying factors, such as resistance of the region towards earthquake disasters, 
or population density, play roles in this process. 
 
Figure 5.1: Global distribution of 54 earthquake disasters (1973-2013). Red dots are the location of earthquake 
disasters in which fatalities equaled or exceeded 1,000 deaths in the period 1973-2013 (listing of 54 events is given 
in Supplementary Table 5.S.1).  
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Table 5.1: List of countries affected by earthquake disasters (1973-2013), number of events in 
each countries, percentage of the total number of events in each category of countries (based on 
continental locations), number of deaths due to earthquake disasters in each country and percentage of the 
total number of deaths in each category. 
Country N of events %N Deaths %D 
China 6 0.1111 337598 0.4330 
Taiwan 1 0.0185 2413 0.0031 
Japan 2 0.0370 7835 0.0100 
Philippines 2 0.0370 10430 0.0134 
tot 11 0.2037 358276 0.4595 
Turkey 3 0.0556 20888 0.0268 
Iran 8 0.1481 95292 0.1222 
Yemen 1 0.0185 2800 0.0036 
tot 12 0.2222 118980 0.1526 
Afghanistan 3 0.0556 7323 0.0094 
Nepal 1 0.0185 1450 0.0019 
India 3 0.0556 31753 0.0407 
Pakistan 2 0.0370 91300 0.1171 
tot 9 0.1667 131826 0.1691 
El Salvador 1 0.0185 1500 0.0019 
Mexico 1 0.0185 9500 0.0122 
Colombia 2 0.0370 6900 0.0088 
Haiti 1 0.0185 65000 0.0834 
Guatemala 1 0.0185 23000 0.0295 
tot 6 0.1111 105900 0.1358 
Russia 1 0.0185 1989 0.0026 
Italy 2 0.0370 3448 0.0044 
Romania 1 0.0185 1581 0.0020 
Armenia 1 0.0185 25000 0.0321 
Algeria 2 0.0370 5766 0.0074 
tot 7 0.1296 37784 0.0485 
Indonesia 8 0.1481 24210 0.0311 
Papua New Guinea 1 0.0185 2700 0.0035 
tot 9 0.1667 26910 0.0345 
Sum(tot) 54   779676   
 
From Table 5.1, we are also able to compare the percentage of the number of disastrous events to 
the total number of events in the countries in which the events occurred. Furthermore, the 
 131 
 
percentage of deaths in earthquake disasters to the total deaths during this period is compared 
among countries. China has the highest number of earthquake-disaster fatalities (43%); Iran and 
Pakistan with around 12% of the fatalities, are next. However, the percentages of number of 
disastrous earthquakes are highest in Indonesia and Iran (14%), while China has 11% of the 
events. Although the percentage value of number of events in China is still among the highest, it 
is not as high as its rank for fatalities.  
Doocy et al (2013) reported global earthquake fatalities in events with fatalities greater than 10, 
between 1980 and 2009. According to Doocy et al (2013), the total of 372,634 fatalities occurred 
during this period and fatalities are dominated in China (21%), Pakistan, and Iran (~20%). 
Although the estimated number of fatalities in their report is different from ours, the ranking of 
these percentages are the same. While local assessment of risk and life-loss on the most affected 
areas is valuable, in this study, we consider earthquake disasters as threats to the global 
population and analyze the global risk and the trend of global societal resistance towards 
earthquake disasters during 1973-2013. 
In this study, we use a risk-based approach to develop a conceptual model for societal 
earthquake resistance wherein risk is a measure of the probability of harmful consequences. 
Here, these consequences are earthquake fatalities resulting from interactions between 
earthquake occurrence and vulnerable conditions (HSE (2001); UNDP (2004)). This conceptual 
model includes three effective components for human life-loss: hazard, vulnerability, and 
consequences which we express as Eq. 5.1, consists of life-loss (Loss), hazard (H), vulnerability 
of the region (V), and elements at risk (EaR). Eq. 5.1 is similar to the risk equation used by 
UNDP(2004), Baecher and Christian (2003), and Porske (2008). 
 Loss = H×[V×EaR] (5.1) 
In Eq. 5.1, Loss is the estimated life-loss due to earthquake disasters with the unit of nbr/year 
(nbr stands for number), and H is the probability of the occurrence of earthquakes that can cause 
fatalities greater than 1,000 with the unit of 1/time (1/year), and EaR is the number of elements 
at risk (here fatalities). From our 54-event database we have established that the minimum 
magnitude associated with an earthquake disaster is M5.5. Many earthquake disaster databases 
do not specify the type of magnitude scale used to express earthquake magnitude. For the sake of 
simplicity, we do not specify the type of magnitude scale reported for a specific earthquake; we 
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suggest that this approximation has little effect on the results of a global investigation. Studies by 
Kanamori (1977; 1983) show that the values of various magnitude types are more or less 
coincident, except for very high magnitudes (Kanamori, 1983). Thus, the type of the magnitude 
used here is considered as a generic magnitude M, without subscripts, rounded to one decimal 
place USGS (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/aboutus/docs/020204mag\_policy.php). Furthermore, in 
Eq. 5.1, V is the vulnerability of the region affected by earthquake disasters. In this study, the 
effects of earthquake disasters are considered global, therefore, global population at the time of 
earthquake disaster is considered as a rough proxy of EaR, elements at risk.  
In general, earthquake vulnerability (V) is the characteristic condition of the region that 
determines the response to the seismic event and thus the losses from earthquake occurrence and 
effects (Fussel, 2007). With further reference to Eq.5.1, since we focus on life loss due to an 
earthquake disaster, EaR, is defined as the number of people exposed to earthquake disasters, 
therefore, we change EaR to ExP in Eq. 5.2. Since H has the unit of 1/time, the unit of Loss is 
annual earthquake-disaster life loss. 
Additionally, to quantify the effects of earthquakes on global societies, we replace 
earthquake vulnerability (V) by the inverse of what we term the societal earthquake resistance 
(R), which is the immediate capacity of the society to withstand the hazard occurrence, i.e., 
V=1/R. Substituting V with 1/R and EaR with ExP in Eq. 5.1 gives us the earthquake-disaster 
Life Loss Equation, Eq. 5.2:  
 LifeLoss  = H×[ 1R×ExP] (5.2) 
In the next sections, we first analyze the probability of hazard, here earthquake disasters. Then, 
we compare the global earthquake-disaster fatality-rate with the global crude death-rate, and 
finally, we estimate the global societal resistance towards earthquake disasters and its trend 
during 1973-2013. 
5.2 Hazard 
Based on ISO31000 documents (Leitch, 2010), hazard is defined as the source of potential harm. 
A quantitative definition of hazard is the probability of occurrence of events that may cause 
harm. Here, as we introduced in the introduction, based on our earthquake disaster dataset, we 
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consider earthquakes with M5.5 and greater as the source of fatalities greater than 1,000 in an 
earthquake disaster. Therefore, hazard, here is the probability of the occurrence of earthquakes 
with magnitude M5.5 and greater. Since the occurrence of earthquakes over time [excluding 
aftershocks] is considered as a Poisson process (Scheidegger, 1975), the probability of hazard 
would follow the Poisson probability distribution, P(x=k)=λe-λ/k!, where x is a discrete random 
variable, k is the number of occurring at the unit time, and λ is the mean and variance of the 
number of events per unit time. In case of earthquake hazard, probability of occurrence of one 
event, k=1, is P= λe-λ, and probability of exceeding that magnitude, here M≥5.5, is 1-P. 
Probability of exceeding magnitude 5.5 is one minus Poisson distribution function with 
parameter λ, which can be estimated in R using ppois model26. 
The λ is calculated over a certain period of time, based on the earthquake catalogues and the data 
available. For this study, we calculated the value of λ per day in a certain year for earthquake 
hazards, with M≥5.5, during 1973 to 2013. The reason that we use the daily value of λ (instead of 
yearly) is that we would like to estimate the probability of occurrence of an earthquake with 
M≥5.5 everyday. However, if we were to calculate the yearly probability, it would be 1, since the 
occurrence of these events is very often throughout the year. Hence, in order to calculate the 
yearly value of λ, based on the daily value, we use the total number of earthquakes in one 
specific year, and then average over the 365 days of the year.  
We used the ANSS earthquake catalogue (http://www.ncedc.org/anss/catalog-search.html) for 
gathering the earthquake data. The selection criteria for the date was, start: 1973/01/01,00:00:00, 
end: 2013/01/01,00:00:00. The total number of earthquakes was 17,305 in 40 years. We also 
gathered the earthquake data from NEIC earthquake catalogue, which is accessible through the 
USGS website (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/), in order to compare the results. 
However, the total number of recorded earthquakes in NEIC was 19,513 in 40 years. The 
difference between the numbers of recorded earthquakes of M≥5.5 suggests that the NEIC 
catalogue include a more complete database. Table 5.2 summarizes the total number of 
earthquakes per year from both of the earthquake catalogues and their corresponding yearly 
probability of hazard, based on the Poisson distribution function.  
 
                                                
26 ppois(1, lambda, lower.tail = FALSE, log.p = FALSE) 
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Table 5.2 Total number of earthquakes with M≥5.5, and probability of earthquakes with M≥5.5, 
P(M≥5.5), during 1973 and 2013 based on ANSS and NEIC compared. We choose NEIC as a 
more complete catalogue due to the differences shown. 
Year M≥5.5 (ANSS) P(M≥5.5)_ANSS M≥5.5(NEIC) P(M≥5.5)_NEIC 
1973 396 0.296 414 0.313 
1974 358 0.258 384 0.286 
1975 410 0.310 439 0.337 
1976 446 0.346 493 0.393 
1977 419 0.319 469 0.368 
1978 400 0.300 389 0.352 
1979 343 0.243 389 0.289 
1980 338 0.238 376 0.277 
1981 291 0.191 350 0.251 
1982 315 0.215 379 0.278 
1983 413 0.313 478 0.379 
1984 328 0.228 489 0.387 
1985 336 0.236 487 0.385 
1986 343 0.243 492 0.390 
1987 362 0.262 509 0.405 
1988 342 0.242 494 0.393 
1989 318 0.218 494 0.394 
1990 386 0.286 538 0.435 
1991 322 0.222 435 0.338 
1992 406 0.306 539 0.439 
1993 379 0.279 471 0.374 
1994 441 0.341 520 0.417 
1995 521 0.419 607 0.495 
1996 501 0.400 566 0.464 
1997 437 0.337 470 0.373 
1998 367 0.267 390 0.293 
1999 432 0.332 443 0.343 
2000 547 0.443 554 0.449 
2001 441 0.341 445 0.347 
2002 442 0.342 446 0.345 
2003 481 0.380 485 0.382 
2004 568 0.462 570 0.465 
2005 534 0.431 533 0.431 
2006 508 0.406 509 0.408 
2007 609 0.498 611 0.499 
2008 506 0.404 509 0.406 
2009 507 0.415 517 0.414 
2010 561 0.455 559 0.453 
2011 718 0.586 705 0.575 
2012 483 0.382 446 0.345 
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    To analyze the temporal trend of hazard during the period of 1973-2013, we use linear 
regression method, given in appendix III. The temporal trend shows an average yearly increase 
of 0.003 ± 0.00078 per year over the 40 years of data (95% confidence interval: (0.0016, 
0.0048); p-value<0.01). Fig. 5.2a illustrates the linear regression fit and the 95% confidence 
interval of the temporal trend of probability of hazard in this period. The yearly increase in the 
probability of occurrence of earthquakes suggests that the magnitude of earthquake disasters 
have also increased. In order to investigate this suggestion, we look at the temporal trend the 
energy released by earthquake disasters over the period of 1973-2013 in Fig. 5.2b. 
 
a)   Temporal trend of probability of hazard, probability of occurrence of M≥5.5, linear regression fit, and its 95% 
confidence interval.  
 
b)  Temporal trend (1973-2013) in energy release of earthquake disasters (54 events). The mean 
energy release is 3.67×1016 J. 
Figure 5.2: Temporal trend of hazard in the record of earthquake disasters (1973-2013). Data is given in Table 5.S.1. 
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The energies released by earthquake disasters are calculated by converting the earthquake 
magnitude (M) to energy (E) using Gutenberg’s (Gutenberg and Richter, 1956) energy-
magnitude relation, log E= 1.5M+11.8. We applied this to the record of 54 earthquake disasters 
given in Table 5.S.1. Fig. 5.2b shows the trend of energy, in log scale, over the period of 1973-
2013 is not significantly increasing or decreasing over time. We applied linear regression at 
logarithmic scale (Appendix III) and found the 95% confidence interval: (-0.028, 0.086), and p-
value: not significant. Constant trend of earthquake energy release, confirms the hazard exposure 
of the global population to earthquake disasters has not been changed since 1973, although the 
probability of earthquake hazard (with M≥5.5) has been increasing. 
Shearer and Phillip (2012) also showed that there is no statistically significant proof in any 
clustering or in other words any increase trend in the dataset of large earthquakes, M≥7 since 
1900. Their result is very much in line with our result. However, it has to be mentioned that, they 
have used the term risk instead of hazard, but since they have only looked at the earthquake 
magnitudes, without considering any of their effects on the human societies, we believe that 
using the term risk is not precise in this context.  
   Using Eq. 5.2 in the list of events of earthquake disaster database, we examine the role of ExP 
in loss of life due to earthquake disasters. In contrast to the increase of earthquake hazard, the 
world has experienced massive population growth in the period of 1973-2013. Indeed, the 
qualitative correlation between cumulative earthquake fatalities and world population has been 
previously noted in Bilham’s work (1988, 2004, 2009) and in Fig. 5.3a where the estimate global 
population is plotted in comparison with cumulative earthquake fatalities. However, due to the 
autocorrelation that any cumulative plot indicates, analyzing the cumulative fatality plot is not 
possible. Instead, the effect of world population on the number of fatalities can be quantitatively 
illustrated by the temporal record of the ratio of number of fatalities to the population exposed to 
the event (Nishenko and Barton, 1995). We call this ratio as the earthquake fatality ratio. The 
exposed population in this study is estimated by considering the global population in the year of 
the event. The data of world population is gathered from World Bank database 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL). Fig. 5.3b is the temporal record for the 
period under study, of the ratio of number of fatalities due to earthquake disasters to the exposed 
population. We applied a linear regression model to analyze the statistics of the temporal trend of 
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this ratio, and no significant trend is observed. The 95% confidence interval of linear regression 
fit to the data is also plotted in Fig. 5.3b. 
 
a) Earthquake fatalities in comparison with estimated global population. (Reproduced from Bilham, 2009, Fig.1) 
 
b) Temporal trend of fatality ratio (death/exposed population). Data for 54 earthquake disasters, given in Table 
5.S.1, is cumulated for each year. 
Figure 5.3: Global population growth and earthquake fatalities (a) in comparison with the annual ratio of earthquake 
fatalities to exposed population (b) 
 
Due to large variations in the data of the death/exp.pop, linear regression is not applicable here. 
Furthermore, we checked Poisson regression as a non-linear model on this data and because of 
overdispersion situation, i.e., variance>mean (Berk and MacDonald, 2007), we modified the 
non-linear model and applied negative binomial distribution for our regression analysis. The 
results of negative binomial model indicated that there was a small (1-fold) insignificant increase 
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of D/P per year (95% confidence interval: (e-0.023, e0.018); p-value: not significant). Therefore, we 
do not have any evidence of change in the earthquake fatality ratio over the 40 year period. 
5.3  Earthquake fatality rate and crude death rate 
To assess the effectiveness of global attempts towards reducing fatalities in major earthquakes, 
we compare the earthquake disaster fatality ratio with the global annual United Nations Crude 
Death Rate (Fig. 5.4). The Crude Death Rate is defined as number of deaths caused by any event 
per 1,000 people per year (http://data.un.org/Glossary.aspx?q=Crude+death+rate) which reflects 
the health of the global population and the magnitude of disease-related fatalities. We take this 
metric as the background global death rate. In Fig. 5.4, the Crude Death Rate (blue curve) is seen 
to decrease over the period 1973 to 2013 in contrast to the ratio of earthquake fatalities per world 
population which, as we shown in section 5.2, does not have any evidence of increase or 
decrease over time.  
To compare the crude death rate of the world during the same period of time with the trend of the 
death/exp.pop, since the crude rate data gathered from UNdata 
(http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A65) is at 5-year pentade level and it 
is per 1000 population exposed, calculating the 5-year average of the fatality ratio (black curve 
on Fig. 5.4), we call it earthquake fatality rate, over the 40 year period was required. On Fig. 5.4, 
for fatality rate of 1973-1974, and 2010-2012, we used 2-year and 3-year average respectively 
since we are comparing based on 5-year intervals recorded for crude death rate. 
Fig. 5.4 illustrates the difference between crude death rate and earthquake disaster fatality rate. 
Using regression analysis of the fatality rate, since linear regression is not applicable, here, due 
to large variations of the data we used negative binomial model, we found that there is no 
significant increase or decrease in the data (p-value: not significant). This result shows that there 
was not a reduction in the earthquake fatality rate in the world despite scientific and engineering 
efforts to the contrary. However, the temporal trend of crude death rate can be modeled by linear 
regression. The result indicates that crude death rate has significantly decreased by factor of -
0.000081 (95% confidence interval: (-0.00009, -0.00007); p-value<0.01; R-squared=0.93) per 
year. We suggest that this is mainly because of the increase in the life-expectancy. The 
decreasing trend of the Crude Death Rate is thought to reflect the successes of fighting disease 
and resulting better global health. The details of statistical models are reported in Appendix III. 
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Figure 5.4: Temporal record of death per exposed population of earthquake disasters averaged for 5-year intervals 
(fatality rate) (black squares) based on 54 record of earthquake disasters in comparison with the Crude Death Rate 
(per individual) of the world (blue circles) based on 
UNdata(http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A65) during 1973-2013. The Crude Death Rate 
data are recorded in 5-year intervals. For fatality rate of 1973-1974, and 2010-2012, we used 2-year and 3-year 
average respectively. 
5.4 Global societal earthquake resistance 
As introduced in the introduction, societal resistance is a parameter that reflects the ability of a 
society to resist a possible disaster. Here, we aim to estimate the global societal resistance 
towards earthquake disasters. Based on Eq. 5.2, by re-arranging the earthquake-disaster Life 
Loss Equation, we obtain a formula for resistance (R), in Eq. 5.3: 
 R =H×ExP/(LifeLoss)  (5.3) 
We have shown the temporal trend of earthquake hazard in Fig. 5.2b, and the temporal trend of 
earthquake disaster fatality ratio in Fig. 5.3b. The increasing trend of hazard, and no evidence of 
difference in the trend of earthquake disaster fatality with the trend of population growth, 
summarized in the fatality ratio, Eq. 5.3 suggests that the resistance of the world towards 
earthquake disasters has either increased or stayed constant over the 40 years period. In order to 
investigate this presumption, we use statistical methods. However, before that, we need to 
calculate the societal earthquake resistance (R) for the period under study, using Eq. 5.3. 
The list of world population (World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL), 
cumulated number of fatalities due to earthquake disasters, probability of occurrence of 
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earthquakes with magnitude greater than M5.5 per year (calculated in section 5.2), earthquake-
disaster societal resistance, logarithm of resistance, crude death rate, and global earthquake 
fatality ratio for the period of 1973-2014 are given in Table 5.3. 
As shown in Table 5.3, in some years, there is no earthquake disaster; therefore, the number of 
fatalities due to earthquake disasters is zero. We exclude those years, from our trend analysis of 
fatality ratio, and global societal resistance. 
Applying linear regression method, we examined the temporal trend of global societal 
earthquake resistance for the period of 1973-2013. The trend does not show any decrease or 
increase over time (95% confidence interval: (-0.015, 0.025); p-value: not significant), Fig. 5.5. 
This result confirms our presumption about the constant global resistance towards earthquake 
disasters. In other words, the growth of earthquake-disaster fatalities has been so strong that the 
effect of increase in the trend of earthquake hazard has not been significant in the trend of 
resistance. 
The average logarithm of societal earthquake resistance of the world is about 5.43. The highest 
societal earthquake resistance of the dataset is 6.47, associated with the year 2002, and the 
minimum value of log (Res) is about 3.75, associated with the year 1976. The very high number 
of fatalities as well as a high probability of hazard in 1976 explains the low societal earthquake 
resistance value for that year. There were 6 earthquake disasters in 1976 among the total of 54 
events in the database, including the Tangshan (China) disaster with 255,000 fatalities (Table 
5.S.1).  
 
Figure 5.5: Temporal trend of the societal earthquake-disaster resistance, calculated from Eq. 5.3 based on data in 
Table 5.3. Linear regression fit, and its 95% confidence interval. No significant trend is observed in the trend. 
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Table 5.3 List of yearly earthquake disaster fatalities (Death), probability of hazard, probability of occurrence of 
magnitude M5.5 and greater based on the NEIC database (P(H)_NEIC), fatality ratio (DP), ratio of death to the 
world population (WP_worldBank), global societal resistance towards earthquake disasters (Res) calculated from 
Eq. 5.3, logarithm of societal resistance (Log(Res), and crude death rate (Crude-Rate) based on UNdata. 
Year WP_worldBank P(M≥5.5)_NEIC Death DP Res Log(Res) Crude-Rate 
1973 3893163134 0.313 2175 5.58672E-07 561133 5.74907 0.011574 
1974 3968980964 0.286 6723 1.69389E-06 169080 5.22809 0.011574 
1975 4043384540 0.337 3698 9.1458E-07 368883 5.56689 0.010572 
1976 4115916175 0.393 290665 7.06198E-05 5564.18 3.7454 0.010572 
1977 4188436970 0.368 1581 3.77468E-07 974465 5.98877 0.010572 
1978 4262342206 0.352 18220 4.27465E-06 82386.4 4.91586 0.010572 
1979 4337808194 0.289 0 0     0.010572 
1980 4413664738 0.277 5983 1.35556E-06 204595 5.31089 0.009961 
1981 4490933561 0.251 5800 1.29149E-06 194459 5.28883 0.009961 
1982 4570949029 0.278 2800 6.12564E-07 454398 5.65744 0.009961 
1983 4651402233 0.379 1400 3.00985E-07 1260773 6.10064 0.009961 
1984 4731579393 0.387 0 0     0.009961 
1985 4813681852 0.385 9500 1.97354E-06 195213 5.29051 0.00942 
1986 4898637867 0.390 1500 3.06208E-07 1273862 6.10512 0.00942 
1987 4985891997 0.405 5000 1.00283E-06 404183 5.60658 0.00942 
1988 5074052131 0.393 26450 5.2128E-06 75380.1 4.87726 0.00942 
1989 5162050406 0.394 0 0     0.00942 
1990 5258687153 0.435 37430 7.11775E-06 61153.3 4.78642 0.009095 
1991 5345005256 0.338 2000 3.74181E-07 904275 5.9563 0.009095 
1992 5427583250 0.439 1740 3.20585E-07 1369249 6.13648 0.009095 
1993 5510964650 0.374 9748 1.76884E-06 211247 5.32479 0.009095 
1994 5593291911 0.417 0 0     0.009095 
1995 5676856597 0.495 8424 1.48392E-06 333698 5.52335 0.008803 
1996 5758273395 0.464 0 0     0.008803 
1997 5839859682 0.373 5372 9.19885E-07 405150 5.60762 0.008803 
1998 5920583500 0.293 9023 1.52401E-06 192545 5.28453 0.008803 
1999 6000290750 0.343 21431 3.57166E-06 96119.4 4.98281 0.008803 
2000 6079865645 0.449 0 0     0.008408 
2001 6157776977 0.347 20005 3.24874E-06 106888 5.02893 0.008408 
2002 6235176063 0.345 1000 1.6038E-07 2152880 6.33302 0.008408 
2003 6312628782 0.382 33266 5.26975E-06 72559.3 4.86069 0.008408 
2004 6390268174 0.465 1001 1.56644E-07 2970288 6.4728 0.008408 
2005 6468011305 0.431 87303 1.34977E-05 31905.4 4.50386 0.008116 
2006 6545818799 0.408 5749 8.78271E-07 464740 5.66721 0.008116 
2007 6623991685 0.499 0 0     0.008116 
2008 6703056019 0.406 87652 1.30764E-05 31069.2 4.49233 0.008116 
2009 6782172832 0.414 1117 1.64696E-07 2512677 6.40014 0.008116 
2010 6862079727 0.453 67220 9.79586E-06 46209.7 4.66473 0.008061 
2011 6942764512 0.575 1400 2.01649E-07 2852175 6.45518 0.008061 
2012 7023106813 0.345 0 0     0.008061 
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5.3  Discussion  
In this chapter, we showed that there is no evidence that the global societal resistance has been 
changed over time. Based on this result, we conclude that, although individual countries have 
improved their seismic engineering resistance through such measures as the implementation of 
building codes and increased construction quality, global societal earthquake resistance has not 
improved since 1973 and has effectively remained constant. Further, earthquake hazard (energy 
release by earthquake disasters, and probability of occurrence of earthquakes with magnitude 
M≥5.5 per year) is also effectively constant (Fig. 5.3), shows that any effort to build seismic 
resistance into the global earthquake disaster system has been offset by the increase in global 
population and thus the number of people exposed to earthquake hazard. One of the discussions 
remained is the actual effect of population growth on earthquake disaster life-loss. One of the 
first questions that can be asked, here, is that what is the expected number of life-loss in case that 
an earthquake disaster occurs somewhere in the world. 
Equation 8.2 in Woo (1999) is a practical equation used for estimating expected economic loss in 
a factory site in case of a seismic shaking.  ! = ! !! ! !! ! !(!)×!!       (eq. 8.2, Woo (1999), pg. 199) 
where L is expected annual economic loss in a factory site due to a seismic activity, F(I) is the 
frequency of seismic shaking with intensity I, P(DK|I) is the relative likelihood that in case of a 
seismic shaking with intensity I, damage D from category K occurs, R(K) is the mean loss ratio 
to the factory, if it suffers damage in category K, and V is the value of factory site at risk. 
We could convert this equation to an equation that is compatible for earthquake disaster life-loss 
by renaming the components of the equation, F(I) to probability of occurrence of a specific 
magnitude, P(M); P(D|I) to the likelihood of fatalities greater than 1,000 happens in case of an 
earthquake with magnitude M, P(D≥1000|M); R(K) to the mean life-loss ratio if fatalities are 
greater than 1,000, R(D≥1000); and V to the number of people exposed to earthquake disasters, 
ExP. Eq. 5.4 is an equation that, hypothetically, can be used for prediction of life-loss in case of 
various disaster scenarios in future. ! = !(!)×!(! ≥ 1000|!)×!(! ≥ 1000)×!"#             (5.4) 
We used the data for earthquake disasters (1973-2010) to estimate the P(M), P(D≥1000|M), and 
R(D≥1000), for M≥5.5, to estimate the life-loss we expect in the year 2013 in case of an 
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earthquake with magnitude M≥5.5. Likelihood of D≥1000 in case of M≥5.5 can be estimated 
from the ratio of the number of events with D≥1000 to the number of events with M≥5.5 with 
any fatality or none. If we calculate the average of the yearly values of each component and 
assume that the current global population as 7,181,580,000, then the expected life-loss from Eq. 
5.4 would be around 52 person. Table 5.4 summarizes the result of this estimation of risk of life-
loss based on the earthquake-disaster data given in Table 5.2, Table 5.3, and Table 5.S.1.	  
Table 5.4 List of components needed to calculate expected life-loss based on Eq. 5.4, and risk of 
life-loss (exp.life.loss × average resistance). 
Avg-P(H) 0.652 
Avg-R (D≥1000/WP/yr) 3.85065E-06 
Avg-likelihood (#events with D≥1000/# events with M≥5.5) 0.0028 
World Pop-2013 7,181,158,000 
Exp-Loss (Eq. 5.4, based on eq.8.2, Woo, 1999) 51.36 
 
The next step of this study would be to estimate the societal resistance and risk of life-loss in the 
most vulnerable cities and countries to earthquake disasters. According to Sundermann et al. 
(2013) (figure 5, pg 16), among 616 metropolitans Tokyo-Yokohama (Japan), Jakarta (India), 
Los Angeles (USA), Osaka-Kobe (Japan), Tehran (Iran), and Tashkent (Uzbekistan) are the 
cities that are at risk of earthquake disasters the most. Assuming global population as a proxy of 
exposure will not be beneficial in case of a city-based approach. In this study it is shown that the 
ratio of earthquake disaster fatalities to the global population at the time of fatalities has 
insignificantly increased/decreased over the last 40 years. However, since most of the life-losses 
due to disasters occurred in metropolitan areas (Sundermann et al., 2013), it is essential to 
consider the growth of population-at-risk, rather than population growth for risk assessment of 
natural disasters. 
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Supplimentary Table: 
Table 5.S.1: List of 54 earthquake disasters (with more than 1,000 deaths) in the period of 1973-2013  
Year Lat Long location M death Source Other death reports Energy (J) 
1973 31.3 100.7 
China: Sichuan 
P.[Mangua E]  7.6 2175 Utsu   5.62341E+51 
1974 28.2 104.1 China 7.1 1423 NOAA/Utsu 20000 1.25893E+47 
1974 35 72.8 Pakistan 6.2 5300 Utsu   1.99526E+57 
1975 40.7 122.8 Haicheng, China 7.3 1328 Utsu   7.07946E+65 
1975 38.5 40.7 Turkey 6.7 2370 Utsu   3.54813E+62 
1976 15.3 -89.1 Guatemala 7.5 23000 Utsu   5.62341E+27 
1976 -4.6 140.1 Papua, Indonesia 7.1 6000 Utsu   0.007943282 
1976 39.4 118 Tangshan, China 7.8 242800 Utsu   7.94328E+63 
1976 6.2 124 Mindanao, Philippines 7.9 8000 Utsu   1.25893E+14 
1976 -4.5 139.9 Indonesia (Irain Jaya) 7.2 6000 Utsu   0.011220185 
1976 39.1 44 
Turkey-Iran border 
region 7.3 3900 Utsu   2.81838E+63 
1976 46.4 13.3 northeastern Italy 6.1 965 Utsu   8.91251E+13 
1977 45.8 26.8 Romania 7.3 1581 Utsu   3.16228E+73 
1978 33.4 57.4 Iran 7.4 18220 Utsu   7.94328E+54 
1980 36.2 1.4 
El Asnam, Algeria 
(formerly Orleansville) 7.3 3500 NOAA/Utsu 5000 1.25893E+59 
1980 40.9 15.3 southern Italy 6.7 2483 NOAA/Utsu 4689 1.41254E+66 
1981 29.9 57.7 southern Iran 6.7 3000 Utsu   4.46684E+49 
1981 30 57.8 southern Iran 7.1 1500 Utsu   6.30957E+49 
1981 -4.6 139.2 Indonesia(Irian Jaya) 6.7 1300 Utsu   0.007943282 
1982 14.7 44.4 Yemen 6 2800 Utsu   7.07946E+26 
1983 40.3 42.2 Turkey 6.9 1400 NOAA/Utsu 1342 1.77828E+65 
1985 18.2 
-
102.5 Mexico, Michoacan 8.1 9500 Utsu   1.25893E+32 
1986 13.8 -89.1 El Salvador 5.4 1500 NOAA/Utsu 1100 3.16228E+25 
1987 0.2 -77.8 Colombia-Ecuador 6.9 5000 Utsu   125892.5412 
1988 26.8 86.6 
Nepal-India border 
region 6.6 1450 NOAA/Utsu 1091 1E+45 
1988 41 44.2 Spitak, Armenia 6.8 25000 Utsu   1.99526E+66 
1990 37 49.4 Western Iran 7.7 35000 NOAA/Utsu 50000 1.99526E+60 
1990 15.7 121.2 
Luzon, Philippine 
Islands 7.8 2430 Utsu   2.23872E+28 
1991 30.8 78.8 Northern India 7 2000 Utsu   1E+51 
1992 -8.5 121.9 Flores Region, Indonesia 7.5 1740 Utsu   1.12202E-08 
1993 18.1 76.5 Latur-Killari, India 6.2 9748 NOAA/Utsu 11000 8.91251E+31 
1995 34.6 135 Kobe, Japan 7.2 6435 Utsu   5.01187E+56 
1995 52.6 142.8 Sakhalin Island, Russia 7.5 1989 Utsu   5.01187E+83 
1997 33.9 59.8 Northern Iran 7.3 1572 NOAA/Utsu 1728 4.46684E+55 
1997 38.1 48.1 Iran: Ardebil 6.1 1100 Utsu   8.91251E+61 
1998 37.1 70.1 
Hindu Kush region, 
Afghanistan 6.1 2323 Utsu   2.81838E+60 
1998 37.1 70.1 
Afghanistan-Tajikistan 
Border Region 6.9 4000 Utsu   2.81838E+60 
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Year Lat Long location M death Source Other death reports Energy (J) 
1998 -3 141.9 Papua New Guinea 7.1 2700 Utsu   1.995262315 
1999 4.5 -75.7 Colombia 5.7 1900 NOAA/Utsu 1185 3.54813E+11 
1999 40.7 29.9 Turkey 7.8 17118 Utsu   7.07946E+65 
1999 23.8 121 Taiwan(Eastern Asia) 7.7 2413 Utsu   3.16228E+40 
2001 23.4 70.2 Gujarat, India 7.8 20005 NOAA   7.94328E+39 
2002 36 69.3 
Hindu Kush Region, 
Afghanistan 6.2 1000 NOAA   6.30957E+58 
2003 36.9 3.6 Northern Algeria 6.2 2266 NOAA   1.41254E+60 
2003 28.99 58.31 Southeastern Iran 6.8 31000 NOAA   1.92752E+48 
2004 3.295 
95.98
2   8.8 1001 NOAA   5527134079 
2005 2.08 97.1 
Northern Sumatra, 
Indonesia 8.4 1303 NOAA/USGS 1313 83176377.11 
2005 34.53 73.58 Pakistan 7.7 86000 NOAA   3.9355E+56 
2006 
-
7.961 
110.4
46 Flores Region, Indonesia 6.2 5749 NOAA   7.21938E-08 
2008 31 103.3 Eastern Sichuan, China 8.1 87652 NOAA   1.99526E+51 
2009 -0.72 
99.86
7 
Southern Sumatra, 
Indonesia 7.5 1117 NOAA   5248.074602 
2010 
33.16
5 
96.54
8 Southern China 6.9 2220 NOAA   3.52777E+54 
2010 18.4 -72.5 Haiti region 7.3 65000 
NOAA/Doocy 
et al. (2013)   2.51189E+32 
2011 
38.29
7 
142.3
73 Japan 8.3 1400 NOAA   1.75995E+62 
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Appendix III 
Negative binomial regression for death/population 
Negative Binomial: Applying Poisson regression, results in p-values and standard errors are too 
small it means that the data is overdispersed. Overdispersion happens when the variance is 
greater than the mean (Berk et al., 2007). To check the overdispersion: 1) examine the mean and 
standard deviation, 2) examine the ratio of the deviance to the degrees of freedom (it should be 
close to 1.0). There are two ways to correct overdispersion: 1) Pearson adjustment (which is only 
available in SAS) and 2) negative binomial distribution (it carries an error term which always 
corrects overdispersion. Here, I choose negative binomial distribution which is a modification of 
glm() in R; glm.nb() in the MASS package (Chambers and Hastie, 1991). 
Hypothesis testing: Assuming Y=a+bX, where Y is the ratio of the death (D) to the world 
population (WP), X is the year and a, b are constants. 
Null hypothesis (H0) : b=0 (i.e., there is no X-trend for Y), Alternative hypothesis (H1): b≠0 (i.e., 
there is a positive or negative trend) 
Call: 
glm.nb(formula = death ~ offset(log(WP)) + Yr, init.theta = 0.5161683824,  
    link = log) 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-1.3578  -1.1815  -0.9708  -0.3951   3.7861   
Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 10.96553   31.82452   0.345    0.730 
Yr          -0.01193    0.01599  -0.746    0.455 
(Dispersion parameter for Negative Binomial(0.5162) family taken to be 1) 
    Null deviance: 69.022  on 53  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 68.257  on 52  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 1128 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 1 
              Theta:  0.5162  
          Std. Err.:  0.0822  
 2 x log-likelihood:  -1122.0350 
 
Since the p-value is not significant, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (i.e., there is no 
evidence of any increase or decrease of D/WP over time). 
Linear regression for probability of hazard 
Hypothesis testing: Assuming Y=a+bX, where Y is the probability of hazard (occuring M≥5.5) 
per year, X is the year and a, b are constants. 
Null hypothesis (H0) : b=0 (i.e., there is no X-trend for Y), Alternative hypothesis (H1): b≠0 (i.e., 
there is a positive or negative trend) 
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Call: 
lm(formula = PH ~ Year) 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
 
-0.10917 -0.03855  0.01082  0.03561  0.13030  
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
 
(Intercept) -6.1348140  1.5516376  -3.954 0.000324 *** 
Year         0.0032718  0.0007787   4.201 0.000155 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1   
Residual standard error: 0.05685 on 38 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3172,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2992  
F-statistic: 17.65 on 1 and 38 DF,  p-value: 0.0001546 
P-value is not significant here, therefore, we do not reject the null hypothesis, i.e., there is no 
significant trend in the probability of hazard. 
Linear regression at logarithmic scale for overal Energy release 
Hypothesis testing: Assuming Y=a+bX, where Y is the enegy release due to earthquake 
disasters per year, X is the year and a, b are constants. 
Null hypothesis (H0) : b=0 (i.e., there is no X-trend for Y), Alternative hypothesis (H1): b≠0 (i.e., 
there is a positive or negative trend) 
Call: 
lm(formula = log(Energy) ~ Year) 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-5.7577 -1.2368  0.3327  1.7472  5.4633  
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -22.20501   56.63885  -0.392    0.697 
Year          0.02904    0.02846   1.020    0.312 
Residual standard error: 2.477 on 52 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.01963,    Adjusted R-squared: 0.0007722  
F-statistic: 1.041 on 1 and 52 DF,  p-value: 0.3123 
 
P-value is not significant here, therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. This means that 
there is no significant trend of increase or decrease in the energy released by earthquake disasters 
per year. 
Linear regression for crude death rate 
Hypothesis testing: Assuming Y=a+bX, where Y is the ratio of the crude death rate (Crude5) to 
, X is the year and a, b are constants. 
Null hypothesis (H0) : b=0 (i.e., there is no X-trend for Y), Alternative hypothesis (H1): b≠0 (i.e., 
there is a positive or negative trend) 
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Call: 
lm(formula = Crude5 ~ Year) 
Residuals: 
       Min         1Q     Median         3Q        Max  
-4.161e-04 -1.742e-04 -4.565e-05  1.003e-04  8.491e-04  
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  1.702e-01  7.326e-03   23.23   <2e-16 *** 
Year        -8.080e-05  3.677e-06  -21.98   <2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
Residual standard error: 0.0002684 on 38 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.927,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.9251  
F-statistic: 482.9 on 1 and 38 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
The p-value is significant, therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and since the coefficient (-
0.0000808) is negative, we conclude that the crude death rate has a negative trend over time. 
Negative binomial for 5-year average earthquake disaster fatality ratio (fatality 
rate) 
Since the variation of the data in our 5-year average fatality rate is huge, we cannot use linear 
regression model here. We use negative binomial generalized linear model instead. 
Hypothesis testing: Assuming Y=a+bX, where Y is the ratio of the 5-year average death (D5) to 
the 5-year average world population (WP5), X is the year and a, b are constants. 
Null hypothesis (H0) : b=0 (i.e., there is no X-trend for Y), Alternative hypothesis (H1): b≠0 (i.e., 
there is a positive or negative trend) 
Call: 
glm.nb(formula = D5 ~ offset(log(WP5)) + Year, init.theta = 1.080786527,  
    link = log) 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-1.4989  -0.9453  -0.8160   0.2731   1.5151   
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -7.319338  26.253194  -0.279    0.780 
Year        -0.002508   0.013176  -0.190    0.849 
(Dispersion parameter for Negative Binomial(1.0808) family taken to be 1) 
    Null deviance: 45.825  on 39  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 45.766  on 38  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 892.79 
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 1 
              Theta:  1.081  
          Std. Err.:  0.214  
 2 x log-likelihood:  -886.792 
 
Since p-value is not significant here, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, meaning that there is 
no significant evidence that shows an increase or decrease in the 5-year earthquake disaster 
fatality rate. 
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Linear Regression for Trend of Resistance 
 Hypothesis testing: Assuming Y=a+bX, where Y is the resistance value of each year, X is the 
year and a, b are constants. 
Null hypothesis (H0) : b=0 (i.e., there is no X-trend for Y), Alternative hypothesis (H1): b≠0 (i.e., 
there is a positive or negative trend) 
Call: 
lm(formula = LogRes ~ Year) 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
-1.61018 -0.46063  0.00407  0.55136  0.97728  
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -4.520133  19.820132  -0.228    0.821 
Year         0.004998   0.009950   0.502    0.619 
Residual standard error: 0.6592 on 30 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.008339,   Adjusted R-squared: -0.02472  
F-statistic: 0.2523 on 1 and 30 DF,  p-value: 0.6191 
 
Since p-value is not significant here, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, meaning that there is 
no significant evidence that shows an increase or decrease in the trend of the resistance of 
earthquake disasters over years.  
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Chapter 6 Risk and reliability in a natural disaster system 
6.1  Introduction 
Natural hazard is a natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other 
health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, 
or environmental damage (UNISDR, 2009). Natural hazards become natural disasters when they 
severely and adversely affect human life/environments. Natural disasters resulting from the 
occurrence of natural hazard processes such as hurricanes, earthquakes and landslides have had 
devastating effects on human life (Degg (1992); Du et al. (2009); GAR (2011)). Here, we define a 
“Natural Disaster System” as a system in which human life, environment or belongings are 
affected by a natural disaster due to the interaction between the natural disasters and the affected 
societies’ resistance. The diverse effect of this interaction is considered to be fatalities more than a 
certain threshold (here, 1,000 fatalities). This is a serious disruption of the functioning of a 
society, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own 
resources (UNISDR, 2009). 
In this study we have three main objectives: 1) review the conceptual framework of risk 
(specially societal risk) assessment methods for application to natural disasters, 2) compare 
engineering risk assessment criteria and acceptable levels of engineering risk with natural 
disasters behavior and occurrence, and 3) propose a modification to reliability assessment for 
natural disasters as a complement to other societal risk assessment measures.  
In general, two view points are associated with risk: individual risk (IR) and societal risk (SR). 
According to the Center for Chemical Process Safety, IR expresses the risk to an individual in the 
potential effect zone of an incident or set of incidents and SR measures the potential for impacts to 
a group of people located in the effect zone of an incident or set of incidents (CCPS, 2009). Here 
we consider societal risk, since frequently in the context of natural disasters, the effects are 
extensive in scale and multiple deaths occur. Societal risk measures are commonly illustrated in a 
graphical representation, Frequency-Number, FN-curve (CCPS, 2009).  
We review the use of FN-curve, where F is the cumulative frequency of all events leading to 
N or more consequences which in our case is fatalities (e.g., used in dam or slope failure 
assessment in Hong Kong (1994). FN-curves are typically plotted on a log-log scale since the 
frequency and number of fatalities often range over several orders of magnitude (CCPS, 2009). 
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FN-curves are then compared to Pf−N curves (a probability-consequence curve on a log-log plot) 
(Baecher and Christian, 2003), where Pf is the annual probability of failure and N is either the 
number of fatalities or amount of financial loss (e.g., used in the Usoi dam risk assessment, Juang 
et al. (2011), pg.101). As stated above we focus on life loss.  
Approaches to societal risk assessment can be complemented by the concept of reliability 
which is extensively used in the characterization of engineering systems such as factories, power-
plants and dams (e.g. reliability in dams and hydraulic structures (Wunderlich, 2005). Reliability 
is the ability of a system or a component to perform its required functions under stated conditions 
for a specified period of time (Andrews and Moss, 2002). Thus, the value of reliability determines 
how effective the system is under any defined condition. A system is fully reliable if its reliability 
value is 1 and it is totally unreliable if its reliability is 0 (Andrews and Moss, 2002). In the context 
of natural disasters, we define a reliable system to be a natural disaster system with fatalities less 
than 1,000. Pisarenko and Rodkin (2014) utilize a statistical method to estimate the threshold of a 
set of disaster data based on the Limit Theorem of the Extreme Value Theory (EVT). In this 
approach, a threshold that is high enough that the data will tend to Generalized Pareto Distribution 
(GPD) is picked based on the minimum Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between the GPD fit and 
the real data. In Appendix IV using NGDC significant earthquake database 
(http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1) for the period of 1950-2013 
with criteria of minimum 1 fatality due to earthquakes, we applied the Pisarenko and Rodkin 
(2014) approach (summarized in appendix IV) to investigate the best statistical threshold for risk 
assessment of earthquake disasters. Although the smallest kolmogorov-smirnov distance between 
the GPD fit and the real values of the data are for 10 and 3,000 fatalities, we pick 1,000 fatalities 
as our threshold since the highest 0.95% quantile value in 10 years occurs at 1,000 threshold after 
the 0.95% quantile of 10-fatalities threshold which is almost infinity. 
In other words, we consider a natural disaster system as a system in which failure results in 
more than 1,000 fatalities. 1,000 fatalities due to a natural disaster event is interpreted as a reliable 
system and in the case of fatalities, the reliability decreases as the number of fatalities increases. 
Below, we explore the use of the reliability concept as a complement to conventional risk 
assessment methods for natural hazards based on the probability distribution of fatalities 
associated with natural hazard systems. 
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6.2  Conceptual model of natural disaster risk 
Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives (Aven, 2011a) and includes two main components: 
1) in-determination (probability of events) and 2) consequences (damages or deaths) (Porske, 
2008). The conceptual definition of risk is conventionally stated, Risk=Hazard×Consequences 
(CCPS (2009), pg. 3). Here Hazard is a replacement word for “likelihood” and it expresses the 
frequency (or probability) of an incident occurrence (CCPS, 2009). Consequences are defined as 
harmful consequences or expected losses (in our case deaths) resulting from interactions between 
natural disasters and vulnerable conditions associated with human activity (UNISDR, 2009).  
A further definition of risk, i.e., Risk=Hazard×Vulnerability(×Exposure) (e.g. Birkmann, 
2006), consequences defined by the product of two parameters, Vulnerability and Exposure, 
defined respectively as the effect of uncertainty on the results at the occurrence of a disaster event, 
and the presence of an object subject to an event or risk source (Aven, 2011a).  
In the context of natural disaster, we introduce a new parameter, Resistance, the inverse of which 
is a replacement for Vulnerability in the risk equation as follows, 
Risk=Hazard×(1/Resistance)×Exposure. Resistance defines the societal resilience (risk-absorption 
level of a system) (Aven (2011b), pg. 12) of a society to the occurrence of a natural disaster. In 
other words, a resistant society can withstand or tolerate even surprises. With this redefinition, we 
consider a natural disaster system as posing potential societal harm to a population, harm that can 
be resisted by human effort (engineering, rescues, warning, mitigation, preparedness). The value 
of 1/Resistance depends on a number of factors, including the financial capability of an affected 
region for adopting and development of technology for damage prevention. In this study, we 
consider data from historical disasters and we aim to analyze the consequences of natural disasters 
based on FN-curves.  
6.3  FN-curves and risk assessment  
FN-curves are introduced in Chapter 1. Here I briefly summarized some of their characteristics. 
FN-curves are log-log plots with F, the cumulative annual frequency of N or more consequences 
versus the value of these consequences. The visual characteristics of the FN-plot is a line that 
starts on a certain intercept (on y-axis) and possesses an inclination with a certain slope. The 
history of FN-curves goes back to the evaluation of nuclear power plant operations in the 1960s 
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(Farmer, 1967). As nuclear power plants and chemical-processing factories became important for 
human safety, researchers (e.g., Farmer, 1967, and Beattie, 1967) began to suggest acceptable risk 
criteria for these activities. FN-curves are also used for comparative risk assessment of various 
hazards (e.g., Gunthal et al. (2006)). Therefore, FN-curves are used for two main purposes: 1) 
analysis of real data for risk assessment (e.g., flood risk assessment, Jonkman (2007)) and 2) 
development of acceptable risk criteria (e.g., Skjong and Eknes (2002); Debesse (2007)).  
The visual realization of the first approach indicates a line that connects a set of points and can 
be fitted to a straight line with an intercept and a slope associated with the data. The second 
approach, on the other hand, is originally generated based on an (power-law) equation containing 
an (imposed) intercept and a (imposed) slope that can create a line on a log-log plot to be used for 
engineering practice (e.g., Trbojevic (2005); Ale (2005)).  
As introduced in previous sections, we associated the value of 1/Resistance with the slope of 
the FN-curves. Slopes vary due to the relation between frequency and magnitude of losses 
(fatalities). As the slope becomes steeper, the frequency of large fatality events becomes less 
frequent, which means that in general, societal resistance to the considered disaster decreases. 
Slopes of FN-curves of real data can be <1 (i.e., high fatalities are more frequent), =1 (i.e., equal 
frequency of all fatalities) or >1 (i.e., high fatalities are less frequent) depending on the risk 
proneness, neutrality or aversion of the region. We borrow the concepts of proneness, neutrality or 
aversion from the acceptable risk criteria used in the industrial practice (Slovic et al., 1984). We 
translate the slope of <1 (for the real data; not imposed criteria) as an indicator of low-resistance 
circumstances, and the slopes of >1, as an indicator of high-resistance circumstances. 
In some countries where FN-curves are used for societal risk assessment, the acceptable levels 
of risk are determined based on the intercepts and the slopes that are justified by judgments of the 
authorities. Details of this method can be found in several studies by Vrijling and van Gelder 
(1997); Ball and Floyd (1998); Skjong and Eknes (2002); Jonkman et al. (2003); Trbojevic 
(2005).  
The problem of this practice is that these criteria are developed for industrial activities and are 
used to define acceptable risk criteria for natural hazards. This is despite the fact that natural 
events have fewer controllable factors, i.e., natural procedures are mainly dominant in nature and 
mostly not controllable. To illustrate the problem, Fig. 6.1 shows the difference between the 
acceptable societal risk criteria of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (as examples of the 
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European countries) and the FN-curves of the European countries’ natural disasters real data. In 
Fig. 6.1, we use the EM-DAT database to gather the data on fatalities due to natural disasters 
(Note: due to the lack of data on over 1,000-fatality events, we use over 1-fatality events) between 
1950 and 2012 in 32 European countries (shown by blue dots). Table 6.1 shows the list of 
European countries and number of fatalities due to each natural disaster. First important message 
from Fig. 6.1 is that the natural disaster data reveals an average slope of -0.5 which is less than 1 
(risk prone; low resistance). Second, comparing the European countries’ data to the acceptable 
risk criteria defined by the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive, HSE (2001) R2P2 
(Reducing Risk, Protecting People, which limits 50 or more fatalities with a frequency of 1 in 
5000 per annum and imposes a slope of -1, risk neutral) criterion shown by a red dot; As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) criteria (HSE, 1989) that limits the minimum and maximum 
frequencies of fatalities with two lines of slope -1 (risk neutral) shown by black lines; and the 
Netherlands (with slopes of -2, risk averse) (Jonkman et al. (2003); Ale (2005); Trbojevic (2005)) 
shown by a purple line on Fig. 6.1, suggests that for 1,000 fatalities, the European countries’ 
natural disaster frequency is about 3, 4 and 7 times greater than the UK, the ALARP and the 
Netherlands criteria, respectively. Thus, these criteria are far too conservative to be used for 
natural disaster risk assessment.   
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Figure 6.1: FN-curve of fatality (greater than 1) caused by natural hazards (earthquakes, landslides, volcanic 
activities, floods, wind storms, wild fires, extreme temperatures, drought and epidemics) in 32 European countries 
(thick blue lines) with respect to acceptable risk criteria in some of them. Red dot is the Health and Safety Executive 
criterion (HSE-2001) plotted on the red line with slope of -1 (Trbojevic-2005) and the purple line is the Netherlands 
upper criteria (Jonkman-et.al-2003; Trbojevic-2005; Ale-2005). Thin black lines are based on the ALARP criteria 
(HSE1989). The European fatality data is obtained from EM_DAT database. 
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Table 6.1: List of European countries and fatalities due to natural hazards (1950-2012), source: EM_DAT. 
 
6.4  Comparison of Pf−N curves and FN-curves 
In engineering practice, the Pf-N curve involves a log-log plot of annual probability of failure, Pf, 
versus the value of consequences, the probability-consequence curve) (Baecher and Christian, 
2003). In these curves, Pf is not a function of consequences but it is the probability of failure of a 
system (based on the history of the malfunctioning of the concerned system). In contrast, FN-
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curves are generated based on the annual frequency of exceedance of the consequences of a 
failure. Fig. 6.2 compares both types of plots.  
Fig. 6.2a illustrates the annual probability of failure of various technological systems versus 
the consequences of their failure (Baecher (1982); Baecher and Christian (2003)). The annual 
probability of failure of the systems (y-axis of the graph) are calculated based on the history of the 
failures of a system (e.g., annual probability of oil spill, Baecher and Christian (2003), pg. 550). 
The consequences of these failures (x-axis) are either in monetary cost, lives lost, or both (Baecher 
and Christian (2003), pg. 553). The “marginally accepted” line on Fig. 6.2a imposes the 
acceptable level of risk line on engineering activities to demarcate safe practices from ones with 
unacceptable levels of risk (Baecher, 1982). However, on Fig. 6.2b, we have the acceptable 
societal risk criteria from risk assessment criteria for Hong Kong (1994), which are based on the 
annual frequency of N or more fatalities versus the number of fatalities to be imposed for natural 
and technological risk assessment (such as dam or slope failure) in Hong Kong (1994) and for 
landslide risk assessment by Fell et al. (2005). There are distinctive differences between the bases 
of these two graphs (such as different methods of calculation for Pf, based on failure rate of a 
system, and F, based on the frequency of exceedance of consequences), despite their being 
assumed to be interchangeable in some literature, including Christian (2004).  
In order to be able to compare the two plots on Fig. 6.2, the same units are needed for the y-
axis on both graphs, which means we need to convert the frequency of exceedance on the FN-
curve (Fig. 6.2b) to the annual probability of failure (Fig. 6.2a). Since the concept of failure 
probability in Fig. 6.2a is based on the failure rate of a system (and failure here is defined in terms 
of life loss due to natural disasters) we can convert the frequency of exceedance of fatalities (Fig. 
6.2b) to the annual probability of fatality due to failure of a system (Fig. 6.2a). Thus, we divide 
the annual frequency of events with more than 1000 of fatalities by the frequency of any (fatal and 
nonfatal) event of magnitude M≥5.5. In this way, the number of fatal events is normalized by the 
total number of events of similar magnitude. In the next section, we illustrate this method using 
life loss data from earthquake disasters. 
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Chapter 1                                    (b) 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Pf-N (a, reproduced from Baecher (1982); Baecher and Christian (2003)) and FN (b, 
reproduced from Hong-Kong, 1994) curves. The Pf-N curve includes the approximate probability of failure of man-
caused events versus both financial and life loss. The FN−curve shows the Acceptable, As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable and Unacceptable levels of risk in terms of fatalities (Hong-Kong, 1994). 
6.5  Analysis of life loss in earthquake disasters 
We use life loss data from earthquake disasters to compare the engineering Pf-N curve with the Pf-
N of earthquake disasters. Earthquake disasters are defined here as earthquake events that cause 
more than 1,000 fatalities during the period 1950-2012; the earthquake disaster database was 
initially collected from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) table of earthquakes with 
more than 1,000 fatalities (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/ 
epic/epic_global.php, 1000). These data have been complemented by data from Utsu’s database 
(2002). The list of these disasters has also been cross-checked with the data of the National 
Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) (http://ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1, 
2010). Our database consists of 75 earthquake disasters that occurred between 1950 and 2012 (62 
years). We assume that 1,000 fatalities represent the failure of an earthquake disaster system due 
to lack of resistance.  
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Fig. 6.3 shows the FN-curve for the earthquake disasters in our database. The acceptable risk 
criterion proposed by the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2001), R2P2, 
which is 50 fatalities with a frequency of 1 in 5,000 for the United Kingdom (UK), is estimated 
for the global population (5,566 fatalities based on 6.2×107 UK population and 6.9×109 population 
of the world) with frequency of 1 in 500,000 (based on F=0.01×(N)-1, which is the acceptable line 
for the UK on the FN-curve based on the R2P2 point, red line on Fig. 6.3). We put this point, 
R2P2, which is the HSE’s acceptable criterion for engineering operations as a reference point 
(from Fig. 6.1, R2P2 is on the upper limit of all acceptable lines) to show that the earthquake 
disaster data is 5 orders of magnitude above the acceptable level of risk. 
To construct a probability-consequence curve, the first step is to find the probability of failure 
of an earthquake disaster system. Probability of failure here is defined as the probability of 
exceeding 1,000 fatalities when earthquakes of magnitude greater than 5.5 occurs. First, we need 
to find the probability of failure of the earthquake disaster system, number of events with ≥1000 
fatalities normalized by the total number of earthquakes worldwide with magnitude 5.5 and 
greater in the year of the events. We used ANSS earthquake catalogue 
(http://www.ncedc.org/anss/catalog-search.html) to gather the data for years between 1950 to 
2013. The selection criteria for start time and date of the data was, start: 1950/01/01,00:00:00, 
end: 2013/01/01,00:00:00. Since the recorded number of earthquakes in ANSS between 1950 and 
1963 is 10 times less than the average number of recorded earthquakes in the following years, 
assuming the same distribution function for the number of events per year, we estimated and 
simulated the number of earthquakes (of magnitude 5.5 and greater) before this time (1950-1973), 
based on the mean and standard deviation of the following years27.   
Fig. 6.4 shows the cumulative annual probability of failure of earthquake disasters (Pf) versus 
the number of fatalities due to earthquake disasters during the period 1950-2012. The marginally 
accepted line on Fig. 6.2a (from Baecher (1982)) is reproduced on Fig. 6.4 (blue line) to compare 
the cumulative Pf-N curve of earthquake disasters and the acceptable level of risk on the Pf-N 
curve of the industrial events. As shown, the difference between the overall probability of system 
failure in the earthquake disaster system (the black line) and the blue line is still more than 2 
                                                
27 The average number of events (M≥5.5) from 1973-2011 is 392 events per year and the standard deviation is 
36.38. The number of events for 1950-1973 are randomly generated based on the Normal Distribution with these 
two parameters (mean and standard deviation). 
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orders of magnitude. Comparing the difference between the R2P2 criteria and the earthquake 
disaster data on Fig. 6.3 (around 5 orders of magnitude) with the 2 orders of magnitude difference 
on Fig. 6.4, we can conclude that the cumulative Pf-N curve shows a more compatible risk for 
earthquake disasters based on engineering risk acceptability. 
In general, to decrease the probability of failure of earthquake disaster systems, according to 
Fig. 6.4, the frequency of events with more than 1000 fatalities has to be decreased. Furthermore, 
to decrease the probability of failure of large events, the slope of the curve has to be increased 
(>1, risk averse) which means increasing resistance of the system and decreasing the frequency of 
large events. In section 6.6, we propose reliability assessment as a new measure for societal risk 
assessment of natural disasters.  
 
Figure 6.3: FN-curve of fatalities in earthquake disasters (N≥1000) black circles with fitted line of F(N)=1.76×N-0.56. 
Note location of the Reducing Risk, Protecting People (R2P2) criterion (red dot) by Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE-2001) on the slope of -1 (red line), which is estimated for the current population of the world (~7 billion). 
Sumatra, 2004, Haiti, 2010 and China, 1976 are labeled as the three most fatal earthquake disasters in the period 
1950-2012.  
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Figure 6.4: Cumulative Pf-N -curve of earthquake disasters (1950-2012), black dots, in comparison with the 
“Marginally Accepted” line on Fig. 6.2 from Baecher1982 (blue). The black line shows the trend of the annual 
probability of system failure in the earthquake disaster system (Pf= 0.29 N-0.34, R2=0.96 
6.6  Reliability of a natural disaster system 
In the previous section, we compared the acceptable levels of risk according to the industrial-
based methodologies and showed that on FN-curves, the risk of earthquake disasters systems is far 
above acceptable (Fig. 6.3). Using Pf instead of FN curve (dividing the annual frequency of 
exceedance of 1000 fatalities by the total number of earthquakes of magnitude 5.5 and greater at 
each year), we produced the annual probability of failure of earthquake disaster systems, 
decreases the difference between the marginally acceptable risk for man-caused events and the 
probability of failure of earthquake disaster systems (Fig. 6.4). This suggests that, the other risk 
assessment aspects in engineering related to probability of failure, such as reliability can be 
applied to the earthquake disaster system. Reliability is defined as the probability of success (or 
survival) (Wunderlich (2005), pg. 386). To evaluate the reliability of an earthquake disaster 
system, we define a reliability function. Here, we define a reliable earthquake disaster system as a 
system with no failure (fatalities greater than 1,000).  
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In order to estimate the reliability of earthquake disaster systems, first, we analyze the statistics of 
yearly earthquakes, disasters and consequences. Statistics of yearly number of earthquakes with 
magnitude 5.5 and greater shows that the number of recorded earthquakes has been stabilized at 
393 between 1950 and 1991, a sharp increase between 1991 and 1996, and an increased trend 
since 1998 (Fig. 6.5). The significant increase of the number of earthquakes with magnitude 
M≥5.5 can be because of two reasons: 1) the threshold of fatalities for disasters as 1,000 fatalities 
might need to vary from years to years, or 2) the advancement of instruments for detecting the 
earthquakes. 
Considering 1000 fatalities and greater as failure of earthquake disaster systems, the statistics 
of the frequency of the percentage of failure (Fig. 6.6) shows that the average percentage of 
failure is 0.003 per year28 and the maximum percentage of failure is less than 0.015 per year. The 
percentage of failure is less than 0.006 in more than 90% of years, i.e., in most years the ratio of 
failure to the total number of events is less than 0.006.  
 
Figure 6.5: Yearly trend of earthquakes with magnitude 5.5 and greater occurrence (1950-2012).  
                                                
28 The average of 0.0027 is rounded to 0.003. 
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Figure 6.6: Frequency (in years under consideration) of the percentage of failure (number of earthquakes with more 
than 1000 fatalities/ number of earthquakes with magnitude 5.5 and greater).  
The annual probability of failure can be modeled as a discrete random variable using the statistics 
of failure frequency. We first assume that each event with more than 1,000 fatalities (considered 
as failure here) represents an independent event in time and space, therefore, we could use a 
negative binomial distribution for the yearly failure of the system. This is similar to the analysis of 
the annual probability of levee failures in the Bay Delta done by Moss and Eller (2007). Woo 
(1999) (pg. 87) also states that negative binomial distribution has been used for describing loss 
distributions, epidemic spreading and contagious processes. Since all of these events’ losses are 
categorized as discrete failures, the binomial distribution also can be used for our model. If F has 
a negative binomial distribution, Eq. 6.1 (Woo (1999), pg. 87) shows the general formula of the 
distribution: 
 Pr(F=k) = ( k+x−1k−1 )p
k(1−p)x (6.1) 
Here, we consider the first event with more than 1000 fatalities in each year as the first failure in 
the row, therefore, the parameter k and consequently x are 1 (which is also equivalent to geometric 
distribution). We estimated the p parameter (overall probability of failure over 62 years of 
earthquake disaster data) as 0.00277 (same as black line on Fig. 6.4). Using the reliability function 
of the system defined as the probability of survival of the system, R(t), over t times operation, Eq. 
6.2 (Andrews and Moss, 2002), 
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 R(t) =1 −F(t) (6.2) 
where F(t) is the cumulative annual failure probability distribution function (here, negative 
binomial), we could calculate the reliability of the earthquake disaster system (using parameter p) 
as a function of the number of earthquakes to occur till an earthquake kill more than 1,000 people. 
The reliability of the system at the current age is the probability that an earthquake will not kill 
1,000 fatalities or greater till the end of the year given no deadly earthquake occurred so far. 
The reliability of earthquake disaster system at the beginning of each year (at time 0 of each 
mission) is calculated based on the number of earthquakes (M≥5.5) at each year. The trend of the 
yearly reliability of earthquake disaster system illustrated in Fig. 6.5 shows an average of 0.3 
which suggests unreliability of the system and a significant decreasing trend by factor of -0.007 
per year (95% confidence interval: (-0.098, -0.005); p-value< 0.001). In order to increase the 
reliability of the system and to reduce the chance of deadly earthquakes, we need to reduce the 
probability of deadly earthquakes by increasing resistance of societies.  
 
Figure 6.7: Yearly trend of reliability (1950-2012) at the beginning of each year based on overall failure rate of the 
system.  
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6.7  Summary and Discussion 
In this paper, natural disasters are considered as systems that can cause harm to human life or 
environments. We compared natural disaster systems with industrial systems. As demonstrated in 
Fig. 6.1, the FN- criteria of two European countries appear far too conservative for natural disaster 
risk assessment. Considering the fact that the annual frequency of fatalities due to natural disaster 
events has been the basis of developing these criteria on FN-curves, it is not reasonable to use the 
same criteria for natural disaster risk assessment. 
To reduce the risk of natural hazards, the only controllable parameters in the risk equation, 
Risk=Hazard×(1/Resistance)×Exposure, are Exposure and Resistance. In terms of Exposure, the 
controls can be applied in the form of mitigation. On the other hand, societal Resistance of the 
region, which is defined as the societal resilience of a society to the occurrence of a natural 
disaster, can be improved by technology, awareness and preparedness.  
We also compared the Pf-N curve of earthquake disaster systems (N≥1000) to the acceptable 
level of risk in industry (marginally accepted line) in Fig. 6.4. We show that although the 
difference between the marginally accepted line and the annual probability of failure of global 
earthquake disasters is much smaller than on FN-curves, the earthquake disaster system is still not 
acceptable. Moreover, there is no significant correlation between the number of fatalities and the 
Pf. This is contrary to the assumption that is considered in industry. 
Furthermore, we suggested a complementary method for global risk assessment of natural 
disasters. This method proposes that natural disasters are systems whose reliability can be 
analyzed similar to industrial set-ups. The essential component of this method is the record of 
failures of the system. We used the cumulative annual failure probability distribution function to 
estimate the reliability of the earthquake disaster system as a function of the number of 
earthquakes to occur till an earthquake kill more than 1,000 people. Our yearly trend of reliability 
(calculated at beginning of each year or at the 0 time of each mission) of earthquake disaster 
system illustrated in Fig. 6.5 is decreasing and shows an average of 0.3 which is a very unreliable 
system. Global reliability assessment can be a quantitative measure for natural hazard risk 
assessment as a complement to other societal risk measures.  
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In Chapter 5 of this thesis, we have shown that there is no evidence that the global societal 
resistance of earthquake disasters has been increasing or decreasing over the last 40 years. The 
decreasing trend of reliability in the earthquake disaster system suggests that the advancements in 
technologies for reducing consequences of earthquake disasters could only keep up with their pace 
of killing. However, since the ratio of the number of fatalities to the number of exposed 
population is also increasing or decreasing over this period, the main killing factor in the equation 
would be the number of exposed population. Therefore, either the pace of the increase in 
population needs to become slower, or more improvements in the technologies are required for 
staying ahead of the pace of population increase, in order to improve the reliability of the system. 
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Appendix IV (Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) fit to earthquake fatalities) 
Methodology (based on Pisarenko and Rodkin, 2014): 
Using Extreme Value Theory (EVT), and Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD), Pisarenko and 
Rodkin (2014) illustrated how to estimate the probability of exceeding a certain threshold given 
the parameters of a GPD fit to a set of data of damages or losses of disasters whose distribution 
can be described by power-like laws with a heavy tail. 
They also, based on some examples of natural hazards, suggest that the maximum possible (or 
observed) event is not a realistic estimation of loss for risk assessment, due to the instability of 
the Mmax parameter which is a parameter used frequently in seismic risk assessment. Instead, the 
high level (e.g., 95%) q-value quantile of the GPD in the next τ years is a better estimation of 
risk since quantiles are more stable, robust characteristics. 
Distributions of many natural processes, such as earthquake energy, and casualties from natural 
disasters, are often modeled by power-like laws, such as the Pareto distribution. The Pareto 
distribution function is as follows (Eq. 1.1 of Pisarenko and Rodkin, 2014): ! ! = 1− (!!)! , ! ≥ ℎ      (A.IX.1) 
where β is the exponent of the distribution. According to Pisarenko and Rodkin (2014), if β≤1, 
then the mathematical expectation of the corresponding random variable is infinite. Therefore, 
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution will be highly instable. These distributions 
are often called heavy tailed distributions. Losses of natural disasters follow these distributions. 
 
If a sample is characterized by the Pareto distribution with index β, the maximum observed event 
parameter, M(n)max=max(x1,….,xn), grows with the size of the sample as n1/β. Pisarenko and 
Rodkin (2014) emphasize that: 
“this tendency of a non-linear growth of M(n)max with the sample size n or, equivalently, with the 
observation time span τ can be incorrectly interpreted as an evidence of a non-stationarity in 
time (Pisarenko and Rodkin, 2010). In many cases, the widespread belief that the rate of losses 
from natural disasters has a clear tendency of increasing with time is precisely connected with 
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the misinterpretation of this apparent non stationarity effect” (pg. 4, Pisarenko and Rodkin, 
2014). 
Pisarenko and Rodkin (2014) summarized some of the treatments of heavy-tailed data as: 
1) Using logarithms of original values. Switching to logarithms (which can be done only 
when the original numerical values are positive) ensures almost always that all the 
statistical moments exist, and hence the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit 
Theorem are applicable to the sums of logarithms. It should be remarked that if X  has the 
Pareto distribution, then log(X) has exactly exponential distribution.  
2) Using order statistics: sample median, sample quantiles, interquartile range, etc. The 
main statistical tool suggested by Pisarenko and Rodkin (2014) for description of 
distribution tail—the family of quantiles Qq(τ)—is a continuous analog of the sample 
ordered statistics. This explains its robustness and stability. 
Pisarenko and Rodskin (2014) model the sequence of disaster occurrences by Poisson point 
process. The effects of the disasters are different, such as fatalities and economic losses due to 
natural catastrophes, earthquake seismic moments and ground acceleration at a fixed point. 
These effects are called “marks” which are assigned to the occurrence times of the point Poisson 
process; marked point process. In our applications we shall model our catalog usually by a 
stationary Poisson process with intensity of λ events per year. The random number of events in 
stationary process for T years is a random Poisson variable with the mean λT.  
Pisarenko and Rodskin (2014) use the total sum of events, Σ! ≅ !". ! + !.!. (!")!/! , where ξ is 
some standard normal random variable, b is the expectation of a single event(>0), and σ is the 
standard deviation of a single event, to consider the ratio, R(T), of the total sum to the maximum 
event for T time period, !! ≅ !. log  (!"), where c is some constant, R T = !!!! ≅ !! . ( !!"# !! ). 
This ratio for heavy-tailed distributions will grow slower than for light-tailed distributions. This 
means that the total sum is determined in a large extent by the single maximum event in heavy-
tailed distributions. This result is important since in heavy-tailed distributions, the effect of large 
events is commonly downgraded due to their low frequency. However, their contribution, in long 
run is very effective, as this analogy shows. 
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In the statistics of natural hazards which are in the form of annual data, the conditional 
probability of x above h is: !"#! ! !, ! = 1− [1+ !! . ! − ℎ ]!!/! , ! ≥ ℎ  (A.IX.2) 
The distribution of X1>h (with probability of p with) which is distributed as GPD. Considering 
future maximum events, Mτ=max(X1,…,Xτ),  for x≥h, the distribution of X1 is (1-
p)+p.GPDh(x|ξ,s), and consequently, using FM(x)=q, the q-level quantile Qq(τ) of Mτ is as 
follows (eq. 2.44 in Pisarenko and Rodskin (2014)): 
 
!! ! = ℎ + !! !!!!!! !! − 1 , ! > (1− !)! (A.IX.3) 
 
where h is the threshold, s and ξ are parameters of GPD, p is the probability (p≅m/N, where m is 
the number of events over a certain threshold (h), and N is the number of sequential years), q is 
the quantile value, τ is the time in future, and Q is the quantile of GPD. 
Threshold of the data set can be picked based on the least kolmogrov-smirnov distance (KD) at 
which the GPD is the best fit to the data (Pisarenko and Rodskin, 2014). Pisarenko and Rodskin 
(2014) used earthquake fatalities in Japan to illustrate this method. They found the threshold of 
2-fatalities is a reasonable threshold of life-loss in their study. They also estimated that the 95% 
quantile of expected life-loss in 10 years is 460,000 fatalities which is a reasonable estimation for 
the risk assessment purposes. We would apply this method to the earthquake disasters between 
1950-2013 to estimate the best threshold for earthquake disasters. 
Earthquakes disasters (1950-2013): 
Here, we use NGDC significant earthquake database 
(http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1) for the period of 1950-2013 
with criteria of minimum 1 fatality in earthquakes (n=947), to first, find the minimum threshold 
of earthquake losses that the data is best fitted to GPD. Then, using Eq. A.IX.3, we find the 95% 
quantile of fatalities in 10 years using the parameters of the best GPD fit in R. Fig. A.1 shows 
that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance (KD) versus various thresholds (10, 100, 150, 300, 500, 
800, 1000, 1200, 1500, 1700, 2000, 2200, 2500, 2700, 3000, 3200, 3500, 3700, 4000, 5000). As 
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shown in Fig. A.1, the minimum KD after threshold of 1 is for 3,000 fatalities. However, since 
the other minimums of Fig. A.IX.1 include 300, 1,200, 2,000, and, 5000, and also we would like 
to minimize the threshold for life-loss risk assessment and every person’s life counts, we also 
compare the 95% estimated quantile of these thresholds to see which one of these thresholds lead 
into the highest expected loss in 10 years. 
 
Figure A.IX.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance versus thresholds of fatalities 
(10,100,150,300,500,800,1000,1200,1500,1700,2000,2200,2500,2700,3000,3200,3500,3700,4000,5000)  in the 947 
data of with fatalities greater than 1 (data source: NGDC). 
 
Fig. A.IX.2 illustrates the comparison between the 95% quantile values of GPD in 10 years for 
various thresholds. This shows that after threshold of 1, the highest 95% quantile is for 1,000 
fatalities. Therefore, we pick the threshold of 1,000 in our further risk assessment analysis and as 
the threshold of failure in a natural disaster system. 
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Figure A.IX.2 0.95% quantile value of GPD in 10 years considering thresholds thresholds of fatalities 
(10,100,150,300,500,800,1000,1200,1500,1700,2000,2200,2500,2700,3000,3200,3500,3700,4000,5000)  in the 947 
data of with fatalities greater than 1 (data source: NGDC) 
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Chapter 7 Synthesis 
7.1  Introduction 
This thesis is intended to provide a better understanding of effective parameters for the 
assessment of risk in natural disasters. Risk assessment strategies available in engineering 
are considered. In particular, the focus is on geological disasters, especially earthquakes. 
Possible quantified modifications to the current risk assessment methods and criteria are 
analyzed and applied for natural disaster risk assessment. Driving each chapter is the 
rationale that by better understanding the underlying concept of risk, statistical, spatial 
and temporal distribution of losses, and the available risk measures, we can improve the 
risk assessment strategies for natural hazards. To this end, the main conclusions from 
each chapter are summarized below. 
7.2  Review of FN-curves for natural hazard risk assessment 
Chapter 2 reviewed the background of FN-curves, their underlying concepts and 
mathematics, in literature. We show that FN-criteria are adequate, mathematically, and 
provide a useful basis for (comparative) risk assessment. However, to have a frame-
independent approach, normalization of FN-curves based on exposed population is a 
reasonable option. We used real natural hazard data on European countries as an example 
to compare risk of natural hazards with acceptable levels of risk in Europe. We used the 
population of certain countries to normalize the FN-curves and suggested that the 
normalized FN-curves can be more informative in terms of the preparedness of the 
underlying societies. We found that the available European acceptable levels of the risk 
are far too conservative for risk assessment of natural hazards. 
Furthermore, the slopes of FN-curves generated from real-data of natural hazards all are 
in the same range of around 0.5. This suggests that, first, natural hazards cause risk-prone 
situations (slope<1), and second, aside from their origins, a certain slope on their 
frequency-fatality graphs universally imposes the background effect of natural hazards. 
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7.3  Concept of Resistance and Haiti 2010 
Chapter 3 introduced the concept of resistance from two perspectives: 1) from 
modification of risk equation (Risk=Hazard×(1/Resistance)×Exp.Pop) and 2) from the 
slope of the FN-curves. By equating these two definitions, we derived the main resistance 
equation, R, which increases by the increase of the slope of the FN-curve. 
We defined two types of resistance, country-specific resistance, Rc, and event-specific 
resistance, Re, both derived from the main resistance equation, R. For the country-
specific resistance, we have to find the best fit to the FN-curve of the past events of the 
country. Furthermore, we need to estimate the probability of hazard, here probability of 
exceeding a certain magnitude. We compared the Rc of Iran, Japan, and Haiti which 
shoed that Haiti has the lowest resistance. 
For the event-specific resistance, we need to consider the daily death rate of the country 
at the time of the event. The probability of hazard at the location of the most important 
city of the affected region is also required; here probability of exceeding a certain peak 
ground acceleration. We compared the Re of Kobe (1995), and Bam (2003) with the Haiti 
(2010) which showed that Bam had the lowest resistance among the three events. The 
difference between Rc and Re and particularly Re<Rc shows that the studied event has 
been an anomaly to the country that occurred in. For the case of Haiti 2010, the 
difference is very small, especially when we consider the 65,000-fatalities scenario, 
instead of 230,000-fatalities. This suggests that, the event of Haiti 2010 was not an 
anomaly with respect to the country’s background and preparedness. 
In this chapter, we also used the equation of resistance to calculate the actual gridded 
resistance of the commune of Port au Prince after the 2010 Haiti earthquake as a case 
study for resistance calculation on a local level. We also estimated the total fatalities in 
the commune of Port au Prince based on the destruction maps and estimation of 1.5 
deaths/buildings destructed. We showed that the total of 230,000 fatalities is not a 
reasonable estimate for Haiti, since the range of fatalities that we estimated for the 
commune of Port au Prince, which is the most destructed commune at the occurrence of 
the 2010 earthquake, is between 26,778 and 65,851.  
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7.4  Magnitude and frequency of geological disasters 
Chapter 4 summarizes the magnitude-frequency relationships in all geological disasters, 
earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides and volcanic activities. We, first, introduced a unified 
scale for comparison of geological hazards based on the source energy of the events. We 
found that the total energy that volcanic eruptions that cause more than 1,000 fatalities 
(disasters) release is the highest among the other geological hazards. Furthermore, we 
calculated the energy-efficiency of geological hazards in causing disasters. Based on our 
data, we found that tsunamis have the highest energy-efficiency. 
To compare the risk that these hazards impose on human life with each other, we used 
FN-curves and showed that geological disasters are dominated by earthquake disasters. 
Furthermore, the slopes of FN-curves in geological disasters are all less than 1.0, which 
suggests that they are mainly controlled by large events.  
We also introduced a new parameter, called risk factor (RF) which is conducted based on 
the inverse of the slope of the FN-curves and the frequency of exceedance of 1,000 
fatalities of the geological disasters. RF of earthquake disasters is the highest; the next 
most risky geological disasters are tsunamis, volcanic activities and landslides, in 
descending order. 
Furthermore, we showed that frequency of events with more than 1000 fatalities has 
increased significantly by factor of 0.004 since 1600 while we could not find any 
significant proof that the total energy-release by geological disasters and the energy-
efficiency of the geological disasters have been decreasing or increasing during this 
period.  
7.5  Global societal earthquake resistance 
Chapter 6 is devoted to investigating the global trend of earthquake resistance since 1973. 
We developed a simple risk-based conceptual model. In order to develop this model, we 
carried out a survey of global earthquake events, and introduced the concept of “global 
societal earthquake resistance". In our proposed approach, there are three main 
determinants of global societal earthquake resistance: the hazard (overall energy release 
by earthquakes with M≥5.5 per year), the number of fatalities and the exposed 
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population. We statistically tested the temporal trend of all three components. 
Furthermore, we showed that, according to our data, the annual ratio of earthquake 
casualties to exposed populations did not increase or decrease during the relevant period. 
This is in contrast to the decreased total number of deaths per year per 1000 people 
(crude death rate)which has decreased during the same period of time. Although the 
energy release by earthquakes increased since 1973, the temporal trend of the societal 
resistance of earthquake disasters did not increase or decrease significantly. 
7.6  Risk and reliability in a natural disaster system 
In Chapter 7, we first compared the engineering Pf-N curves with the similar curve of 
earthquake disasters. We showed that there is no correlation between the number of 
fatalities and probability of failure in earthquake disaster system. We also suggested 
improvements in the risk assessment methodologies used for natural hazard systems by 
borrowing a relevant idea (reliability) from engineering studies. Reliability of a system is 
defined as the probability of survival of that system over a certain period of time. We 
examined the reliability of the world due to earthquake disasters over 1950-2012. We 
estimated the probability distribution function of failure of the system (negative 
binomial) to evaluate reliability as a function of earthquakes to occur till more than 1,000 
fatalities killed by earthquakes. The temporal trend of yearly reliability (at the beginning 
of each year) of the earthquake disaster system has been significantly decreasing since 
1950. The temporal trend shows an average of around 0.3, which is an unreliable system 
comparing to the reliability assessment criteria defined for industrial settings (0.9). 
7.7  Future Work 
In this thesis, we have illustrated a simple quantitative risk-based approach to natural 
hazards. We have shown that in the case of natural hazards, the response of societies to 
natural hazards can be summarized in the losses and resistance of the underlying society. 
In order to improve this method and to advance our ability to quantify risk, knowing 
detailed physical properties of each hazard is essential, and particularly, the effect of a 
specific hazard on a specified society (e.g., the effect of landslides (Fig. 7.1) in a village 
in Italy (Arattano et al., 2010)) and, the effect of human activity on the occurrence of a 
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specific hazard (e.g., the effect of deforestation (Fig. 7.2) on the occurrence of landslides 
in New Zealand  (Glade, 2003)) 
 
Figure 7.1: landslide occurred in Villar Pellice, near Turin, Piemonte Region, Italy on 29 May 2008 (photo: 
EPA/Tonino Di Marco )   
 
Figure 7.2: Deforestation in New Zealand (South Island- Tasman, Westcoast) (photo: Martin Wegmann)  
Furthermore, the secondary effects of natural hazards that have not been considered in 
risk assessment before need to be added to the risk calculations. For example, one of the 
known effects of a tsunami on a society other than fatalities is considered to be water 
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damage to properties. However, in the recent tsunami in Japan (2012), the secondary 
effect of the tsunami was the destruction of nuclear power plants and consequent nuclear 
contamination of water. These are unpredicted effects that need to be considered in future 
risk assessments. 
The effect of infrastructural characteristics of a society on a disaster is another 
component affecting risk that needs to be considered and quantified for risk assessment 
purposes. As Bilham (2010) said about the 2010 Haiti earthquake, “corruption kills”. For 
example, in the case of any huge future earthquake in Tehran, the secondary effects need 
to be analyzed since the infrastructure of the city is not well developed (Nateghi-A, 
2001).The risk of life loss would be very high since Tehran is the capital of Iran and 
consequently the heart-holding hospitals, businesses and the government; it is also 
located at the base of mountain foothills, which makes escaping for people almost 
impossible.  
One way to include more details in the risk calculations is using more accurate data 
for risk assessment. Dasymetric mapping method (based on land-cover data) that in a 
separate project I used for the spatial analysis of earthquake fatalities in the Middle East 
is an example illustrating the importance of this point. Further analysis on the controlling 
factors of risk is also essential.  
We hope that this thesis could brought about some of the major issues for the risk 
assessment of natural hazards helpful for further investigations and could connect science 
with policy in a new perspective. 
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